Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Graduate Program in International Studies Theses &
Dissertations

Graduate Program in International Studies

Winter 2014

Nuclear Security Complexes: An Alternative
Approach to Nuclear Nonproliferation
Beyza Unal
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Political Theory Commons
Recommended Citation
Unal, Beyza. "Nuclear Security Complexes: An Alternative Approach to Nuclear Nonproliferation" (2014). Doctor of Philosophy
(PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/r2er-m877
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/96

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

NUCLEAR SECURITY COMPLEXES: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
by
Beyza Unal
B.A. June 2007, Cankaya University, Turkey
M.A. July 2010, Bilkent University, Turkey

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment o f the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
December 2014

Approved by:

Regina Karp (Director)

Steve Yetiv (M im ber)

Peter Schulman (Member)

ABSTRACT
NUCLEAR SECURITY COMPLEXES AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Beyza Unal
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

Existing literature examines nuclear proliferation from a regional or a national
perspective but nuclear issues are inherently transnational. The literature also often
focuses on single-state policies for deterrence purposes. Following tailored (single-state)
policies, however, is too narrow because these policies are bilateral and based on national
interest; they do not include global concerns. In response to the literature, this dissertation
proposes to examine states grouped according to their state characteristics in terms of
threat existence, democracy level in the nuclear field, and membership in nuclear
organizations and compliance with major nuclear treaties. The focus here is to ask: “Does
regional security complex theory explain nuclear behavior?” To some extent it does.
Regional security complex theory groups states in relation to their geopolitical context.
This grouping method is essential for the model that I call nuclear nonproliferation
security complexes. Different than the former theory, I argue that nuclear issues are
inherently transnational, not regional, and states’ nuclear behavior is shaped by the
aforementioned state characteristics.
This model places states into seven different groups in terms o f their
characteristics. A triple Venn diagram helps to picture this conceptualization. The
first three groups— called material, liberal, and norms-based security complexes— are the
core parts o f the Venn diagram. Security complexes four through six lie on the

intersections between one, two, and three, with the seventh lying at the center. The state
characteristics o f Iran, Israel, Turkey and the United States are examined in order to
understand how the model functions. This dissertation finds that despite having common
Middle Eastern security concerns, Iran, Israel and Turkey follow different nuclear
policies and their relationship with the United States is a fundamental factor in their
nuclear decision-making. In conclusion, I suggest that the United States should
differentiate its national interest, which is more to follow nuclear nonproliferation
policies, from the global interest, which is to follow nuclear disarmament policies. From
this perspective, the United States should find equal ground for both policies to work in
conjunction with each other. This could lead to a more comprehensive nuclear approach
that incorporates and engages with all actors.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Both nuclear proliferation literature and various attempts to contextualize the new
world order suffer greatly from a lack o f theoretical perspective that supports alternative
policy-making. Existing policies are a result o f regional or national interest calculations
and do not help to create an enduring international nuclear regime at a global level
through multiple party engagements. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), in
theory, is an example o f how close we come to establish a universal treaty that’s Articles
are subject to both nuclear weapon states' and non-nuclear weapon states. In practice,
NPT lacks commitment and action by both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear
weapon states. This dissertation is positioned around this logic to understand and explain
nuclear behavior o f nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, through their
fundamental state characteristics.
The nuclear literature is heavily dominated by studies that rest on regional context
and studies that are too narrowly defined through single-state examination. These studies
disregard an alternative way, which is a non-territorial approach to nuclear
nonproliferation. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by proposing to group states
regardless o f their regions. The puzzle is nuclear issues are inherently transnational and
should not be reduced to a regional or national level. Regional and national policies at the

1 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty defines a nuclear weapon state as “one which has manufactured
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.” This
dissertation takes into account both de ju re (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United
States) and de fa c to (India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan) nuclear weapon states. See Article IX
in United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. March 5, 1970. Treaty on the NonProliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
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decision-making level will suffer from any general framework that could be established
in the long run.
The purpose o f this research is to suggest an alternative theoretical and policy
approach to nuclear nonproliferation in order to unfold existing nuclear problems. Some
states choose to proliferate while others do not and the reasons behind these different
policy choices are not necessarily the same. There is one common theme when states
attempt to legitimize their nuclear programs, which is the ongoing power disparity
between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. This disparity is an
enduring feature o f the modem world that is based on hierarchical structures and great
power dominance. One way to deal with this disparity is to strengthen nuclear
organizations’ decision-making to a level that objective policies are feasible.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND ARGUMENTS

With the aim o f moving theory closer to the policy realm, this dissertation
analyzes security complex theory for nuclear proliferation behavior. The main research
question is “Does security complex theory explain nuclear proliferation and
nonproliferation behavior?” To some extent it does. I argue that conventional security
complex theory provides the fundamental understanding, which is to group states;
however, it is filtered through geopolitical boundaries. I argue that nuclear issues, are
transnational in nature. I, therefore, propose to group states in terms o f their state
characteristics that shape their nuclear posture, without regional limitations. The main
reason for extracting geographic location out o f my analysis is because nuclear issues are
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transnational in nature; nuclear weapons, knowledge, and material cross boundaries. I do
not disregard regional calculations framing national interest; however, I go beyond this
thinking, to seek an alternative nuclear policy understanding. Grouping states in terms of
state characteristics that shape their nuclear posture creates awareness and generates
alternative policies that may unlock the current stalemate in the nuclear nonproliferation
and disarmament field.
A sub-argument that I follow, posits nuclear issues as part o f a security puzzle
rather than a pure political matter; thus, I argue that nuclear proliferation should be
securitized rather than politicized. To politicize an issue means that it becomes a tool for
policy-making that serves national interest and become an object o f domestic politics.
The United States, for instance, views Iranian nuclear proliferation as a matter of policy
because domestic organs, like Congress and the State Department, cannot converge on a
single policy position regarding Iran. An issue being securitized means it is a matter o f
security; above daily political dynamics; therefore, it should be handled through higher
(international organs); bypassing the daily politics.
After addressing the main characteristics o f the conventional security complex
theory and applying these characteristics to nuclear proliferation, I suggest amending the
theory, by grouping states with regards to their state characteristics (threat existence,
democratic nuclear policies, membership to nuclear organizations and compliance to
international treaties) rather than their geographical positioning. This argument is
followed through a theoretical undertaking, resulting in what I call ‘nuclear security
complexes.’
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RESEARCH THEORIES

The main theory o f this research is Barry Buzan and Ole W aever’s Regional
Security Complex Theory. This theory rests on constructivist framework with realist
regional dimensions. It is selected to understand and explain nuclear nonproliferation
behavior in the post-Cold War era. This dissertation aims to go beyond this conventional
theory by modeling a new approach to nuclear nonproliferation studies. This alternative
model— grouping states in terms o f state characteristics— rests primarily upon three
fundamental theories: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The selected variables for
identifying state characteristics also come from the theoretical literature. Realist scholars
indicate threat existence as the main variable for nuclear proliferation. Liberal scholars
posit the role o f domestic actors, scientific groups, and democratic nuclear policies in
nuclear decision-making; whereas constructivist scholars indicate the role o f nuclear
institutions and treaties to curb nuclear proliferation. These theories are the backbone of
this dissertation because they demonstrate the differences and nuances in nuclear policies
through a theoretical framework.
The idea to group states in terms o f their state characteristics emerge after reading
Alexander W endt’s Social Theory o f International Politics. Following a structural
approach, Wendt argues that not only national interest but also social interactions matter
in state-to-state relations. Wendt, then, establishes three types o f cultures that dwell under
anarchy: Hobbessian culture, Lockean culture and Kantian culture. All three cultures
exist at the same time, the author says. Nuclear security complexes are formed with the
inspiration from W endt’s work. Material security complex (realism), liberal security
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complex (liberalism) and Norms-based Security complex (constructivism) are all existing
structures in the world. Then, it is futile to explain a world through a single theoretical
lens.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

There are three main methodological designs used in this dissertation. First one is
the falsification method, designed by Karl Popper. By applying conventional security
complex theory to nuclear proliferation and suggesting that it does not hold for
transnational issues, the method rests on falsification o f theory. This dissertation uses the
method o f taxonomy, which is to classify or group states. Taxonomy is a method that has
been used in social sciences to understand and analyze phenomenon. Yet, it is generally
underestimated and not noticed in the nuclear field. Nuclear scholars make an implicit
classification in the literature, but have not used grouping as a method. This dissertation
aims to fill this gap because grouping is not only a method o f mapping but also a method
o f linking the dots in that mapping.

Taxonomy, in this dissertation, is relevant for

classifying states in terms o f state characteristics that shape their nuclear posture. Based
on this classification, a group-level-policy approach becomes viable to tackle
proliferation. Classifying states is also important to create awareness on nonbiased
nuclear policies at the international level.
This dissertation also uses case study methodology (examples) to understand how
the proposed theory works. These case studies (Iran, Israel, Turkey and the United States)
do not test nuclear security complex theory; rather they are the examples to demonstrate
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the ways in which the proposed theory functions. In other words, these cases are the
operationalization of the nuclear security complex theory. Throughout the case studies
chapter, I use primary data from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United
Nations Office o f Disarmament Affairs. Notably, the working group papers o f Islamic
Republic o f Iran , Israel, Turkey and the United States at the Preparatory Committee
Meetings in the Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
o f Nuclear Weapons, shed light on the nuclear posture of these states. I have used several
governmental documents while examining Turkey and the United States. Lastly, while
examining the state characteristics and nuclear posture o f Israel, my research is based on
unclassified United States’ documents.

CONTEXT

The word ‘complex’ originates from the Latin word complexus and it first
appeared in English in the 17th century. When used as a noun, complectere means to
embrace or to comprise. In the modem dictionary, a complex is “a group or system of
different things that are linked in a close or complicated way.” A nuclear security
complex then is a group o f states that share similar nuclear posture. To analyze states’
nuclear posture, I examined their state characteristics through an examination o f the
nuclear literature review. I argued that states facing threat existence have nuclear
ambiguity as state policy. States that base their nuclear dialogues on a ground of

2 Unless stated otherwise, I refer to Islamic Republic o f Iran simply as Iran in this dissertation.
3 Oxford Dictionaries. Complex.
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democracy are likely to follow nuclear nonproliferation posture, if not proliferated
already. The nuclear weapon states in this group are also likely to follow nuclear non
proliferation policies. States that base their nuclear dialogues on international nuclear
organizations and internalized nuclear nonproliferation through domestic policy
structures are likely to follow nuclear disarmament posture. These three nuclear postures
are not in accord with each other at all times. As a result of clashing national interest,
there is not much change on nuclear undertakings in the 21st century.
1 suggest employing a common nuclear policy-security response at the
international level for states in the same nuclear security complex, with the aim of
eradicating biased third-party involvement for the case-by-case assessment and
addressing o f proliferation problems. More or less impartial nuclear nonproliferation
policies are possible at the international level4. These policies are likely to accelerate
dialogue among parties since favoritism will diminish and hierarchical power dimensions
in the nuclear arena will dissolve. The international policies might range from deterrence
policies to non-proliferation and disarmament.
Nuclear security complexes place states into seven different groups, which can be
helpfully conceptualized through a triple Venn diagram (see Figure 1 below). The first
three complexes, called material, liberal, and norm-based security complexes are the core
parts o f the Venn diagram. Security complexes four through six lie on the intersections
between one, two, and three, with the seventh lying at the center. The seventh nuclear
security complex has only the United States as its sole member. The United States is the

4 1 mean an international level engagement where all parties have equal saying on the matter.
United Nations Security Council for instance is an international organ, but the hierarchical
positioning o f the Security Council members over the members o f the General Assembly limits
this sort o f engagement that I am referring to here.
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main actor that has the ability to shape and influence other security complexes, projecting
its national interest in nuclear nonproliferation policies. In this regard, all security
complexes have distinguished characteristics/variables to explain nonproliferation. This
model suggests addressing alternative policies to each group o f states rather than to each
state per se.

Figure 1. Nuclear Security Complexes based on State Characteristics

Prim ary Intern atio n al System (Anarchy)
I Im part of anarchy differs
v 7 in sub-system s

M aterial
Security Complex

L iberal
Turkey

Security Complex

Israel

Iran
N orm s-based
Security Complex
Q uasi-hegem onic
Security Complex

Security complex theory renders an alternative policy-making context to unfold
the nuclear proliferation problems that exist in the 21st century. The key point o f this
alternative policy is an awareness o f similar nuclear postures and state characteristics.
After a careful analysis, North Korea and Israel are found to be the members o f the same,
material, security complex. This means, a common policy that is excused o f third-party
national interest, is projected by both North Korea and Israel. Alienating Israel and other
de facto nuclear weapon states from the proliferation dynamic complicates the nuclear
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posture of several other states; one o f which is Iran, as it officially claims equal nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament policies for all parties. Therefore, understanding the
similarities in the nuclear behavior o f states is also important when attempting to generate
an alternative policy making model.
The cognizance of states in different geographies having similar nuclear postures
brings about the question; how does the established nuclear regime tackle possible
nuclear proliferator states? I argue that the United States makes its ‘national interest’ a
synonym o f the ‘international interest’ in the 21st century, at least in the nuclear field. It is
the United States that shapes the international nuclear agenda. The United States’ Nuclear
Posture Review Report o f 2010, for instance, shows the on-going role o f strategic
deterrence and stability in the United States’ national security as well as significance of
nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Posture Review Report does not weigh nuclear
disarmament as equally as nuclear nonproliferation. In other words, it prioritizes noncompliance over nuclear abolishment.
The national interest based policies o f the United States jeopardizes the global
interest too. The United States government, for instance, blocked the last meeting o f the
Conference on Disarmament (CD), which was going to take place on March 25th 2013.
Erin Pelton, the Spokesperson at the United States Mission to the United Nations, stated
that the United States posture was a result o f Iran’s upcoming Presidency position at the
CD. Pelton stressed “countries that are under Chapter VII sanctions for weapons
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proliferation or massive human rights abuses should be barred from any formal or
ceremonial position in UN bodies.”5
There are no clear-cut differences between the interest o f the United States and
the interest o f the United Nations Office o f Disarmament Affairs when the United States
uses the international forum as leverage for its national interest. The nuclear treaties and
agreements are also synonym o f the United States’ national posture. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) nuclear posture, stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept,
shares common statements with the United States’ Nuclear Posture Review Report. The
problem at the moment is that the United States does not differentiate the international
will from its national interest. This, therefore, results with an international nuclear policy
that is driven by the United States interest in which neither the states following nuclear
disarmament policy nor the states following nuclear ambiguity policy are happy of. Some
o f the states that oppose the nuclear agenda driven by nuclear non-proliferation is not
only Iran, but also European states, like Norway and Sweden. It is noteworthy to see
these states with different state characteristics follow a similar nuclear policy, but with
different rational behind. North Korea and Iran use nuclear disarmament as leverage
against the nuclear weapon states; whereas, European states ask for nuclear disarmament
because o f their support to international nuclear regime that is based on nuclear
abolishment.
The United States is being challenged majorly in different settings, including in
the nuclear nonproliferation field. President Obama does not bring anything new to the
table to solve the issues in the Middle East or in Asia, for instance. To have a
5 Pelton, Erin. May 13, 2013. Statement by Erin Pelton on Iran's Rotation as President o f the
Conference on Disarmament, edited by United States Mission to the United Nations. New York,
NY.
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comprehensive solution though, the United States should differentiate its national interest
from the international interest. The United States can share its power in the nuclear issues
in order to enable other parties to involve in nuclear-policy making. The Joint Action
Plan, signed with Iran on November 24 ,2013, for instance, was a result o f a successful
European initiative through the representation o f the European Union High
Representative Catherine Ashton. When Bashar Al-Asad used chemical weapons against
the Syrian population, it was Russia that came up with the rules of mediation, which was
to convince Syria to renounce its chemical stockpile and become a member o f the
Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. In return the Western powers agreed not to
initiate further military action against the Syrian regime. One should also note that the
British Parliament had already chosen not to have military involvement in Syria, after the
government was defeated in a parliamentary vote. These examples show that the United
States is being challenged at home and abroad, on different levels, and this challenge
brings about alternative and new solutions to the problems that persist in the nuclear
nonproliferation field that are beyond the scope o f national interest.

DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION

Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the conventional security complex theory by
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. Security complexes are clusters o f states whose national
securities are linked to each other. These complexes feed from local patterns where
security problems are deeply interconnected. Buzan and Waever call this security
interdependence. According to Buzan and Waever, regional patterns are responsible for

defining security complexes. Geographical proximity, the number o f states, mutual
exclusiveness, mutual recognition o f membership, and patterns in relations are the main
characteristics o f a security complex. A security complex uses securitization as the main
political tool to increase awareness in areas of low politics, such as environment. At the
bottom line security complexes is an approach to grouping, which arranges states in terms
o f geopolitics.
Chapter 3 brings in nuclear literature by discussing the field, as viewed through a
grouping method lens. Nuclear scholars implicitly grouped states into categories by
asking questions. One o f the groupings is based on legal possession o f nuclear weapons.
In this grouping, states are divided into two groups: nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear
weapon states. Second type of grouping is related to the theoretical posture o f the
researchers. There are realist, liberal, and constructivist posture that is visible in nuclear
scholarship. Third type of grouping asks whether nuclear proliferation brings stability or
not? Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that proliferation has optimistic results whereas Sagan
says proliferation has negative consequences. These scholars are grouped as proliferation
optimists and proliferation pessimists. Fourth type o f grouping occurs in the geographical
setting that nuclear issues dwell in. A group supports regional approaches to nuclear
proliferation whereas another group supports state-based tailored approach. There is not
enough scholarship that supports global considerations in the nuclear field. Fifth group
identifies the methods to prevent proliferation. These methods are grouped deterrence,
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. These methods can all be
complimentary or oppositional in a state’s nuclear policy posture. This debate identifies
nuclear weapon states to be in favor o f following a nuclear proliferation policy whereas
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non-nuclear weapon states following nuclear disarmament policies. This debate indicates
that deterrence is not an effective strategy in the 21st century. Tailored deterrence creates
biased proliferation policies and cannot lead to solutions in complex cases. This chapter
suggests a mid-level approach, which is grouping states with state characteristics that
shape nuclear posture. States are grouped in three categories; nuclear weapon states, non
nuclear weapon states and nuclear transitioning states. The main variables for state
characteristics derive from the literature on nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation.
This grouping is different than the others because it relies on active state characteristics;
therefore needs persistent analysis o f country nuclear profiles. Other groupings are all
implicit to the research, whereas grouping in terms of state characteristics is an explicit
methodological approach that may benefit from persistent policy analysis. In other words,
previous groupings are an outcome o f a process. For instance, the difference between a
nuclear weapons state and a non-nuclear weapon state is an outcome o f a legal process.
Grouping in terms o f state characteristics, on the other hand, is the initial methodological
process, to understand and examine nuclear behavior. State characteristics, moreover, is
an overarching way o f grouping where all o f the other implicit grouping methods can
engage in the analysis
Chapter 4 uses the state characteristics for grouping states. These are threat
existence, nuclear democratic policies and transparency, nuclear treaty membership and
compliance. This chapter introduces seven types o f nuclear security complexes. The
material nuclear security complex uses threat as the main variable. States that are
overwhelmingly subject to, and prioritize, threat existence in national policies are likely
to follow a nuclear weapons program. The material-liberal nuclear security complex uses
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both threat existence and nuclear democracy level to define states that are not totally
democratic in nuclear energy and weapons program and are not also prone to threat.
These states are in transition and this security complex needs careful assessment.
The liberal nuclear security complex uses nuclear democracy and economic
regulations as main state characteristics that shape nuclear posture. Democratic states that
proliferated before 1967 are part o f this security complex as well as non-nuclear weapon
states with transparent nuclear energy policies. The liberal-norms based nuclear security
complex feeds from good institutional standing in nuclear organizations and democratic
nuclear posture as the fundamental factors. States in this security complex do not follow
nuclear weapons program and are likely to securitize nuclear issues at the institutional
level. This means that they would prioritize the role of nuclear institutions. The national
interest in this regard, is a projection o f international nuclear posture, not the other way
around. Germany is an example o f liberal-norms based nuclear security complex as well
as Japan.
The norms nuclear security complex is composed o f states that follow
disarmament as a major policy. Internalization o f nuclear treaties in national policies,
compliance to treaties and voluntary undertakings o f nuclear transparency are the main
factors of this security complex. States in this security complex prioritize nuclear norms
and the idea of nuclear taboo over interests o f states or institutions. Any actor that supply
to the benefit o f the nuclear norms would be part o f this security complex. Transnational
advocacy networks, non-profit organizations are an example o f broad spectrum of actors.
The material-norms based nuclear security complex is composed o f states that are
affected from threat but are still being members o f major international treaties. These
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states politicize nuclear agenda through national interest by pushing disarmament policies
at the expense of non-proliferation. Iran is a member o f this security complex.
The quasi-hegemonic security complex is not a group o f many states. It is only
composed o f the hegemony, in today’s world the United States. This is still a security
complex (group) because the group representation emanates from the distribution o f
power at the system level. Today’s unipolar system is a representation o f this group;
however, if the analysis would be conducted in the Cold War, this security complex
would be based on bipolarity. There are three main factors to be considered in the quasihegemonic security complex. These factors originate from the literature on hegemony
and they are centered on the power that hegemony holds. These factors are power in
terms o f capability (military and soft power), the leadership role in the nuclear field, and
to provide nuclear umbrella as a part o f public good sharing. The United States is the
only member o f this complex under the condition o f unipolarity in the international
structure.
Chapter 5 models nuclear security complexes with selected country examples.
There are 44 nuclear capable states, defined in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Four
o f the states are selected to explain nuclear security complex modeling with real world
implications. The selected cases are Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the United States. The first
three cases are from the Middle East to directly show that nuclear behavior is not
primarily related to regional dimensions. The analysis indicates that these states have
different proliferation and nonproliferation postures, despite Israel’s nuclear weaponry.
The United States is selected as the fourth case because it has the potential to influence
the international nuclear dynamic on its own. When states are grouped in terms o f state
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characteristics, states like North Korea and Israel end up in the same group. Nonetheless,
the international pressure on the two states differs drastically. This type o f grouping
indicates that Iran has different nuclear posture than North Korea. Nevertheless,
international treaties treat the two countries similarly. The reason for this type o f political
confusion is the dominance o f the United States’ nuclear interest in the international
arena. The United States’ nuclear behavior over states in the Middle East complicates the
Middle Eastern dynamics, as states could not agree whether to focus on nuclear
proliferation or disarmament as an end-state. The United States’ nuclear policy over this
region is to ensure deterrence policies and to keep nuclear status quo. Keeping status quo,
however, will not bring change in the nuclear behavior o f the states in the region. An
alternative approach for the United States may to employ policies without regional
considerations, purely based on state characteristics.
Chapter 6 analyzes the proposed theory with the examples (cases) used
throughout this dissertation. This chapter links the overall dissertation to the general field
o f International Relations through two important discussions. The first discussion states
that nuclear proliferation is a transnational issue; thus its implications are global. Nuclear
issues are transnational because nuclear weapons cross borders and regions. As such,
third-party concerns about possible proliferator states pass beyond regions and full
nuclear fuel cycle needs international assistance. Policies regarding nuclear proliferation
should stem from globalization and transnationalism literatures. I draw some policy
implications with this respect. I indicate the role o f interdependence, international
organizations, treaties, transnational network groups; socialization and cooperation
imperatives should be o f utmost importance in nuclear policy-making. The second
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discussion is about the role o f power in nuclear studies. In this discussion, my model
suggests that the United States has the most power to shift the nuclear discourse at the
international level. I also discuss that states in the material security complex lack power
and they try to compensate this through nuclear weapons program.
Security interdependence finds a new form in the nuclear field. This dimension is
similar to the interdependence theory suggested by Keohane, but with a nuclear tone.
Non-nuclear weapon states are politically and strategically “vulnerable” to nuclear
weapon states’ threats and power (vulnerability). Nuclear weapon states, on the other
hand, are sensitive to nuclear proliferation. The sensitivity is a result o f economic and
military power that nuclear weapon states already have. These options make it easy to
direct these states’ effort to impose power on others, if necessary. Nuclear weapons states
states can divert their capabilities to conventional weaponry and new technological
advancements in the weapons sector (sensitivity). Nonetheless, the more states with
nuclear weapons, the less political leverage de jure nuclear weapon states would have
over the newly proliferated ones. This would also have an impact on the general
nonproliferation regime.
Overall, the model suggests that nuclear non-proliferation posture is non-regional.
State characteristics shape nuclear posture o f a state. Alternative nuclear policies may
generate through an understanding of non-territorial grouping. The United States and
international organizations should create group-level profiles and can publish reports on
how does a state do on nuclear non-proliferation by conducting a quantitative analysis.
States, in return, may aim to improve these points in order to comply with the rules o f the
nuclear regime.
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The research showed that nuclear weapons are being used as a tool for national
policy making rather than being a security issue. When issues are nationalized concession
becomes harder between the parties. Nuclear policies do not go beyond the national
interest, today. Grouping states in terms o f state characteristics, as an alternative method,
aims to securitize nuclear weapons at the international level. The proposed alternative
nuclear security complex theory sheds light on this securitization process, as it highlights
a group level approach to state characteristics that leads to nuclear posture, without
getting involved in the dilemmas caused by examining national interest. International
decision-making bodies should consult a similar grouping method to crosscheck nuclear
policy-making. This might eventually eliminate claims that international organs work for
the benefit o f the powerful. A nonbiased approach can be achieved only through an
objective classification o f nuclear capable states.
Finally, future research is suggested to examine how states shift from one security
complex to another and how states in different security complexes interact. A
continuation o f this dissertation could also be an in-depth qualitative and quantitative
analysis of all nuclear-capable states, referred in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in order
to have comprehensive nuclear country profiles.
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CHAPTER 2
SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY

This chapter rests on the examination o f security complex theory to utilize it in
understanding nuclear security complexes. Security complexes are composed o f states
that share similar understanding o f security and thus to follow similar security policies.
The idea o f a security complex originates from the English School writer Barry Buzan, as
he asserts the role o f regions and regional dynamics to explain certain state policies and
behavior.
The first section defines security complexes and security complex theory as
formulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in the 1970s. This section states the main
characteristics of the theory and how it is applied to regional security complexes. The
second section goes a step further and examines regional security complexes by asking,
“what differentiates one region from another to the extent that eventually a new security
complex is created?” The main reasoning behind this question is to understand the
construction and differentiation o f security complexes from each other.
The third section identifies two types o f debate in the literature. The first debate is
between the traditional school o f thought (neorealism) and the Copenhagen
School/English School. The second debate is between the scholars from the Copenhagen
School and alternative school theorists in general. Whereas the first debate rests on
capturing how the traditional school o f thought in International Relations reacted to
security complex theory, the second debate acknowledges this part but differentiates on
the nuances o f how to view security complex theory. The main contributors to the second
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debate are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in one camp, and David Lake and Patrick
Morgan in the other. The debate aims to highlight the main differences o f understanding
security complexes through territoriality versus non-territoriality.
The last section introduces nuclear nonproliferation security complexes as a new
and alternative way to study nuclear security and policy. This section feeds from the
debate identified in the literature. It follows the main approach by Buzan and Waever, but
with a twist of non-territoriality, borrowed from Lake and Morgan. This idea offers an
issue-based framework for studying international relations. The issue at stake is nuclear
nonproliferation. This chapter makes a constructive critique o f security complex theory
by Buzan and Waever. It states that the existing regional approach cannot be applied to
the proliferation puzzle as nuclear weapons are a transnational issue and are not fixed to
regions. Therefore, the chapter concludes with a need to model non-proliferation and
proliferation security complexes by grouping states with regards to their state
characteristics and nuclear posture, with the aim o f creating group-level nuclear policies.
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DEFINITION

What is Security Complexes?
In People, States, and Fear, Buzan advocates a broad security approach as he
hints to the idea o f security complexes.1 This broad approach interlinks the military,
economic, political, societal, and environmental security sectors. The author suggests the
referent objects of security to be widened, as he challenges the centrality o f states in
security. Buzan notes the “security o f any one referent object or level cannot be achieved
in isolation from the others; the security o f each becomes, in part, a condition for the
security of all.”3
Security complexes are cluster of states “whose primary security concerns link
together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be
considered apart from one another.”4 They are the “nodes” in the international system
that “define intense and relatively durable local patterns” and “guide and shape the
impact o f larger external powers on these local patterns.”5 A security complex is
composed o f “states whose security problems are closely interconnected.”6 It is a
form o f classification for states that have similar security dynamics and processes.

1 Barry Buzan, 1983, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations, 1st Edition, Wheatsheaf Books: John Spiers Publisher.
2 In the traditional international relations literature “actors” are similar to the “referent objects.”
Non-traditional school o f thought purposely uses “referent object” rather than the agents because
it diminishes the role o f the agent and prioritizes the issue at stake. This makes “actors” the object
and the phenomenon the “subject.”
3 Barry Buzan, 1991. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in
the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd Edition, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, p. 26.
4 Buzan, 1983, p. 106.
5 Buzan, 1983, p. 111.
6 Buzan, 1983, p. 114.
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Buzan signifies that security complexes are “durable, dynamic, open to change and
are not permanent and internally rigid.”
Buzan formulizes the security complex theory, by referring to the Middle East
and South Asia, suggesting security complexes are an “alternative approach” to security
studies.7 Security complexes, therefore, create mini-systems that are linked to the
international system. Buzan accepts that by drawing attention to “particular systems”
rather than the “power structure o f the system” the “ability to make comparisons is lost.”8
The author suggests, however, that by fusing particular systems, the assessments made
are “rich” and more detailed than those o f the all-encompassing international system that
the traditional school favors. Buzan’s approach is regarded as an “incorporation o f
systems theory into area studies based on regional criteria.”9
To “label the relevant structures” at the mid-level analysis, Buzan uses the term
“security complexes.” 10 Buzan introduces a sub-structure/supra-agent level into the
equation to explain state policies, and this sub-structural level is regional. Regions are the
mini-systems with characteristics. Buzan argues the following about the mini-systems11:
“This middle level of analysis is an important but seriously neglected area of
international relations analysis. Much effort is devoted to analysis o f security at
the state level both in terms o f national security policy and in terms o f situation
analysis of trouble spots. Similarly, a weight o f analysis is oriented towards the

7 Barry Buzan, 1983, pp. 105-115.
8 Buzan 1983: 105.
9 Carlos Teixeira, 2011, Dissertation: The Absent Empire: The United States and the South
American Regional Subsystem, Old Dominion University
10 Buzan, 1983, p. 105.
11 Buzan, 1983, p. 105.
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grand abstraction o f systems analysis. In between, however, we find only the hazy
derived notions o f regional balances o f power, and sub-systems.”

CHARACTERISTICS

Security complexes can be formed by “geographical, political, strategic,
historical, economic or cultural links.” Since it is hard to differentiate the former
concepts, the boundaries o f security complexes may be fuzzy. Security complexes are
“historical” since they follow the patterns o f interactions between states.12 However,
not all types o f interaction direct a state to a particular security complex. The United
States, for example, has significant security interests linked to the Middle Eastern
region but is not part o f that region. A combination o f insecurities o f states,
interdependence, economic regulations, treaties, geographical location, trade levels,
partnerships, and “local and external patterns o f insecurities,” all may contribute to
placing a particular state a specific security complex.13
One security complex is not distinct and separate from other security
complexes. Buzan suggests that alignments “lock” security complexes “together.” 14
This clearly means that alignment, or any other form o f organization, makes security
interlinked for different complexes. States in the same security complex have similar

12 Buzan, 1983, p. 114.
13 Buzan, 1983, p. 111.
14 Barry Buzan, 1983, p. 110.
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disputes, alignments, and external interests.15 The external powers— states from
different security complexes, depending on their size and power—have impact on
other security complexes as well. These external powers may also link one complex
to the other depending on their interests. Buzan notes that the power o f the major
states has impacts both on the system and other security complexes. This mutual
impact is stated as follows:
“In forcing attention to both levels [macro-level o f great power impact on the
system and micro-level of local state relations], security complexes emphasize the
mutuality of impact between them, with external influences tending to amplify
local problems, and local problems shaping and constraining external
entanglements and influences.” 16
In essence, security complexes are organically bound to the international
system. The primary system has affect on all regional security complexes. Each
regional security complex is composed o f states. The intense security
interdependence is pictured with strong lines from one state-to-another-state.
A security complex is composed o f states that have high level o f security
interdependence. The security complexes above are formulated through regions. It is
worth noting, non-territorial security complexes— unlike Buzan’s regional work—

15 Kenneth W altz’s sentence on states act alike under the same conditions fits better to security
com plexes rather than the international system because in one security complex, states that have
similar insecurities and concerns are formed together. Similarity exists in terms o f security
management methods as well.
16 Parenthesis added. To clarify, the usage o f the term ‘local’ may drag the reader to think it as
‘dom estic’. Here, local problems do not associate to the problems inside one state but local to one
security complex (region). Here, Buzan’s thesis on the mutual impact o f local problems and
external forces is similar to why Iran acts in the way that it does on nuclear proliferation and why
the US acts on the way it does as a response. See, Buzan, 1983, p. 112.
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may stay at the abstract level because they are less tangible than regions and have
higher normative aspects.
Buzan finalizes the earlier idea by noting that security complexes can be
“applied to any situational analysis.” In a more dynamic mode o f analysis, security
complexes “offer a class o f durable entities whose patterns and processes o f evolution
are o f as much theoretical, and perhaps more practical, interest as those o f the power
structures o f the system as a whole.” 17

How do security complexes encompass the security idea?
Security complexes prioritize not only the “traditional power” conjunctions
but also the “patterns o f relations” and “sources of insecurity at all levels through
which power relations are mediated.” 18 Security complexes include “balance of
power” but they are not “limited” to it.19 Traditional power relations among states are
significant in security complexes as they form a pattern.
Differently, security complexes also capture states with relatively less
power.20 In a security complex, small states have an impact on the major powers.
Small states have characteristics peculiar to each other and have “patterns within and
among themselves which condition to some extent the great powers.”21 This leads an
analysis o f hierarchies o f power through security complexes, which also exists in
nuclear nonproliferation security complexes.

17 Buzan, 1983, p. 114.
18 Buzan 1983, p. 112.
19 Buzan, 1983, p. 125, Footnote 33.
20 Buzan 1983, p. 112.
21 Buzan, 1983, p. 112.
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Regions and Powers, co-authored with Ole Waever encapsulate the boundaries
and relationship between security complexes as it includes nine regional security
complexes as case studies. In Regions and Powers a security complex is redefined as a
“set o f units whose major processes o f securitization, desecuritization, or both are
interlinked that their security problems cannot be able to analyzed or resolved apart from
one another.”
There are two major points to unfold in the above definition. First is related to
extending the actors and sectors in security complex theory. The new definition
encompasses “different type of actors” and “different sectors o f security” to be involved
in the regional security complex; and it keeps the essence o f interdependence o f the
actors within the security issues.22 Security complexes, therefore, may compose non-state
actors as well as untraditional security issues (sectors) such as environment or societal
security. This means that environmental problems can also group states in the same
security complex. A river that passes more than one state might be related to water
security and can be securitized, for instance, by those states that are involved. Waever
notes “security becomes a practice” and an issue is securitized when it is constructed as a
threat.23
The second point with regards to the difference between the earlier and later
definition o f security complexes is with the term securitization24. Waever introduced the

22 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 44.
23 See Ole Waever, 1993, Securitization and Desecuritization in On Security, Ronnie D.
Lipschultz, (NY: Colombia University Press, 1995: 46-86.
24 To follow the debate on securitization see Bill McSweeney, 1996, Identity and Security: Buzan
and the Copenhagen School, Review o f International Studies, 22:1, pp. 82-93; Barry Buzan and
Ole Waever, 1997, Slippery, Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School
Replies, Review o f International Studies, 23:2, pp. 241-250; and Bill M cSweeney, 1998,
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securitization theory through the Copenhagen School25. Securitization is significant in
security complexes, because it follows a process-based approach to security, where actors
label a “politicized” problem as if it is a security problem. Not all politicized issues are
security issues and not all security issues are captured in policies. A security issue does
not necessarily need to be an issue where state survival is at stake. The five sectors—
environmental, social, political, economic, and military— are all security issues. This
means that a security complex is composed o f issues that are political in nature and are
explicitly securitized.
To understand the definition o f security complexes, one needs to understand what
is securitization and desecuritization, and how securitization occurs. Securitization is to
“shift an issue into the realm o f security” to gain more attention for the issue.26 By
securitizing, the issue at stake gains priority over other issues. Hirschauer says, “attaching
the term security to an issue— lifts the issue above politics and above regular (political)
agenda setting” where the “act of securitization” occurs.
♦

•

11

This means any issue can be
•
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securitized by the elites (particularly by decision-makers and interest groups) .
The act of securitization occurs through threat identification, where threat is open
to interpretation by the actors.

9Q

Dillon regards security to be a function where the

Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Waever, Review o f
International Studies, 24:1, pp. 137-140.
25 The name o f the school is associated to the Center fo r Peace an d Conflict Research in
Copenhagen, today renamed as Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).
26 Sabine Hirschauer, August 2012— Dissertation: All is Fair in War: Violent Conflict and the
Securitization o f Rape, Old Dominion University.
27 S. Hirschauer, 2012, p. 49.
28 Although the authors contemplate non-political issues to lift it to the security realm like
environmental problems or issues related to human security such as hunger, AIDS/HIV, one can
think o f security issues like terrorism or nuclear proliferation to be securitized as well. A security
issue does not inherently mean it is securitized. There should be also a “level o f securitization”
which is dismissed in the securitization literature so far.
29 S. Hirschauer, August 2012, p. 54.
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process is subjective to the actors.30 Securitization occurs in three steps. First, an issue
needs to be presented as a threat by the actors. Second, the public or some other audience
needs to accept this issue as a threat. Third, the issue gains political prominence,
prompting elites/decision-makers to initiate specific policies.
Suffice to say, security complex theory is based upon a general securitization
theory. Why securitization theory is significant to explain security complexes?
Securitization theory assumes that the “security agenda is about different things in
different regions” since states react differently to security issues (sectors) in different
regions.31 Securitization theory suggests that not all security complexes would perform
extraordinary measures for any specific phenomenon. Policies are shaped depending on
whether the security o f the actors’ (states, decision-makers, interest groups,
organizations) coincides with each other and whether these actors call for attention. One
of the reasons why the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Latin America cannot be
replicated in the Middle East, for instance, is that the issues securitized in the Middle
Eastern region do not open up room for conciliation.
Securitization challenges the traditional method where security issues are pre
given; rather it suggests that issues are constructed by someone and for some purpose.
Securitization theory observes not only the power relations but also the historical
relations of actors. By inserting the historical accounts, securitization aims to trace the
root causes o f state behavior and foreign policy.
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30 G. M. Dillion. 1990, The Alliance o f Security and Subjectivity, Current Research on Peace
an d Violence, p. 110.
31 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 86.
32 The methodological approach to securitization— if scholars like to unpack how an issue is
securitizes, is most likely to be historical materialism where causes and changes are examined
through historical preceding. In international studies “what?” questions are empirically driven and
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DEBATE

David Lake started a debate on Regional Security Complexes. Lake defines
regional security complexes where the members are “affected by one trans-border but
•j i

local security externality.” According to Lake, security externalities are previously
called “spillovers” or “neighboring effects” and they are the most definitive factor to
border a region. Trans-border externalities cross national borders and have “strategic and
political impact” yet they are local because they stay in the regional terrain .34 Security
externalities focus on transnational issues to frame the regions; therefore, this definition
is inclined towards an issue-based understanding to define the security complexes rather
than an actor specific approach.
There are two differences between Buzan and Lake. Firstly, in Buzan’s definition,
securitization is the key; whereas, Lake does not discuss securitization. Buzan claims
interdependence through securitization, whereas Lake claims interdependence is a result
o f transnational issues. Secondly, Lake assumes non-regional actors can also be member
o f a security complex, whereas Buzan disagrees to this point. Buzan and Waever
associate security complex theory exclusively with regions. The authors do not work on
non-territorial security complexes; yet they agree that it is possible.35

ask for data analysis whereas “how?” questions are process driven. To capture the main idea on
the difference between problem-solving theories and critical study see Robert Cox, 1981, Social
Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, Millennium: Journal o f
International Studies, Vol. 10: 2, pp. 126-155.
33 David Lake, 1997, p. 49.
34 David Lake, 1997, p. 51.
35 Bear in mind that Chapter 2 o f this dissertation utilizes a non-territorial security complex
approach to non-proliferation. For this aim it models non-proliferation into seven security
complexes. This approach differs from a “regional” method.
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Regional security is different from regionalism. The latter is expounded in
International Relations literature from 1960s and 1970s. Regionalism starts with the
assumption that states’ cooperation in one region may result in integration within that
region. The end-state in regionalism, therefore, calls for regionalism and formation of
security communities. Regional security is also different from area studies, yet some area
studies scholars like Mohammad Ayoob, may follow a regional approach.36
Buzan and Waever argue that world politics is best explained by “several
subsystems” and each subsystem should have its own dynamics and actors (Schoenman
2005:141). The definition of subsystems is obscure however. Teixeira suggests scholars
are calling the same approaches by different names. Regional subsystems, subordinate
systems, cluster o f nations, and submacro partial international systems are all the
synonyms for subsystems.37 A sub-system is an “extremely broad notion, and security
-jo

complexes could be the type o f sub-system.”

Russett notes that sub-systems are

invariably associated to “geographical regions.”39 The regional level is a mid-level of
analysis. This layer informs the sub-systemic explanation o f security interactions among
regional actors. It does not neglect the impact o f anarchy on states at the global level, but
focuses on regions and regional characteristics.

36 Mohammad Ayoob, 1986,Regional Security in the Middle East, in Regional Security in the
Third-World: Case Studies from South East Asia and the Middle East, Mohammed Ayoob (ed.),
London: Croom Helm.
37 Carlos Teixeira, 2011, pp. 20-22.
38 Barry Buzan 1983, p. 125.
39 Bruce Russett, 1979, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political
Ecology, Yale University: Greenwood Press Publishers.
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Regional security complex theory rests on four levels o f analysis:
1- At the domestic level, it rests on the “vulnerability” o f the states. Here the
authors observe whether a state is labeled a strong or weak state.
2- At the state level, the theory looks at state-to-state relations. Here the interstate
relations are significant to label insecurities and securitize issues.
3- At the regional level, the integration with other security complexes— regions—
is significant.
4- At the global level, the role o f global powers in security complexes are
observed. Global powers in one region, as has been stated previously, have the power
necessary to have impacts on other regions.
The four levels are in play at all times, yet sometimes one level is dominant over
the others. Security complexes evolve and change as well. The regions may have three
different stages o f evolution. They may stay the same in the status quo stage, may have
internal change either through “ideological shifts” or by the “change in the leadership”
(internal transformational stage), and may have external transformation, where “the outer
boundary o f the region expands or shrinks” (external transformational stage).40 Change at
the regional level, therefore, is visible.
Regions are constructed complexes. They are constructed all through history,
either by the states that benefit from shaping the boundaries, or by the political, cultural,
and historical interactions o f the countries within a geographical region. The former is the
traditional way to literally ‘make’ a region. When Middle East is considered, the question
o f why scholars call it “Middle East” demonstrates the construction o f a region. The label
Middle East is by the “representation to British and later the US strategists to think about
40 Barry Buzan 2003, p. 53.
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and organize action for maintaining security” in the “south-west o f Asia and North
Africa.”41 Even if the strategic and security framing o f great powers— formerly Britain
and presently the US— shape regions, the historical and cultural links o f the countries
make these framing either obsolete or real. At this last aspect, Buzan and W aever’s view
on how to compose regions and how to differentiate one region from another is helpful.
There are four variables that differentiate regions. The first one is the “intense
interaction” among the actors.42 State-state relationship and the security interdependence
o f the actors comprise this intense interaction. Geographical proximity, actors’
“recognition” o f their presence in one sub-system, and a “minimum o f two actors” are the
other three variables making up regional security complexes.
Referencing to the main idea o f security complexes, so far specific security
complexes are defined through regions. It is stated that regional security complexes
reshape the abstract security framework to allow practical application. The following
section dwells on the characteristics o f regional security complexes.
a- Geographical proximity: Regional security complex theory considers
geographical proximity to be the core tenet to establish a complex. Security o f
neighboring states is threatened much easily by similar threats. Since “many threats travel
short distances more easily than long distances” security o f neighboring states overlap in
many ways 43
Geographical proximity makes neighboring states’ “security interaction” frequent
and it leads to a pattern. Often it comes to a point where a state’s security cannot be

41 Pinar Bilgin, January 2000, Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Security Studies
Perspective, Dissertation, University o f Wales, Aberystwyth.
42Robert E. Kelly, 2007.
43 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, 2003, p. 45.
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delivered without the security o f other neighboring states. Buzan and Waever (2003) call
this “security interdependence,”44 where the security o f states in one complex is
dependent on the security of the other states in the same complex.45 The actors in the
security complex are interdependent, and this interdependence allows room for patterns
o f cooperation on major security issues. It could also result in a negative pattern o f
behavior resulting in less security for all the states in the complex.
The geographical proximity causes a level o f interaction among states, which
results with an ally or adversarial relationship and an identity o f “fear, hatred, or
friendship” among the regional actors 46 According to Buzan and Waever, a region is
more than the borders. It is composed o f “history, culture, religion, and geography.” The
regional security complex is shaped by security practices. This gives regional security
complexes a constructed character.
b- Number of states: A regional security complex is composed o f at least two
states. For Cantori and Spiegel, two or more states that have similar cultural, social, and
historical links, in other words states that share similar identity create security
com plexes47 The actors in the regional security complex are important because they are
linked through security interdependence. These states have similar threat identification to
the threats faced in the same region as well. This means that the number o f states is
important in the conventional security complex idea. The issues that these states
encounter are secondary because it is the geographical proximity that links these states to
each other.
44 How to create interdependence on nuclear weapons? States might need similar logic in the
nuclear realm.
45 Buzan and Waever, 2003.
46 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 50.
47 Cantori and Spiegel, The International Politics o f Regions, pp. 6-7.
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Security complexes have levels as well. A “higher level security complex” is
“composed o f major powers which define their security in regional or global terms.”48
In turn, major powers have great impact on “local complexes” says B uzan49 The
relations o f major states (high level complexes) impact on “local complexes,”
strengthening the patterns in each security complex.50 However, “local” powers are
affected more from external great powers due to the “disproportion in size and
resources”.51 Not only size and resources, but also different power capabilities of
major states, infuse into “local complexes” easily. Buzan and Waever call security
complexes that are composed o f strong states to be definitive o f the structure, whereas
they call security complexes with weak powers to be “unstructured protocomplexes.”
c- Mutual exclusiveness: Another characteristic o f a regional security complex,
from Buzan and Waever, is that it is mutually exclusive. A state that is characterized as
belonging to a certain security complex cannot be a member o f another security complex.
States in the same complex should have a degree o f security interdependence both to bind
them and also to separate them from other regional security complexes. Turkey,
according to these authors, can only be in one regional security complex— either in the
Middle Eastern Security Complex or in European Security Complex. However, because
Turkey has shared security concerns, historical, cultural, and economic ties with both o f
the complexes, Buzan and Waever names Turkey an “incubator” state.

48 Buzan 1983, p. 108.
49 Buzan 1983, p. 108.
50 Buzan, 1983, p. 111.
51 Buzan, 1983: 111.
52 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.62.
53 Buzan and Waever, 2003.
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follows for landlocked country, Afghanistan. On contrary to Buzan, Lake and Morgan
suggest that states can be part o f more than one regional security complex. According to
Lake the concept o f “interlocking regions” is an example o f a state to be a member of
multiple security complexes.
d- Mutual recognition of membership: States should acknowledge their
membership o f the security complex and the recognition should be mutual with other
members o f the complex. Not only the state itself, but also other states in the complex,
should recognize each other. This point is similar to the Wendtian “identity”
conceptualization. According to Wendt state identity is constructed two-fold: 1- a state
names its identity, 2- others recognize this identity or attribute different identities.54
Considering the Turkish case, even if Turkey claims to be a European country, a lack of
attribution from the European powers to Turkey on its European-ness diminishes the
reality o f that identity. Similarly, in a territorialized security complex, both sides need to
acknowledge each other in the same complex. Lake quotes Boals; constructivist theory
assumes this mutual recognition as a “collectively produced self-understanding.”55
In the nuclear security complexes the mutual recognition is related to the nuclear
posture o f states. Often times although a state claims not to acquire nuclear weapons, is
subjected to international pressure because its nuclear posture is not mutually recognized.
e- Patterns in relations: According to Thompson, regional security complex
members have interactions to such a “particular degree o f regularity and intensity that a

54 Alexander Wendt, 1994, Social Theory o f International Politics, Cambridge University Press:
New York.
55 David Lake, 1997, Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach, in Regional Orders:
Building Security in a New World, David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), The
Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania.
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change at one point in the subsystem may cause change in other points.”56 This means
that change in particular state’s posture/policy in the security complex might also cause a
change in other actors’ postures. Likewise, states might reinforce their stance by copying
the posture o f other states. The patterns in the relations of the actors are similar to what
Buzan calls the “security interdependence” o f the regional actors in one security
complex.57

What makes Regional Security Complexes significant?
Is there a significant reason to observe nuclear posture in a cluster rather than
observing it separately? This question is significant because if a security complex is not
“more than its parts” then formulating them into clusters would not make any difference.
According to Buzan and Waever, the “outcome o f the interactions o f the security
complex would be different if it were not in regional security complex.” This means that
the regional aspect generates the security structures through practice. Thinking similarly,
security complexes in general are different than observing state policies individually. By
compartmentalizing states into different groups— or by creating the boundaries o f regions
like Buzan and Waever do— the researcher works at a different level. This level enables
the researcher to be flexible and to recognize that the most absurd cases can end up in the
same cluster. If so, the nuclear policy upon these bizarre cases should also be similar. For

56 William R. Thompson, 1973. The Regional Subsystems: A Conceptual Explication and a
Propositional Inventory, International Studies Quarterly, No: 17: 89-117.
57 In the second chapter the “patterns o f relations” is going to be examined through non
proliferation security com plex idea in which it is defended that posture and policy o f one state in
a security complex may change or reinforce the posture o f other states with regards to their
proliferation practices. For instance, the idea that liberal states do not proliferate in the post-Cold
War era rests upon their collective posture. Besides, states like North Korea and Iran follow
proliferation practices because they feed from each other’s posture.
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instance, in Chapter 5 it is discussed, Israel and North Korea’s nuclear posture are
similar; yet the policies to these two states from the United States and international
nuclear groups are different. This results with continuous problems and questioning of
other actors. The realization o f the similarity in some cases renders an opportunity to
revise existing policies and to turn the nuclear course into a different direction.
There are two types o f debate on the security complex theory. The first debate is
between the regional security complex defenders and their opponents. The second debate
is among the defenders of the regional security complexes, yet the scholars disagree on
how to frame security complexes and their main assumptions. Suffice to say that the first
debate is more general and broad that the focus is not so much on the security complexes
p e r s e but on the level o f analysis, whereas the second is more particular in that it focuses

on the functioning of the security complexes.

Debate # 1:
This debate results from calls to favor different levels o f analysis from both the
mainstream and regional theorists. The traditional approach to security studies
emphasizes the global character o f world politics. Scholars from neo-realist school o f
thought such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer believe in the
supremacy o f the system— explained through distribution o f power and anarchy— over
the agents (states)58. The level o f analysis in the traditional approach is global, where
anarchy (a system level characteristic) shapes and molds state policies and affects the
decision-making. This approach suggests that states act similarly under same conditions.
58 See John Mearsheimer, 1990, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,
International Security, 15:1, pp. 5-56; Stephen Walt, 1987, The Origins o f Alliances, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
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Mainstream international relations scholars remain at the global level o f analysis and
make systems level explanations. Kelly says, for instance, “global-level international
relations theories regard regionalist approaches to be “a brief upsurge while system-level
forces calibrate new equilibria.”59 To any approach that defends system level analysis,
like those of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, regionalist explanations do not
sufficiently explain world politics.
In response to the mainstream analysis, Hentz and Boas find “systemic
international relations too abstract and distant to capture regional dynamics.”60 Therefore,
the latter scholars accuse the mainstream view being too general. At the global level
analysis, scholars are mainly criticized to be ahistorical and too much concerned with
theory that cannot bind history and theory together. 61
In general, the debate stems from the agent-structure debate in international
studies. As a response to mainstream approaches that diminish agency, alternative
theories— mainly of the constructivist school— integrate agents within the structure,
stressing the “choice”
structure.”

o f states, and how policy impacts can alter the “social

When agents, namely states, have the choice to carry out an action, that

choice might make free from an international system based on “self-help.” In a self-help
system, actors are expected to act similarly under the same conditions; yet, states’

59 Robert E. Kelly, 2007, p. 199.
60 Quoted in Robert Kelly. Main citation: James Hentz and Morten Boas, eds. 2003, New and
Critical Security and Regionalism. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
61 This feeds another debate in international relations: which one is a priori: history or theory.
62 See Nickolas Onuf, 1989, World o f Our Making, Columbia: University o f South Carolina
Press.
63 Nicholas Onuf, 1989.
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policies differ in response to the same situation. In other words, both agent and the
structure interact in the constructivist perspective.64
Agent-structure debate is significant with respect to the possibility o f change in
the system.65According to realism, the international system is definitive and there is no
significant room for change because the system is based on anarchy. This paradigm, in
reality, observes the billiard table (the black box) rather than the billiard balls. According
to alternative theories, change is possible and the system is in constant change. The
agent’s role in shaping the system should not be diminished. This paradigm, in reality,
observes not only the change o f the shape of the billiard table after the billiard balls
interact with each other and hit the table, but also to the billiard balls that jum p off the
table. Alternative theories question the black box and unfold this box into its pieces. To
take from this school o f thought, Buzan and Waever contribute to the sub-system
analysis— regional— suggesting that regional interactions are affective to shape and
transform the international system.
This primary debate is also related to the study of hegemony in the 21st century.
The supporters o f the global level o f analysis regard major powers to be the only
significant actors. More precisely, if the system is unipolar then the hegemon shapes the
state relations. Buzan and Waever degrade the importance o f the hegemony in the
contemporary world; indeed defending hegemony is in decline due to the rise o f regional

64 For an extended analysis see Alexander Wendt, 1987, The Agent-Structure Problem in
International Relations Theory, International Organization, No. 41:3.
65 For an extended work, composed o f thirteen articles on change in the international system see
Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.), 1981, Change and the Study o f International Relations:
The Evaded Dimension, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 1-241.
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powers. Ikenberry, Nye, and Keohane challenge this view.66 Buzan, in an interview,
states:
“The way that the world is unfolding, with a greater global distribution o f power
and more voice to non-western cultures, makes the idea that hegemony is ever
going to be legitimizable (that is, not in practice, but as agreed upon by the
multiplicity o f states) on a global level a passing one.” 67

Debate #2
The main contributors to the second debate are Buzan and Waever, and Lake and
Morgan. The latter scholars have debated the security complex theory majorly with
respect to the aspect o f territoriality within regionalism.

According to Lake, the system

is anarchic but not all the relationships in the system are based on the rules o f anarchy.
Anarchy does not explain much o f the relationships of states; rather a focus on
hierarchical relationships is in need.69 Lake stresses international hierarchy over
international anarchy, which places the scholar close to the English School, like Barry
Buzan himself. Patrick Morgan differentiates between two types o f relations in
international relations: anarchic and transnational. Morgan suggests that realism can be
applied to anarchic systems and liberalism can be applied to “transnational security

66 On hegemony, see Robert Keohane, 1984, After Hegemony, Joseph Nye, 2001, Seven Test:
Between Concert and Unilateralism, Ikenberry (ed.), 2002, America Unrivalved, and Ikenberry,
2011, Liberal Leviathan.
67 Theory Talks #35: Barry Buzan, December 19, 2009, Barry Buzan on International Society,
Securitization, and an English School Map o f the World, Accessed from:
http://w w w.theorv-talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html
68 Regionalism in Buzan and W aever’s study is different than the traditional regional studies that
support integration at the end o f regionalism. The European studies scholars use regionalism
conventionally different than Buzan and Waever.
69 David Lake, 2007. Escape from the State o f Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,
International Security, 32:1, p. 49.
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communities.”70 Although scholars (Buzan and Waever vs. Lake and Morgan) follow
generally a similar perspective on international relations, the latter scholars differ slightly
on the idea o f security complexes.
Unlike Buzan and Waever, Lake and Morgan say that regional security complex
theory does not have to compose o f states that are neighbors. This means that
“geographical proximity” is not a necessary condition for a state to be a member o f a
security complex. Following this logic, the United States is a member o f more than one
security complex because it is involved in many regions. Suffice to say, regional security
complexes have “overlapping membership” for Lake and Morgan, whereas they have
“exclusive membership” for Buzan and Waever. The response to Lake and Morgan is on
the importance o f geographical proximity since states that do not share same
geographical location always have the “option to opt-out” from that region.71 Buzan and
Waever omit the possibility that in essence the option for a state to leave a security
complex might also be the reason for that complex to transform.
Buzan and Waever have two debated points on security complexes. The first is on
the assumption o f territoriality. Lake and Morgan disagree with this assumption by
suggesting normative thinking in security complexes, stressing that globalization and
transnational threats challenges the “approach on territoriality.” Buzan and Waever reply
to Lake and Morgan on territoriality by stressing that they do not refuse non-territorial
security constellations but they do not use it on their study.72 Constructivist scholars such

70 Crofft and Terriff, eds. 2000.
71 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 80.
72 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 462.
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as Vayrynen, go even further to question Buzan and Waever, and suggest emancipating
security studies from its “territorial prison” by focusing on “identities.”73
The second point is on regional level analysis. Buzan and Waever put the whole
approach at regional level. Lake and Morgan still keep the regional level analysis but
regard regions as a term that is not purely geographical. Kelly, on the other hand, twists
this approach and asks whether regionalism is important when the United States is the
hegemon? The main logic of the latter scholar derives from the driving force o f the
hegemon to shape international system. Some scholars even write about hegemonic
regionalism where the United States shapes the regions. To counter critiques, Buzan and
Waever self-criticize their approach, saying, “it could be argued that the whole levels-ofanalysis set up is biased towards the territoriality.” Regardless of this self-critique, they
do not make step further to tackle this circular relationship.
Even in the traditional understanding o f the security complex theory, Buzan could
not give up formulizing the theory without resorting to a regional perspective. This
actually biases the theory because the theory loses its explanatory power without
referring to the regions. The idea o f keeping the regional perspective in utmost
importance allows Buzan and other writers on security complex theory to follow an
unorthodox level o f analysis, which is not global or local but regional. Yet again, the pros
and cons of this theory show that there is a great necessity to produce security
constellations regardless o f regions.
One o f the other critiques is on the necessity o f geographical proximity as “threats
spread easily within proximate actors.” The transnational approaches in international

73 Vayrynen Raimo, 2003, Regionalism: Old and New, International Studies R eview , No.5, pp.
25-51.
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studies argue that globalization shrinks the world and threats travel easily, not only in
neighboring states, but around the globe. This creates a certain level o f interdependence
among the states since “an action of a state affects an action o f other states.”74 Since
threats travel easily, it is hard to claim a regional approach for state relationships because
the impact o f the threat could be the same even in different regions. International
terrorism is the only example that Buzan and Waever label as a global threat. In essence,
the nuclear threat is also a global one that states relations might be shaped by, since the
weapon itself has power to cross borders.
The idea of security interdependence has not been discussed in depth by the
authors, but it has similarities with the liberal theory on economic interdependence.
Although the term ‘security interdependence’ is helpful to figure out the regional
dynamics, it has some shortfalls. The ambiguity o f security interdependence within the
regional security complex theory is that the authors do not ask explicitly the question
whether security interdependence diminishes conflict. Buzan and Waever regard regional
security complexes to be “socially constructed and they are contingent on the security
practice o f the actors.” If one state’s security is dependent on another’s, and security
practices determine this process, then the authors need to explain how a region might
transform war-like characteristics into a peaceful dynamic. Is Germany’s security
transformation sufficient to change the whole regional security conceptualization? Is it
enough to have one state to change its security practice? How many states are needed to
transform a regional security complex? It is apparent that, it is important whether a state
is strong, weak or a great power with the ability to transform the whole region. However,

74 Helen Milner, 1991, The Assumptions o f Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A
Critique, Review o f International Studies, No: 17, pp. 67-85.
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how this transformation occurs is the question. These questions are important, because
under constant repetitions o f threat or warfare, how one state could change its security
discourse and policy still needs to be explained, in the regional security complex theory,
and more broadly in International Relations.
Security complexes, according to say Buzan and Waever, need to be examined
“sector by sector” and “unit by unit” to build the “security constellation” among the
regional actors.75 The reason for this is regional security complexes may fall short in
explaining “intense security dilemmas” as it gets hard to find the real threat and the
perceived threat in the same sector.

NON-TERRITORIALITY: MISSING ELEMENT

The debate between Buzan-Waever and Lake-Morgan lacks a “non-territorial”
understanding o f security complexes. Originally, security complex theory explained mid
level analysis on state behavior, encompassed through a regional filter. Lake and Morgan
criticized the territoriality aspect of it, as for them, “what really matters is the flow of
threats that binds states regardless o f their location.”76 In this understanding, any state can
be a member o f any security complex, because regional security complexes are “issuespecific.”

77

Buzan and Waever do not consider issue-specific security complexes to be

efficient, claiming, “one can find thousands o f complexes based on almost every sub-

75 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 169.
76 Kelly, 2007, p. 209.
77 Kelly, 2007, p. 209.
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global threat perception.”78 In an issue-based security complex the central focus moves
away from the actors to the issues. This kind of shift is beneficial in better understanding
the phenomenon because actors’ policy practice changes, not depending on the actor that
it faces, but depending on the issue in question.

NUCLEAR PRACTICES AND SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY

This chapter, so far, examined the definitions o f security complex theory. It
looked at the debates relating to the theory and stressed the main contributors to these
debates. The main difference between the founders (Buzan and Waever), and Lake and
Morgan lies in territoriality. Lake and Morgan stressed security complexes do not need
boundaries and geographical locations. Likewise, “what really matters is flow o f threats
that binds states regardless o f their location.”79 Any state can be a member o f a security
complex because regional security complexes are “issue-specific.”80 For Lake, a region is
nothing more than cluster o f states. Buzan and Waever believe to issue specific security
complexes not to be efficient because “one can find thousands o f complexes based on
almost every sub-global threat perception.”81
Contrary to Buzan and Waever, this dissertation revolves around issue-specific
security complexes with a focus on the nuclear practices o f states. There is no need for
hundreds o f issue-based security complexes like Buzan claims. Based on the

78 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 80.
79 Kelly, 2007, p. 209.
80 Kelly, 2007, p. 209.
81 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 80.
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securitization level of certain issues in world politics, an issue specific analysis can be
made. Alternatively, Buzan categorizes security issues in five sectors. As
aforementioned, there are political, military, economic, social, and environmental
security sectors for Buzan. The nuclear security complexes fit into the political-military
security sector threats.”82
An issue-based security constellation is one where the states’ posture is
categorized in terms o f the issue at stake. The issue that the next chapter highlights in
depth is nuclear proliferation. Although a regional approach is fixed to the territory,
issue-based groupings— security complexes— are subjected to change over geography.
State behavior on nuclear proliferation may change over time. That is why the security
constellations rest upon the historical posture o f states.
This kind of conceptualization is different than the traditional security complexes
that Buzan and Waever have defined, in terms o f two aspects: The first point is that issuebased security complexes place the issue at the center o f the study rather than the
geographical positions o f states. It groups states’ postures (security policies) with regards
to proliferation. For instance, the traditional school o f thought assumes every issue is
significant, as long as it is related to power and capabilities and determines state survival.
However, states do not react to all security issues (be it nuclear, terrorism, environmental,
human rights) in a similar fashion. State polices differ as their securitization level o f the
issue differs. Since states follow different approaches to different security problems, it is
extremely hard to talk about a fixed international system with the assumptions of anarchy
that shapes state-state relations.

82 Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 80.
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The second point is that security complex theory originally assumes change in the
system but regional perspective limits the idea o f change in security complexes since
regions are more or less defined through geographical locations. A non-territorial security
complex, gives flexibility back to the theory. Since state relations are significant to
certain policies, regions might be significant only to observe actors’ policies in one
region on a specific issue. With regards to nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation
practices, following a regional approach generally falls short because states even in one
region may have very different policies regarding proliferation.
Why suggest issue based security constellations rather than focusing merely on
regions? The regional security complex theory has shortfalls to explain transnational
security problems such as international terrorism and nuclear proliferation. This shortfall
rests on the main assumption o f the theory that threats travel easily in the neighboring
states; that is why regional security complexes are territorial in origin. Nuclear weapons
undermine this assumption, as they are easy to deploy beyond the immediate
geographical region. Some can even be deployed intereontinentally. This means any state
might be a security concern for any other state regardless o f geography. It also means that
the nuclear practices o f one state, in one region, might affect non-regional actors
shockingly more than regional actors, depending on the level o f securitization or
politicization o f the nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation in the latter state.
Both the United States and Israel, for instance, are affected by the results o f an
Iranian nuclear weapons program. A regional response alone is not sufficient to
adequately confront the issue. Turkey, however,— which is another regional actor—
although clearly states not to allow Iran to be a nuclear weapons state, differs in the
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nuclear approach to Iran and on its own nuclear policies. According to Buzan and
Waever’s security complex theory, Israel and Turkey are linked through security
interdependence, which is the Iranian nuclear proliferation. If, however, there is security
interdependence, why doesn’t it result in similar state policies?
Although regional proliferation security complexes may explain an expected level
of interdependence in a region, it cannot explain the question o f why Egypt is so
supportive o f a non-nuclear region, whereas Iran is all into acquiring nuclear weapons,
and Turkey follows a strict new nuclear energy approach rather than focusing on the
nuclear weapons program, especially as Israel has nuclear weapons.
Security complex theory is useful, as it prevents us from viewing security as
monolithic. On the contrary, it allows room to capture security in terms o f clusters.
Security does not mean the same for all actors, and a security issue that is vital for one
state may not be that vital for another. This causes the differences among regional actors
on any securitized issue.
Security complex theory is useful for explaining nuclear practices o f states
because it places securitization theory at the center o f the study. With securitization the
issue at stake, like nuclear proliferation, gains a momentum where state agenda shifts to
the issue. In practice nuclear proliferation has never been totally securitized. It has always
been highly politicized especially in the United States. The issue is regarded as a security
issue, but the policies to tackle it encompass only one dimension; the national security
perspective. Solving proliferation in this way generates particular state policies and does
not unlock the problems. The securitization o f the nuclear issues means to take into the
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international level, where national policies and posture melts away, which opens up a
room for change.

CONCLUSION

To conclude this chapter, issue-based security complexes do not dismiss regional
perspectives. An alternative to examine proliferation is through an issue-based approach.
It is sufficient to say that both regional and issue-based security complexes aim to explain
state behavior. Both are significant, and complementary in understanding nuclear
practices and only when they are considered together, is comprehensive analysis possible.
The next chapter focuses on nuclear proliferation as the security issue at stake, and seeks
to group states in terms o f their state characteristics that shape nuclear behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
EXAMINING NUCLEAR LITERATURE THROUGH GROUPING METHOD

Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, and
the necessary nuclear technology into the hands o f more actors.1This chapter is
structured to use the grouping methods o f the existing literature. The focus is given to the
nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation debates. The existing literature uses grouping
as a method but this has never been exposed as a special undertaking. In this chapter, I
briefly introduce nuclear proliferation and then examine the nuclear literature through the
use o f the grouping method. Later, I introduce to group states in terms of state
characteristics. In the theoretical realm, grouping states in terms o f state characteristics
related to nuclear posture enables one to utilize the three core theoretical approaches in
International Relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) at the same time. The
proposed grouping, however, is not an eclectic approach because each group feeds from
one dominant theory rather than several theories. There is little work in either the policy
or theoretical realm on utilizing grouping methods in the nuclear field, so far.
This chapter first demonstrates the nuclear literature where grouping methodology
is utilized. Depending on the questions asked different groupings emerged in the nuclear
literature. To unfold these questions, this chapter looks into the proliferation debates and
reveals how researchers grouped states, their policies, and capabilities. One o f these
debates is the explanation o f proliferation by answering the question: why does nuclear
proliferation takes place? This debate identifies factors from three core theories (realism,
liberalism, and constructivism). Another debate asks: what are the methods to prevent
1 Joshua Goldstein, Jon Pevehouse. 2012. International Relations: Pearson.
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proliferation? This debate identifies deterrence, non-proliferation, and disarmament as the
core policies. Based on this particular debate, the chapter highlights the problems with
the deterrence strategy in the 21s1 century as it seeks to maintain the status quo. The trend
on nuclear especially in the European realm is to outlaw nuclear weapons and to follow
nuclear disarmament. States are grouped, indirectly, in the literature as nuclear
nonproliferation supporters, nuclear disarmament supporters and peaceful use o f nuclear
energy supporters. This chapter concludes by positing that non-proliferation policies
should be parallel to nuclear disarmament policies in which international will can balance
national interest. By international will, I mean the will o f the states in the international
arena, such as at the United Nations General Assembly, International Atomic Energy
Agency and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Commissions. Although states
mainly strive to preserve their national interest in the international arena, these
organizations still represents the will o f the collective.
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GROUPING METHODS

Grouping in terms of Legal Possession:
Many scholars in the nuclear field implicitly group states while conducting
research. Depending on the question, different groupings emerge. One o f the questions
often asked is what constitutes a nuclear weapon state? This question is derived from the
main comparison o f nuclear weapon states with non-nuclear weapon states. This
comparison initially grouped nuclear weapon states as the ones that possess nuclear
weapons before the initiation o f the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1967.
Nuclear weapon states, then, are the group of five states, acknowledged by the treaty.
Non-nuclear weapon states are the rest o f the world, which pledged not to acquire nuclear
weapons. This grouping is important as it draws the line in international law and created
the vocabulary we still use today. This does not show the “reality” o f today as there are
de facto nuclear weapon states— India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. The possession
of nuclear weapons then cannot be reduced to a legal perspective where de jure nuclear
weapon states are the only nuclear weapon states. The proposed model of nuclear security
complex theory, considers India, Pakistan and Israel as nuclear weapon states even
though these states acquired nuclear weapons after 1967.
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Grouping in terms of Theoretical Posture:
What is the reason for proliferation and non-proliferation? This is another
question that has led to grouping in terms o f theoretical posture. This question has
resulted in realist, liberalist, and constructivist camps. In the realist camp, scholars argue
that states proliferate due to threat existence with the logic o f national survival. Regional
insecurities are motivation for states to consider nuclear proliferation but they are not the
only reason. This argument maintains that threats travel more easily in geographically
close locations than in others. Stephen W alt’s argument that contradicts Kenneth Waltz
for instance, revolves around a similar idea.
According to Walt, states do not balance against the strongest state but rather they
balance against the most threatening state. The level o f threat, for Walt, depends on
“aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.”3
Offensive power projection correlates with geographical proximity as well. On the role of
geographical proximity, “states that are geographically close can threaten one another
more easily.” 4 As a result o f offensive power perception, states mirror each other’s
behavior.5 In the end, this mirror imaging results in a security dilemma and can cause an
arms race. Susan F. Burk, Special Representative o f the President for Non Proliferation in
Brazil, indicates, “when one state acquires nuclear weapons, its neighbors may feel the

2Stephen M. Walt, 1987. The Origin o f Alliances. Ithaca: N ew York: Cornell University.
3 Stephen, Walt. 1987, p. 22.
4 Mirror-image perception in psychology is “reciprocal views o f one another often held by parties
in conflict, for example, each may view itself as peace loving and the other side as evil and
aggressive.” See David G. Meyers. Social Psychology Glossary, 7/e. McGraw Hill Higher
Education 2002.
5 Mirror-image perception in psychology is “reciprocal views o f one another often held by parties
in conflict, for example, each may view itself as peace loving and the other side as evil and
aggressive.” See David G. Meyers. Social Psychology Glossary, 7/e. McGraw Hill Higher
Education 2002.
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need to do likewise, leading the entire region down the path o f insecurity.”6 According to
Burk, Latin America is the “opposite” example for this logic where “mutual security” has
prospered by abolishing nuclear weapons in the region.
Realist school argues that threat existence decreases in the formation o f alliances.
With regards to nuclear weapons, the United States nuclear umbrella continues to provide
the main alliance dynamics of today. With the nuclear umbrella, the United States assures
its allies that in the case o f a nuclear attack, it is the United States who would protect
them. The nuclear umbrella ensures states not to proliferate for security reasons. Not to
acquire nuclear weapons may rest purely on national interest calculations, such as the
economic costs o f nuclear weapons program. Not to acquire nuclear weapons may also
rest on trust and cooperation between actors. In that case, parties follow a liberal
worldview. The nuclear umbrella is not all encompassing; it excludes most o f the states
from protection. Therefore, although nuclear umbrella seems to create unification and
non-proliferation, it also drives other states to consider proliferation.
Alliances are a form o f security assurance. They are “outward oriented and are
intended to increase the security o f the members vis a vis external parties.”7 According to
realists, alliances are formed for national interest and they would dissolve if the interest
diminished. If more states acquired nuclear weapons, the role o f nuclear umbrella would
diminish and the “credibility” o f the United States’ as a protective ally would be

6 Burk, Susan F. October 29, 2009. The Future o f the NPT: A Vision for Strengthening and
Success. Paper read at International Seminar on Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, p. 3.
7 John Duffield, Cynthia Michota, Sara Ann Miller. 2008. "Alliances." In Security studies: an
introduction, edited by Paul Williams, xxiv, 552 p. London; New York: Routledge.
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undermined.8 Alliances are like building blocks for non-proliferation; a function for
realism, where alliances are formed for “offensive reasons” and dissolve easily.9
For liberalism, alliances generate cooperation. States realize that national security
is assured by and with the security o f others. In other words, security in the contemporary
era is not independent o f other states’ security. This logic stems from the liberalconstructivist view, where security o f one state provides security o f all, not against all. In
this circumstance, states feel they are “part o f a larger political community,” and are more
likely to preserve the alliance.10 When alliances exist within the security fo r all, rather
than prioritizing national interest, a liberal posture can prevail.
Second difference between realism and liberalism is on the role o f democracy and
nuclear nonproliferation. The literature misleadingly states that democracies are more
likely to acquire nuclear weapons. Jo and Gartzke’s quantitative research finds “no
difference between democratic states and autocracies to produce nuclear weapons.” 11 Jo
& Gartzke’s finding was the result o f an analysis o f three nuclear weapons states which
are full democracies (United Kingdom, United States, and France) and three de facto
states, two o f which are “clear democracies” (Israel, India), and one, which is a partial
democracy (Pakistan), based on the Polity dataset. The problem with this analysis is that
de jure nuclear weapons states proliferated before the ratification o f NPT. Israel is
believed to acquire the nuclear weapons in 1960s, yet it never declared publicly.

8 Matthew, Kroenig. June 4, 2012. "The History o f Proliferation Optimism: Does it have a
Future." Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
9 John Duffield, Cynthia Michota, Sara Ann Miller, 2008.
10 John Duffield, Cynthia Michota, Sara Ann Miller, 2008, p. 299
11 Jo, D. J., and E. Gartzke. 2007. "Determinants o f nuclear weapons proliferation." Journal o f
Conflict Resolution no. 51 (1): 179; 184.
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The tendency o f proliferation by democratic states in the post-NPT world has
significantly decreased. The dissolution o f threat from Europe is perhaps related to the
nuclear abstention as well. This tendency highlights how nuclear capable democratic
states have abstained from following the nuclear path for the last decades. This literature
does not take into account the ongoing commitment o f the non-nuclear weapon
democratic states under the NPT ruling, as Sagan highlights.12 A future analysis with two
time periods may capture this distinction.

1T

Democracy as an indicator for nuclear weapon programs should focus on the level
of democracy in relation to the nuclear posture. A transparent nuclear program for
peaceful nuclear energy is one o f these indicators. All o f the de jure nuclear weapon
states that are democracies in the POLITY IV dataset became so in non-democratic
conditions, without public consent and approval. In democratic states, the domestic
pressures are high to change the course o f any nuclear activity o f a state. The Cold War
environment was tense where European states created a security paradigm o f which the
public consent for military affairs was not required due to intense level o f hostility. The
post-Cold War environment, however, did not allow national security matters to outlaw
nonproliferation posture in Europe.
The liberal camp also states the economic burden to initiate nuclear weapons
program. Threat might trigger states to acquire nuclear weapons program, but it is not

12 Sagan, S. D. 2011. "The Causes o f Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." Annual Review o f Political
Science, Vol. 14 no. 14: 238.
13 While modeling nuclear security complexes, the liberal security complex (group) uses
democracy as an indicator. I do not however make a distinction between nuclear weapon states or
nonnuclear weapon states in this regard. Democracy is an indicator for nuclear transparency and
nuclear domestic pressures with regards to follow or abstain nuclear weapons program.
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sufficient to follow economically and politically costly path when states would rather
focus on strengthening their conventional military.
The constructivist camp uses factors like established norms, treaties, and the
nuclear taboo for using nuclear weapons. Safeguards compliance is also based on a
checklist o f rules that groups states. This grouping is based on the nuclear posture o f a
state. Non-nuclear weapon states are obliged “not to manufacture, or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 14 Noncompliance is determined
through a checklist, such as diversion o f materials to nuclear weapons, refusal of
safeguards inspection, the overall record o f the state on performance o f safeguards and
nonproliferation commitments, and the context o f safeguards breaches.15 This checklist
groups states in line with the treaty terms.
The realist-liberalist debate on nuclear proliferation did not progress much but a
new thinking emerged from the debate. This thinking, blended with the constructivist
approach, enables an alternative understanding and explanation by which to group states.
The constructivist explanation supports the logic that states do not act similarly at all
times.
The constructivist scholars added ideational reasons to explain proliferation. In
this new approach, the debate has shifted from the question “how to prevent
proliferation” to “why do some states not consider proliferation an option?” 16 If all states
act similarly under the same conditions— which is the existence o f threat— then we would
expect more and more states with nuclear weapons in time. Constructivist scholars
14 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. April 22, 1970. Article II. International
Atomic Energy Agency.
15 Carlson, John. May 2009. "Defining Noncompliance: NPT Safeguards Agreements." Arms
Control Today.
16 Tanya Ogilvie-W hite, 1996, p. 45.
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emphasize that state characteristics differ in the international system; thus, states’ nuclear
proliferation ambitions also differ from one another.17 Constructivism does not disregard
the role of threat in decision-making but it includes national identity, norms and rules in
the equation. To follow this premise, grouping states in terms o f ideational and
institutional characteristics is a method for the constructivist approach in the nuclear
field.18
Sagan tested three groups in Three Models in Search o f a Bomb— the security
model, domestic model, and norms model— to explain the motivation for proliferation
through a theoretical filter.19 This article is an inspiration for following an eclectic
theoretical approach in the nuclear field. By analyzing the three models, Sagan implicitly
groups states into three categories.
For Sagan, the security model is the realist explanation o f proliferation where
external security concerns drive states to acquire nuclear weapons. This model assumes
that states do not trust each other and acquiring nuclear weapons causes a security
dilemma, which results with proliferation.20 According to the security model, states are
restrained from acquiring nuclear weapons only when they do not face “military threat.”21
The domestic politics model articulates nuclear proliferation by prioritizing the
interests o f leaders, scientific communities (nuclear energy experts) and military
personnel. It takes into account the effect o f the scientific-military-industrial complex on

17 Tanya Ogilvie-W hite, 1996, p. 46.
18 Chapter 4 is designed on the categorization o f states through a theoretical framework: realist,
liberal, and constructivist theories are the core ones in this grouping.
19 Scott, Sagan. 1996-1997. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three M odels in Search o f
A Bomb." International Security no. 21 (3): 54-86.
20 Scott Sagan, 1996, p. 55.
21 Scott Sagan, 1996, p. 61.
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the decision making process.

22

The norms model signifies the symbolic role o f nuclear

weapons in association with national identity and increased status.
Sagan’s three models open up new dimensions o f thinking by following
theoretical dividing lines. Sagan’s work results in an eclectic posture, concluding, “each
theory explains some past cases quite well and others quite poorly.” Sagan does not
evaluate the issue from a regional standpoint explicitly. However, from his writings, it is
implied that the security model might assume threats would travel easily within the
regions; therefore proliferation is most likely the result o f regional insecurities. The
historical examples that Sagan states also support this view, as he looks at Chinese and
Indian nuclear proliferation as a result o f regional threat existence as well as the
Argentinian and Brazilian nuclear reversals. Even when the author examines the domestic
model, Sagan states that internal actors may use external threats as their cause for
proliferation.
Sagan shows that the security, domestic, and norm models might all be affective
to explain a state’s nuclear posture. This is an eclectic posture where “more than one
reason might explain nuclear proliferation or restraint.”24 Regional approaches with a
mere focus on threats are necessary, but not sufficient, to explain all cases.

22 Scott Sagan, 1996, p. 64.
23 Scott Sagan, 1996, pp. 65-66.
24 Scott Sagan, 1996, p. 85. Although this dissertation acknowledges the benefits to follow an
eclectic stance, it differs from Sagan’s point as well. Nuclear proliferation security com plexes
here suggest that some states are eager to proliferate primarily for security reasons, and some
states primarily for normative reasons. Similarly, if a state restraint from proliferation even
though an external threat exists, that state might have other primary driving motives to restrain. In
this regard, this dissertation follow s different theoretical explanations for different case groups.
This is different than an eclectic approach where all different theories explain a case.
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Grouping in terms of advantages and disadvantages of proliferation:
The initial question o f why states proliferate opened up a new debate on the
proliferation advantages and disadvantages. During the Cold War not all scholars agreed
that proliferation begot proliferation. There were two groups o f scholars; proliferationoptimists and proliferation-pessimists. Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan were the heads o f
these two groups respectively. The difference between the two groups laid on the
question whether proliferation creates stability or not.

Waltz was a supporter of

proliferation (a proliferation optimist), whereas Sagan was concerned (a proliferation
pessimist) with the spread of nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer contributed this debate,
suggesting controlled proliferation, which is to allow certain regions to proliferate, such
as Europe, to reestablish balance o f power.26 With this view, Mearsheimer groups states
regarding their geographical positioning. Simply put, Mearsheimer has followed
controlled proliferation logic where proliferation would bring stability to Europe but not
to the Middle East.
This debate revolved around the main terms in international relations such as
peace, stability, conflict and balance o f power at the system level.

It rested on the

question “what will be the risk of war in an international system of tens o f nuclear
weapon states?”28 Waltz believed that the more the states acquire nuclear weapons, the
more stable is the system. From W altz’s logic, states would be more “cautious” in a

25 Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, 2003, The Spread o f Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed,
Second Edition, New York: W. W. Norton.
26 See John Mearsheimer, 1990, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,
International Security, 15: 1.
27 Shai Feldman, 1995, Is There a Proliferation Debate, Security Studies, 4:4, p. 787.
28 Brad Roberts, 1995, Rethinking The Proliferation Debate: A Commentary, Security Studies,
4:4, pp. 792-801.
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proliferated world, and this would prevent nuclear catastrophe.

This also meant that the

chance o f war in a proliferated world is less likely.30 For Waltz, the third image, which is
the international system, is deterministic in state decisions.
In W altz’s defense, there are several reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons. One
of the reasons was state security and survival. According to Waltz, “if a state does not
have a nuclear ally, it would want the nuclear weapons all the more if some o f its
adversaries have them.” 3'Although Waltz did not acclaim a regional pattern, his
examples were driven from regional threat existence. Waltz explained Israel’s interest in
nuclear weapons through regional adversary relations as well.

32

Unlike Waltz, Sagan argued, “more [nuclear weapons]33 will be worse.”34 Sagan
stressed that the proliferation debate lacks an “alternative approach where the debate only
shows the likelihood of war when the nuclear weapons is spread to more actors.”35
Sagan’s argumentation is two-fold: Nuclear proliferation might result in catastrophe
because o f organizational failure (military) or because o f the lack o f “civilian control” in
29 Kenneth Waltz, 1981, The Spread o f Nuclear Weapons: More May Better, Adelphi Papers,
Number 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
30 See other scholars on nuclear optimism: Steven J. Rosen, 1977. The Stable System o f Mutual
Nuclear Deterrence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, The American P olitical Science Review, 71(4):
1367-1383; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker. June 1982. "An Assessment o f the
Merits o f Selective Nuclear Proliferation." Journal o f Conflict Resolution no. 26 (2): 283-306.
See also, Michael D. Intriligator, Dagobert L. Brito. 1981. "Nuclear Proliferation and the
Probability o f Nuclear War." Public Choice no. 37: 247-260. Intriligator and Brito show a
mathematical analysis claiming: “proliferation may reduce the probability o f nuclear war.”
Nuclear proliferation studies during the Cold War were heavily dominated by mathematical
analysis. During this timeframe, scientific studies had a clash with social science. For a general
debate see Morton, A. Kaplan. 1966. "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in
International Relations." World Politics no. 19 (1): 1-20; Hedley, Bull. 1966. "International
Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach." World Politics no. 18 (3): 361-377.
31 Kenneth Waltz, 1981.
32 Kenneth Waltz, 1981.
33 Emphasis added.
34 Scott Sagan, 2003, More will be Worse, in Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, The Spread o f
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, Second Edition, New York: W. W. Norton.
35 Sagan, 2003, p. 47.
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future nuclear dealings.

Sagan argues that deterrence optimism is a “mistaken
" in

nostalgia” and a “faulty analogy.”

Sagan acknowledges that “external security threat” is

the primary cause for nuclear proliferation; but satisfying domestic actors and the
symbolic power of nuclear weapons being an object for status should not be dismissed
from the analysis.38
The main difference between Sagan and Waltz is on the level o f analysis. The
level of analysis is also a kind o f grouping in terms o f units o f analysis. Specifically,
Waltz follows systems level o f analysis, whereas Sagan follows a domestic politics
approach.39 For Waltz, states are the primary actors and decisions are taken within
rational decision-making. For Sagan, it is not the states per se but the domestic actors,
such as military organizations and scientific cadre, that are significant on the decision
making. The organizational characteristics like offensive culture and bureaucratic politics
play role on this decision. For Waltz, states aim to increase their power at the expense of
others; which is known in the International Relations literature as relative gain seeking
behavior. Suffice to say this debate at the general level, relates to realist and liberal
claims on nuclear proliferation.
Waltz argued that states are expected to behave similarly under the same
conditions. This means it is futile to group states to examine their proliferation behavior,

36 Sagan, 2003, p. 47.
37 Sagan, 2003, p. 48.
38 Scott, Sagan. Sep/Oct 2006. "How to Keep the Bomb from Iran." Foreign Affairs no. 85 (5).
39 The debate on the levels o f analysis exists not only in the issue o f nuclear proliferation but it is
also a micro-theoretical one. In the macro level, realism observes state behavior through an
international level o f analysis where states dwell under anarchy, whereas liberalism observes state
behavior with regards to institutions and cooperation. In the micro-theoretical level, different
approaches feed from the level o f analysis. As it is discussed in this dissertation security
complexes literature also feeds from the levels o f analysis debate, where Barry Buzan has created
a mid-level analysis between states and the system. This mid-level is called regional level o f
analysis. See Chapter III.
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since they would choose to proliferate to maximize national interest anyway.40 Following
this logic, Mearsheimer predicted a nuclear Germany in the post-Cold War era 41
Germany, however, followed a new “role” that rested on nonproliferation.42 The case o f
Germany shows that not all states are in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons because
national interest is not related solely to the logic o f survival or relative gains. To compare
the United States and Germany’s nuclear posture today, the United States’ nuclear policy
stems from the interests of the United States; whereas Germany regards proliferation as a
“universal problem rather than a national one.”43 The latter approach objectifies the
proliferation problem in a universal manner whereas the former personalizes/nationalizes
it.
Waltz had a few supporters if not more, which claim positive aspects of
proliferation for creating stability in a bipolar w orld.44 Proliferation optimists like Waltz
indicated the regional stability that nuclear weapons may bring when there are two
superpowers in the system. Steven Rosen, for instance, suggested that mutual deterrence
40 Kenneth, Waltz. 1979. Theory o f International Politics: McGraw-Hill.
41 See John Mearsheimer, 1990, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,
International Security, 15:1.
42 This is the constructivist approach to explain why some states choose not to proliferate even
though they have the incentive to do so. Constructivist school follows the role o f identities,
norms, and “nuclear taboo” to be affective in the decisions. See, Harald, Muller. Summer 2003.
"Germany and WMD Proliferation." The Nonproliferation Review, p. 16. For nuclear taboo, see
Nina, Tannenwald. 2008. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use o f Nuclear
Weapons since 1945: Cambridge University Press.
43 Harald, Muller. 2003, p. 5.
44 For an extended analysis on the proliferation o f nuclear weapons in the Cold War see Frank
Bamaby, 1989, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, I.B. Tauris:
London. According to Bamaby, nuclear weapons can create stability in one region only when the
system is bipolar, when parties have mutual recognition and communication with each other, and
both have second strike nuclear capability with conventional deterrence capability as well. See
also Bhatia Shyam, 1988, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, Routledge: London & New York;
Greenwood Ted, 1977, The Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, in The Diffusion o f Power: I.
Proliferation o f Force, Adelphi Papers, Number: 133, pp. 24-33; Karem Mahmoud, 1988, A
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects, Greenwood Press: New
York.
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is viable in the Middle East, as nuclear weapons would equalize Israeli military capability
with the Arab states.45 Rosen asked whether nuclear weapons help regional powers to
ameliorate existing problems. It is suffice to say that proliferation optimists rely on their
cases o f regional balancing as a stabilizing outcome o f proliferation. The neglected point
in this type o f grouping, however, is the global consequences o f nuclear proliferation.
Grouping based on nuclear stability filtered through regions does not disqualify the
transnational aspects and the role o f nuclear weapons. In the 2 1st century, a nuclear
proliferator state has negative impact on the established nuclear regime, which is based
on non-proliferation dynamics.
In late 1970s, the nuclear proliferation optimists supported “selective
proliferation” to create stable regions.46 Selective proliferation is closely linked to
following a policy o f regional deterrence, since it integrates “fear o f retaliation” as the
cause for non-action. Wentz, for instance, suggested the United States to help Japan
acquiring nuclear weapons to create balance in the far E ast47 This is also a grouping
method— where Japan is checked in to proliferate while others do not— based on national
interest o f the United States. Following a national interest based approach to tackle
proliferation is not sufficient in the long run, because it creates a biased approach.

45 Steven J. Rosen, 1977. The Stable System o f Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, The American P olitical Science Review, 71 (4): 1367-1383.
46 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker. June 1982. "An Assessment o f the Merits o f
Selective Nuclear Proliferation." Journal o f Conflict Resolution no. 26 (2): 283.
47 B., Wentz W. 1968. Nuclear Proliferation. Washington: Public Affairs Press. See also, Michael
D. Intriligator, Dagobert L. Brito. 1981. "Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability o f Nuclear
War." Public Choice no. 37:247-260. Intriligator and Brito show a mathematical analysis
claiming, “Proliferation may reduce the probability o f nuclear war.” Nuclear proliferation studies
during the Cold War were heavily dominated by mathematical analysis. During this timeframe,
scientific studies had a clash with social science. For a general debate see Morton, A. Kaplan.
1966. "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations." World
Politics no. 19(1): 1-20; Hedley, Bull. 1966. "International Theory: The Case for a Classical
Approach." World Politics no. 18 (3): 361-377.
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Grouping in terms of regional versus global considerations:
There are two groups of studies considering the value of a regional approach. The
first group of scholars argues that some regions are prone to proliferation. Nuclear
weapons are a regional issue, the decision-making to acquire nuclear weapons feeds from
regional threat identification, and nuclear weapon free zones are the solution to prevent
the spread o f nuclear weapons. The second group o f scholars argues that proliferation is
not regional. Nuclear weapons are transnational in nature and have global impact; thus,
they are not limited to regional calculations. Nuclear security complex model favors the
latter approach and builds upon transnationalism for the nuclear proliferation puzzle.
a- Regional Considerations: According to the supporters o f regional approach,
some regions are prone to proliferation. Betts, in Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and NonProliferation Revisited, for instance, argues firstly that proliferation is a political problem
that is not related to the capabilities o f states.48 It is a political problem because even
though states have the capabilities, they might not consider pursuing a nuclear
proliferation policy based on their political preferences. The post-Cold War era showed
that states such as Germany, Italy, Japan, and many others have abstained from acquiring
nuclear weapons, although they have the economic and technological power to do so.
According to Betts, states proliferate either to gain status49 or to ensure national security.
With regards to security, the author groups states into three categories: pygmy states,
pariah states, and paranoid states. Pygmy states are the ones when states are “threatened
by powerful neighbors;” pariah states are the ones when a nation is surrounded by
48Richard, Betts. Spring-Summer 1993. "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Non-Proliferation
Revisited." Security Studies no. 2 (3-4): 106.
49 Betts label Iran as a status seeker power rather than a security seeker one. Although it might be
true in early post-Cold War, today Iran also seeks security because it gets the threat perception
not only from Israel but also from the United States and its Middle Eastern allies.
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neighboring enemies; and paranoid states are the ones when states create the threat when
there is no actual threat to a nation’s survival.50 This grouping follows a regional
framework. Pygmy states would feel threatened by the “local enemies or regional
hegemonic powers,” says Betts.51 The nuclear non-proliferation treaties as well as the
safeguards regulations are not solutions for the pariah, paranoid, or pygmy states.

The

solution, the author claims, is to “reaffirm and extend the protective alliances” since
alliances would decrease “insecurity.”

ST

Nuclear proliferation behavior in the same region differs due to different
understandings of the leaders. Thus, claiming that some regions are prone to proliferation
is an exaggeration. Early in the Cold War, Brazil followed a nuclear weapons program
with the help o f West Germany against Argentina. It had its uranium mining and limited
reprocessing facility, and research centers with adequate scientific knowledge.
Historically, both Argentina and Brazil were powerful rival states in Latin America.
During the military ruling while Brazil pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program,
as Hymans uncovers, Argentina’s enrichment program was directed to produce a nuclear
submarine to follow a policy o f nuclear nationalism, which was to master nuclear
technology for nationalistic reasons.54 However, Brazil had the transition to democracy
and renounced upon its ballistic missile program in 1990s.55 Although the rivalry
between the two states did not disappear overnight, their perspectives have changed. Both

50 Richard Betts, 1993, p. 107.
51 Richard Betts, 1993, p.109.
52 Richard Betts, 1993, p. 115.
53 Richard Betts, 1993, p. 118.
54 Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2001. "Of Gauchos and Gringos: Why Argentine Never Wanted the
Bomb, and Why the United States Thought it Did." Security Studies no. 10 (3): 153-185.
55 Nuclear Threat Initiative. Country Profiles: Brazil. Available from http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/brazil/official-documents/.
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states signed the Treaty o f Tlatelolco that prohibited nuclear weapons in Latin America.
Additionally, they created the Brazil-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control o f
Nuclear Materials. In recent years, Brazil has also followed a general nuclear policy as it
presses nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapons and to comply with
NPT Article VI.56
It is suffice to say that, for Betts, the problem is regional (threat identification
from neighbors) but the solution is global (alliance formation). For other scholars, the
solution is to establish Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ), because nuclear weapons
free zone create an “environment for nonproliferation, diminishes the risk of arms race,
and strengthen peace and security.”57
Others, like Holst, would argue that NWFZ is a “reassurance about intensions”
and part of confidence-building measures. NWFZs are not an ultimate solution to create a
secure region, as some regions have already existing problems, such as “rising tensions,
absence of direct channels o f communication, defiant leadership, and religious feuds” in
co

the Middle East.

Bamaby also supports the view that a NWFZ in the Middle East at

least, is hard to establish because o f the mutual security concerns.59 Bamaby is in favor o f
controlling proliferation because o f its destabilizing effect. The author concludes that the
solution rests on recognizing the Israeli state, and satisfying Palestinian Arabs by giving
them their political rights. Another solution that the author indicates to stop proliferation

56 NPT Preparatory Committee. May 8. 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee Cluster 1 Debates by
Brazil.
57Mahmoud Karem. 1988. A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the M iddle East: Problem s and
Prospects, Contribution in M ilitary Studies: Greenwood Press.
58 Johan Jorgen, Holst. 1983. "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework."
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy no. 25 (1): 2-15.
59Frank, Bamaby. 1989. The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the M iddle East.
London: I. B. Tauris.
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is by putting measures in place to prevent the nuclear states from selling nuclear
technology to third parties. In this regard, Bamaby rests his position on the early 1960s
when France helped Israel with its plutonium production and did not share this
knowledge with the United States. Therefore, if proliferation occurs in the Middle East, it
does through the transnational assistance o f other states.
A regional understanding persists in the nuclear scholarship. Although thinking
through regional distinctions assists in creating an overall nuclear understanding with
regards to the existence o f threat; it does not explain the different postures and policies o f
states in the same region. The policy realm overburdens proliferation with spillover
effects in a region. For instance the premise that Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are
likely to proliferate if Iran acquires nuclear weapons is an overestimation with little
factual analysis. Campbell et al advocated this point, arguing that a nuclear Iran would
cause instability in the region.60 Among the three likely proliferators, Saudi Arabia was
shown to be the most likely country to proliferate in the scholarly literature. On contrary
to these claims, in Nuclear Proliferation: The Case o f Saudi Arabia, Bahgat suggested
that Saudi Arabia does not face imminent threats from “Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Yemen.”
Previously, Saudi Arabia had a balancing role between Iraq and Iran.61 The nuclear
umbrella that protects allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, thus diminishes
the possibility o f a nuclear Middle East.
The regional approach can be found in the cases that Waltz, Mearsheimer, and
Sagan used in their analysis of the Cold War. This approach continued into the post-Cold
60 To read a political analysis for possible nuclear proliferation scenarios, see Kurt Campbell,
Robert Einhom, Mitchell Reiss (eds.), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their
Nuclear Choices.
61 Gawdat Bahgat. 2006. "Nuclear Proliferation: The Case o f Saudi Arabia." Middle East Journal
no. 60 (3): 421-443.
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War nuclear scholarship as well. Etel Solingen for instance, has offered a regional
comparison o f nuclear ambitions with a focus on the domestic political environment with
regards to integration into the global economy.
According to Solingen, states in the Middle East differ from East Asia in their
nuclear pursuit, and this suggests a regional pattern. There is a correlation between East
Asia not following nuclear weapons program and their integration to the global market,
says Solingen. Likewise, the Middle East follows inward looking market economy and
nationalistic policies, which end up with an increased likelihood o f establishing a nuclear
weapons program. In the Middle East, leaders utilize nuclear logics to stay in power.62
There are some problems however with Solingen’s generalizations. Egypt for
instance does not follow a nuclear weapons program, neither Turkey in the Middle East.
North Korea— by following nuclear weapons program— is another anomaly on the East
Asian side, if East Asia is less likely to follow nuclear weapons program. Solingen’s
findings are valuable for state-to-state evaluation rather than regional generalization.
Global integration into world markets could be one o f the indicators for the liberal based
security complexes. The idea derives from the proposition that liberal economies value
integration into world markets more than following nationalist pursuits. Yet, not all
liberal economies follow global integration to a similar level. Other factors also play role
in the nuclear pursuit o f states. Due to this reason, there are regional anomalies in
Solingen’s analysis. Interdependence level is also another indicator in the nuclear
equation as not all states are similarly interdependent and some states value nuclear
capabilities more than the costs associated with a nuclear weapons program.

62 Etel Solingen. 2007. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

70
b- Global/Transnational Considerations: Proliferation is not limited to regional
calculations, more so it is a global issue. This perspective, which is the main theme of
this dissertation, is underscored in the nuclear literature. The power o f nuclear weapons
comes from the destructive capability when these weapons are deployed. They can be
deployed over long distances through intercontinental ballistic missiles. This provides a
transnational perspective to these weapons. Transnationalism means actors and issues cut
across state and regional boundaries. In other words, nuclear weapons can cross borders
easily and may be used outside a particular region.
Transnational issues require multilateral approaches to ameliorate the problems.
Nuclear weapons as a transnational issue involve the interest not only o f states but also of
non-state actors, such as civil society and terrorist groups as well as transnational network
groups. Secondly, for states to specialize in a nuclear weapons program requires all the
technology and material needed to do so. It is extremely hard to be self-sufficient without
external help in the nuclear field. A state needs all the nuclear fuel cycle capabilities to
make a single bomb. This nuclear fuel cycle is composed o f mining, milling, fuel
fabrication, power reactors, conversion plants, storage places, reprocessing facilities,
waste storage capacity, repositories, and weapons fabrication. In simple terms, a state
needs to have uranium or be able to reprocess plutonium to make a single bomb. Even if
it does have the material, it still needs the scientific knowledge and also the units to
enrich it. When a state lacks nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, it turns to third parties to sell
the material or technology. In this way the issue crosses the interest o f different actors in
the world. It is well known, for instance, that North Korea helped Syria to start its nuclear
program even though these countries are in different regions.
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Nuclear weapons are a global threat and this does have regional consequences.
Focusing on the regional dynamics per se is to focus on the surface o f the issue however.
Many states aligned with the United States during the Cold War due to its nuclear
capability. This alignment was not limited to regional calculations. According to
Duffield, Michota, and Miller alliances in a transnational setting have three primary
characters: I) alliances are institutionalized through organizations and bureaucratic
settings, 2) institutional capabilities need to be in place to preserve alliance, 3) there is a
socialization process needed to create an alliance identity. The nuclear alliance works
properly with regards to all o f these characteristics. To apply, nuclear alliance is
reinforced through an “institutionalization process” via Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s verification structure. The United
States provides the main capability — a nuclear umbrella — to preserve the alliance’s
coherence. The nuclear alliance identity is to agree on non-proliferation and to push for
nuclear disarmament. This socialization63 is a major statement point in the constructivist
school under “nuclear taboo” as well.64
The third-nuclear test o f North Korea in 2013 alarmed the United States and the
allies because a nuclear weapons program jeopardizes the established nuclear regime and
norms. A nuclear North Korea could threaten world powers due to nuclear weapons’
long-range trajectories. The North Korean nuclear test was a clear rebuke to the

63 Socialization is a contested process. It rests on the idea that states interest can transform
through institutional socialization. This type o f socialization is a part o f learning process. How
long will this process take is not known as well as whether socialization would continue without
institutions is contested. For further analysis on socialization see Bamett, Michael. 2009.
"Evolution without Progress Humanitarianism in a World o f Hurt." International Organization no.
63 (4): 621-663.
64 Nina, Tannenwald. 2008. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use o f Nuclear
Weapons since 1945: Cambridge University Press.
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universally supported Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Right before the
meetings in the United Nations to employ tougher sanctions, North Korea raised the
threat o f a “pre-emptive nuclear strike on its enemies, o f which the United States ranks
first.”65 Using its nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip, North Korea’s foreign
policy behavior rests on intimidation and it utilizes nuclear weapons both symbolically
and materialistically in its policies.66
Transnational issues like nuclear proliferation, have the ability to establish
common settings across actors through ideas, treaties, and norms. Transnational issues
are “framed” in a certain way by social movements or political parties 67 Framing is a part
of coverage for the social movements, according to Tarrow, to bring popularity to the
issue and to create awareness. Nuclear weapons are framed as lethal weapons that have
destructive capability. Nuclear framing is more than micro-cultural and ideological; it
rests also upon the sheer morality o f acquiring nuclear weapons. Framing is fixed in the
memory of both the decision-makers, as well as the population, through the
documentaries, photography, and political satire in relation to the bombings o f Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. This provides the anti-humanistic character that is associated with the use
and acquisition of nuclear weapons. The present nuclear framing results in a culture that
is against the use of nuclear weapons and results in questions about the efficacy of even
having nuclear weapons, if they are never going to be used.
Since nuclear weapons have intercontinental deliverability capability, the
geographical proximity o f the opponent does not matter. Geographical calculations play a
65 Rick Gladstone and David E. Sanger. March 7, 2013. "New Sanctions on North Korea Pass in
Unified U.N. Vote." The New York Times.
66 See Anne Harrington de Santana. 2009. "Nuclear Weapons as the Currency o f Power:
Deconstructing the Fetishism o f Force." Nonproliferation Review no. 16 (3): 325-345.
67Sidney Tarrow. 2005. The New Transnational Activism: Cambridge University Press.

73
role in threat identification, yet, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have longrange trajectory that spreads the threat across borders and regions. General deterrence
policy in the Cold War was between the Soviet Union and the United States; two
geographically distant states.
Nuclear weapons serve the purpose o f deterrence. The logic o f deterrence is to
take no-action, keep the status quo and have bargaining power over the opponent. When
the opponent parties are geographically proximate, the bargaining power o f nuclear
weapons in decision-making disappears. For bargaining, decision-makers need sufficient
time to assess the options. In a situation o f proximate actors relying on nuclear weapons
for bargaining purposes, this time frame dissolves. It takes approximately three minutes
for a missile launched from Iran hit an Israeli city and vice versa, for instance. In such a
case, relying on nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip for decision-making is not logical.
It is the existing nuclear framing that includes nuclear weapons into this kind o f national
interest calculations, even though decision-makers are cognizant o f their non-use.
Regardless, states in the same region may follow different nuclear policies.

Grouping States in terms of nuclear policy posture:
States follow different nuclear policies. In general terms, these policies are part o f
deterrence, nonproliferation, and/or disarmament approaches. The main nuclear policy
and strategy that states follow throughout the Cold War onwards is nuclear deterrence.
Deterrence as nuclear policy posture: Deterrence rests on preserving status quo,
which means to keep nuclear weapons intact, believing they serve a purpose. Deterrence
views nuclear weapons as an asset rather than liability. Tailored deterrence is a “refined
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deterrence strategy” where states “determine” what is a threat; and when and how to
respond it.68 It is to shape policies based on the opponent’s nuclear posture. It is projected
as the viable United States’ nuclear policy. The National Security Strategy o f the United
States indicates that the United States follows “tailored deterrence to stop both state and
non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons.”69 States following tailored deterrence adapt
their foreign policy for each opponent. Therefore, tailored deterrence is an actor-specific
approach. It rests upon initiating policies subject to particular actors rather a general
nuclear non-proliferation policy based on tangible security threats.70
Deterrence in the 21st century is highly debated in terms of its effectiveness. The
first group aims to revitalize nuclear deterrence through tailored deterrence policies; the
second group o f scholars rejects the value o f deterrence today.71 For the supporters of
tailored deterrence, there is no need for immediate deterrence because there is no longer
the Cold War environment. Yet, deterrence needs revitalization72 today to minimize
horizontal and vertical proliferation.73 For instance, the Obama administration is being

68 Patrick M. Morgan, 2003, p. 103.
69 The White House. 2006. The National Security Strategy o f the United States o f America.
Washington D.C.
70 Nuclear issues in many states is politicized rather than securitized. In the United States for
instance although nuclear proliferation is labeled as a security issue, it is claimed to receive the
attention o f the general public. It never reaches a point to generate security policies or concrete
effort by the policy makers. Nuclear proliferation is not the top three problems that the Obama
Administration works on today. The reason for this is it is not securitized.
71 Deterrence has methodological problems with regards to testing. Lebow and Stein argue that
deterrence clearly worked only in nine cases within eighty years (1900-1980). In response, see
Huth and Russett defending the positive role o f deterrence policies through quantitative analysis.
Paul Huth, Bruce Russett. Jul 1990. "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference."
World Politics no. 42 (4): 466-501; Richard Ned Lebow, Janis Gross Stein Apr 1990.
"Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics no. 42 (3): 336-369.
72 Patrick M. Morgan. 2012. p. 96.
73Patrick M. Morgan. 2003. Deterrence Now. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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accused o f dismissing “containment” and “deterrence” with regards to the policies it is
adopting towards Iran.74
Contrary to deterrence supporters, others suggest that deterrence is “at the core o f
the problem o f nuclear proliferation.”

Nuclear deterrence is not the solution to establish

peace; therefore, another policy should be adopted. This group does not neglect the given
purpose o f nuclear weapons during the Cold War; but it does not associate value with this
policy in the post-Cold War era. Nuclear deterrence suffers from four nuclear trends in
the contemporary world order. There is an “increased danger o f proliferation after the
Cold War, the threat o f nuclear terrorism, the growing relevance o f international law, and
nuclear taboo.”76 Nuclear deterrence as a strategy does not prevent states initiating
nuclear weapons program.77 Nuclear deterrence relies on preserving status quo with
nuclear weapons rather than transforming the “irrelevance o f nuclear weapons.”78 The
main question today is whether nuclear deterrence can take the nuclear world order a step
further where nuclear weapons are no longer a threat to national security and are not the
tools of foreign policy?
Deterrence preserves status quo, which serves the powerful to remain in power.
To expect different result while keeping same policies is not a rational strategy,
especially in issues related to international security. Nuclear deterrence serves a
conceptualization where nuclear weapon states keep their nuclear weapons while others

74 Stephen M. Walt. March 18, 2013. Why 1 hope Obama is Bluffing. Foreign Policy.
75 Tom, Sauer. 2011. Eliminating nuclear weapons: the role o f missile defence. New York:
Columbia University Press, p. 105.
76 Tom, Sauer. 2011. Eliminating nuclear weapons: the role o f missile defence. New York:
Columbia University Press, p. 19.
77 Tom, Sauer, 2011. Eliminating nuclear weapons: the role o f m issile defence. New York:
Columbia University Press, p .2 1.
78 Mueller, John. 1988. "The Essential Irrelevance o f Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar
World." International Security no. 13 (2):55-79.
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do not acquire them. The system is biased towards the powerful. Today, the less powerful
actors challenge the powerful actors in the international arena, through diplomatic
channels. Power embraces not only tangible military capability but also less tangible
characteristics. This suggests that nuclear dynamics are now in a flux.
Nuclear Nonproliferation as Nuclear Policy Posture: The main supporters of
nuclear nonproliferation are the nuclear weapon states and states that have tangible power
capability. There are different policies under nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Counter
proliferation is one of these efforts. Safeguards and verification methods through the
IAEA are also part o f non-proliferation efforts. Creating links between different
proliferation cases is significant for nonproliferation policies as well. The United Nations
Security Council Resolutions for instance, explicitly point out the benefits o f eliminating
the Iranian nuclear weapons program to “nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere.”79 If made
a binding resolution this would create the middle ground between the United States’
national interest and international common will to tackle nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear Disarmament as Nuclear Policy Posture: The main supporters o f nuclear
disarmament are states, favoring impartial nuclear policies due to national interest, which
ask parity in non-possession, and/or which value the humanitarian dimensions o f non
possession. These states have less tangible capabilities. The lethality of these weapons
started discussions for nuclear disarmament as a viable policy. With this aim, George P.
Shultz, William Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn published three consequent
articles from 2007-2010. The overall argument was the world faces a “tipping point”

79 United Nations Security Council. 24 March 2007. Resolution 1747.
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QA

where the new nuclear vision should be the total elimination o f nuclear weapons.

These

policy makers o f their time argued that “relying on the nuclear weapons is hazardous” for
the future.81 In the first two articles, these authors suggested an institutional approach,
which was to boost the role of international actors and factors to cope with proliferation.
In the last article, the authors suggested to empower the United States’ leadership to
shape nuclear decisions to “maintain the safety, security, and reliability o f the United
States weapons.”82 Suffice to say, these policy suggestions generally revolve around the
role o f the United States in shaping the international nuclear regime.
Nuclear disarmament policy is reinforced by ideas like nuclear taboo. Nuclear
taboo suggests that nuclear weapons are not used after 1945 because there is an
established moral dimension for non-use. The nuclear disarmament supporters suggest
that in devaluing the role o f nuclear weapons, and delegitimizing nuclear weapons
through international law enforcement the taboo for non-use increases international
security.
Non-governmental organizations generally push states in the direction of nuclear
disarmament. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and
Global Zero are two activist movements with this aim. Both NGOs aim to create a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons through awareness campaigns. The problem lies in the
debate between arms control versus disarmament. We are accustomed to think about

80 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn. January 15, 2008. "Toward
a Nuclear Free World." The Wall Street Journal.
81 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn,. January 4, 2007. "A
World Free o f Nuclear Weapons;" George P. Shultz, William Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam
Nunn. January 19, 2010. "How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent." The Wall Street Journal.
82 George P. Shultz et al. January 19, 2010.
83Nina, Tannenwald. 2008. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use o f Nuclear
Weapons since 1945: Cambridge University Press.
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arms control in conjunction with disarmament; however, in practice the two do not
always complement each other. The actual question becomes whether to prioritize arms
control or disarmament in nuclear policies. Nuclear disarmament needs a combination o f
policies and aspirations to be in effect.84
This chapter summarized the existing literature in the nuclear field through the
lens o f grouping methods. It fed off theoretical and political debates mainly from Cold
War onwards. The reason to cover theory and practice together is to show that there is
disagreement between the theoretical schools o f thought on the methods and strategies to
approach nuclear proliferation. This disagreement is visible in the political postures as
well.
Theoretical debate in the literature on why states proliferate shows that states are
categorized in different theoretical groups regarding their tendency to proliferate.
National interest, domestic groups interest, threat existence, and international norms are
fundamental factors shown in the nuclear literature to differentiate the nuclear postures of
states in terms of their proliferation tendency. The policy debate in the literature indicates
that tailored deterrence is viable for supporting the national interest o f the United States
in particular, and the nuclear weapons states in general. An alternative policy approach is
to follow parallel nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation approaches where all parties
are content with the outcomes. Strengthening the international nuclear regime at the

84 This approach is similar to Kenneth Booth’s call for “utopian realism.” According to Booth, the
word utopian becomes “a kiss o f death” in social studies; yet, it does not have to be negative.
Utopian realism is to “critique what is politically, semantically and philosophically contestable”,
to “set goals and be catalyst to action”, and to “create a desire to have better living in the culture.”
Every conscious policy with a focus on the utopian ideal then is a right one, and should be
appreciated. Nuclear disarmament, then, is similar to “utopian realism” where policies direct you
to the ideal. There is no right or wrong policy but a process to achieve the ideal. See Kenneth
Booth. 1991. "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice." International
Affairs no. 67 (3): 527-545.

79
expense o f a particular national interest is a policy that the United States should volunteer
because other actors have already started to challenge the United States in this field.
There is a rivalry and a never-ending debate among realism, liberalism and
constructivism. States choose to follow nuclear weapons projects for different reasons
and they follow different nuclear policies; therefore a single theory is not sufficient to
explain everything. Eclectic studies, like Sagan’s three models to explain nuclear
behavior, also have problems because they end up explaining a single case with multiple
theories. Thus, the recommendation to unfold the proliferation puzzle suffers. In nuclear
security complexes, discussed in Chapter 4 , 1 group states in terms o f state characteristics
(threat existence, nuclear democracy, institutions and nuclear treaty compliance) that
shape nuclear posture (through policies and speeches) and employ a single theoretical
framework to each group o f states. By this approach, I aim to create an alternative
understanding where a country’s nuclear ambitions can be explained by a single theory;
but not necessarily that all nuclear capable states’ nuclear ambitions derive from that
theory. In other words, a theoretical approach is visible for every group o f states in the
nuclear security complexes.
Grouping states through theoretical and political undertaking does not aim to
predict future proliferation. In a globalized world, it is extremely hard and perhaps futile
to predict the future environment. The false Cold War predictions establish an example o f
this. Rather, grouping states enables us to envision a future in which nuclear proliferation
is under control, nuclear weapons are diminished in quality and quantity, or may even be
totally abolished; while ameliorating the current condition where states follow different
nuclear proliferation policies. Grouping in this way opens up an alternative political
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thinking, where nuclear weapons become a security rather than a policy issue o f national
interest.
The literature on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation is trapped either in
case-by-case explanations or in abstract generalizations. Scholars could not find a mid
way where they would not lose focus on the practice o f proliferation and the theoretical
underpinning o f the practice at the same time. Following a group-based approach— which
is called nuclear security complexes— is a mid-way analysis. To tackle both theoretical
and policy based problems, the next chapter proposes the nuclear security complexes
model.
The arguments that alert us to regional spillover effects are part o f the
politicization o f nuclear weapons rather than securitizing them. The politicization of
nuclear weapons means that states make nuclear weapons an issue o f policy. This has
been stated as a valuable debate during the Cold War when the discussion was whether
nuclear weapons were a military or political issue. In the 2 1st century, the military value
o f nuclear weapons stays only in contingency planning exercises o f states and
international organizations. The political value prevails through deterrence policy. The
politicization of nuclear weapons means that Iran or North Korea cannot acquire nuclear
weapons but if an ally country was to acquire them, the United States might be less
concerned because these nuclear weapons would not necessarily damage its national
interest. Threat existence is both real and perceived and the politicization o f nuclear
issues makes this perception more rigid because state policies create and reinforce the
facts. Securitization o f nuclear weapons, on the other hand, works to uplift nuclear
weapons to the international level, where the collective will prevails. In this aspect, the
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nuclear weapon states, and especially the United States, should be willing not to
dominate international decision-making so as to reflect their national interest because
politicization only reinforces the problems in the nuclear field.
Lastly, the method o f grouping, through state characteristics, bypasses bias based
on national interest. It rests fundamentally on the speeches o f decision-makers as well as
nuclear actions. Therefore, it is easy to group states from different regions in the same
category. The nuclear decision-making in the political sphere is chained to national
interest, especially o f the nuclear powers, such as the United States. When national
interest prevails over international interest, decision-makers follow similar policies over
and over again. Whilst following these policies they expect different results. Expectedly,
the same policies result in the with same outcomes. Doing the same thing over and over
again and expecting a different result, as Einstein said, is stupidity. Nuclear security
complexes, in this regard, aim to create an awareness that is above national interest, an
alternative approach to nuclear thinking in the hope o f changing existing policies and
outcomes.
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CHAPTER 4
NUCLEAR SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY

Scholars utilize the method o f grouping or taxonomy in foreign policy making to
understand and explain the international system and state policies.1 In the security field,
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever follow the grouping method to explain regional patterns to
security studies. This is called the regional security complex theory , which is structured
on neo-realist and constructivist theoretical frameworks. This chapter adds the nuclear
dimension to the conventional theory and further develops the theory by grouping states
regardless o f their regions.
The conventional security complex theory is composed o f five characteristics:
geographical proximity, number o f states, mutual exclusiveness, mutual recognition o f
membership, and patterns in relations among the member states.3 Nuclear security
complexes develop from these five characteristics. The argument in this chapter is that
the conventional security complex theory provides the grounding for an understanding o f
grouping; however, firstly, it is not sufficient to express nuclear nonproliferation policy
implications. Secondly, nuclear proliferation does not strictly rest upon regional settings.
1 Alexander Wendt describes three types o f anarchic cultures. Wend describes three embryonic
cultures that form social structures under anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures. In
the Hobbesian culture, states view each other as “enem ies.” In the Lockean culture, states view
each other as “rivals.” In the Kantian culture, states view each other as “friends.” Alexander
Wendt, 1999, Social Theory o f International Politics, Cambridge University Press: New York.;
Robert Cooper categorizes the world order in terms o f pre-modem, modem, and post-modern
systems. See Robert, Cooper. 1996. The Post-Modern State and the World Order: Demos; Robert,
Cooper. 2003. The Breaking o f Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century. London:
Atlantic Books.
2 Regional Security Complexes, according to Buzan are cluster o f states “whose primary security
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be
considered apart from one another.” See Chapter 2 for detailed analysis o f regional security
complexes.
3 See Chapter 2, pp. 21-24.
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Nuclear security complexes group states in terms o f their state characteristics and
nuclear postures. Nuclear posture is identified in three categories: nuclear weapons states,
non-nuclear weapons states, and nuclear transitioning states. Nuclear posture feeds from
the current national nuclear agenda o f a state with regards to whether nuclear weapons
are viewed as an asset or liability.4 State characteristics are identified through regime
type, treaty compliance, institutional standing, adherence to nuclear norms and
regulations; and threat existence. Why to take the nuclear posture and state characteristics
as the main variables for grouping? Nuclear posture projects the short and mid-term
nuclear aspirations of states, and state characteristics design the long-term vision. This
enables a relatively stable study that benefits from current and enduring features o f states.
The main aim o f grouping is to apply policy per group to create awareness on the
similarities of certain states in their nuclear posture. Tailored deterrence suggests “to
understand the psychology o f the adversaries and the operating environment to assess the
things that are most valued by their leaderships.”5 Keith Payne and Colin Gray originally
discussed tailored deterrence in 1980, supporting that deterrence needs to be adversary
specific. Lantis specified the link between tailored deterrence and strategic culture,
4 Depending on the nuclear posture, states view nuclear weapons either as an asset or liability.
Nuclear weapons can be an appreciating or a depreciating asset. They can also be an issue o f
liability in terms o f responsibility to protect non-nuclear weapon allies against any sort o f nuclear
attack, which is called positive nuclear assurance. When nuclear weapons are an issue o f liability,
a limited group protects the existing nuclear regime. The limited number o f states protecting the
nuclear regime creates a “destabilizing provocation with invaluable consequences.”4 Liability
also brings about the issues with nuclear safety, to protect the nuclear facilities and materials (e.g.
secure the nuclear wastes, ensure the safety o f nuclear reactors, and provide security to nuclear
material.) According to Graham, nuclear weapons are depreciating assets. See Thomas, Graham.
June 13, 2013. Vocabulary and History o f Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation.
Brookhaven National Laboratory; and Jacques E. C. Hymans, 2001. "Of Gauchos and Gringos:
Why Argentine Never Wanted the Bomb, and Why the United States Thought it did." Security
Studies no. 10(3): 155.
5 Jacquelyn K. Davis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Charles M. Perry, James L. Schoff, February 2009.
"Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning." The Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis.
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shifting the rational focus by following a constructivist model o f incorporating cultural
f\

7

dimensions. As discussed in Chapter 3, tailored deterrence has shortcomings. Out of
these shortcomings, following a culture or adversary specific deterrence approach limits
the ability to tackle proliferation at a higher level. Tailored deterrence is biased towards
the question “who is the proliferator state?” If the proliferator is an ally o f the United
States, deterrence strategy does not take place at the same level as a non-ally state. The
neglected if not allowed Israeli nuclear proliferation in 1960s is an example o f a biased
nuclear policy where Israel was not deterred to acquire nuclear weapons capability. The
value-added part to group states is to prevent national interests to kick in the policy
structures at least in the international bodies.
To put it into practice o f the shortcomings o f deterrence, the United States’
nuclear policy towards North Korea and Iran are almost identical. The current policy
identifies the possible threats and offers a range o f options but, in the end, employs the
same policy regardless o f Iranian or North Korean state characteristics and nuclear
posture. This policy is the issue o f United Nations Security Council Resolutions and
employment o f economic sanctions. Yet, these states are not in the same nuclear security
complex (group). In a nutshell, Iran is still responsive to institutional pressures whereas
North Korea is not party to NPT, thus does not follow the IAEA inspections as part o f
international rule of law. It is problematic to expect a single policy to work for two such
drastically different states. This dissertation, therefore, proposes to model a nuclear
security complex theory that employs distinct group policies for nonproliferation.

6 Jeffrey S. Lantis, Dec 2009. "Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence; Bridging the Gap
between Theory and Practice." Contemporary Security Policy no. 30 (3): 467-485.
7 See Chapter 3, page 17 for why tailored deterrence does not work in the 21st century.
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There are seven nuclear security complexes identified in this chapter. Each
security complex is composed o f indicative variables. A triple Venn diagram would be
helpful to picture this grouping. The first three security complexes, called the material,
liberal, and norm based security complexes, are the core parts o f the Venn diagram.
Security complexes four through seven lay on the interactions between one, two, and
three, where seven lies at the center. The United States, as an exception, is the single
member o f the seventh nuclear security complex. This chapter concludes, suggesting an
alternative approach to develop policies for each security complex rather than following
tailored or general deterrence.8

NUCLEAR SECURITY COMPLEXES METHODOLOGY

Nuclear security complexes are non-territorial, issue-focused grouping o f states.
Neither general deterrence doctrine nor tailored deterrence is viable in the contemporary
nuclear proliferation setting; therefore, a middle ground— group method— is proposed as
the alternative way. This argument moves away from deterrence because deterrence
strategy o f today cannot prevent the happening o f the nuclear events. This argument is
discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. To remind, deterrence aims to prevent states to
acquire nuclear weapons and to keep the status quo. In the current nuclear situation,
North Korea and Iran follow nuclear policies that challenge the current nearly universal
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Secondly, keeping up with deterrence
means not to challenge the existing power dimensions between the nuclear weapons
8 See Figure 1 o f this dissertation on page 9.

86
states and non-nuclear weapon states. However, as long as the nuclear weapons exist
through deterrence, the system will be challenged by some states. Nuclear terrorism is
also a challenge to the current strategy, as tailored deterrence cannot prevent non-state
actors to use the nuclear weaponry, ever if acquired. September 11 resembles a challenge
to the general deterrence theory as well. This method suggests that there is a pattern of
relationships and pattern o f interactions within and among the states inside and outside a
security complex.
In the nuclear field, several scholars group states to explain nuclear proliferation
behavior. This literature is given in Chapter 3, however, briefly, Betts clusters states with
regard to their likelihood to proliferate as “paranoids,” “pygmies,” and “pariah.”9
Similarly Chafetz clusters states through a hierarchical setting similar to the World
Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein.10 Chafetz argues, the core states have already
acquired nuclear weapons and the periphery depends on the core group.11 These previous
attempts to group states stuck at the theorizing level and they lack the understanding o f
states that are in transition. Chafetz dismisses the examination o f the “semi-periphery,” as
there are states in the middle o f nuclear decision-making. Additionally, in the 21st

9 Richard, Betts. Spring-Summer 1993. "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation
Revisited." Security Studies no. 2 (3-4): 100-124.
10 There is an economic gap between the North (rich countries) and South (poor countries) in the
world order. According to Wallerstein, modem nation states with econom ic wellbeing and with
the capacity to manufacture goods are called the core states. States that have the raw material but
do not have the manufacturing capability are the periphery states. The latter group is dependent
on the core states to sell the raw material in low-price; the former are composed o f developed
countries that enjoy the cheap commodity by making a surplus. See world system theory:
Immanuel, Wallerstein. 1976. "The Modem World-System." In The Modem World-System:
Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins o f the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century,
228-230. N ew York: Academic Press.
11 Chafetz follows Immanuel W allerstein’s argument on the hierarchical link between core and
periphery and applies this to nuclear proliferation. See Glenn, Chaftez. Spring/Summer 1993.
"The End o f the Cold War and the Future o f Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Alternative to the
Neo-realist Perspective." Security Studies 2:128.
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century, explaining the nuclear ambition through nuclear security complexes aim to align
nuclear theory/theorizing with policy implications.

The following section applies the characteristics o f traditional regional security
complexes from Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, discussed in Chapter 2, to nuclear
proliferation in order to highlight certain differences and similarities and to sketch out a
new model for nuclear security complexes.
a- Geographical Proximity in Nuclear Proliferation: As discussed in Chapter
2, conventional security complex theory suggests that threats travel easily within a close
geographical proximity. States in the same region have “security interdependence,”
closely linked to regional existing threats. This view is overemphasized in realist
literature because threats in the globalized and transnational world travel easily regardless
of geographical positioning. When nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is examined
for instance, fear resulting from the Iranian nuclear weapons program does not lead
technologically and economically capable Middle Eastern states to proliferate. Contrary
to the geopolitical settings, Iranian nuclear weapons program do not necessarily lead
Turkey, Egypt or Saudi Arabia to proliferate. These three neighbors view Iranian threat
differently. Yet, the United States’ threat assessment to Iranian nuclear proliferation is
high, as a nuclear Iran would shift the balance in the Middle East. Similarly, the Israeli
nuclear weapons program that started in 1960s did not let Iran to seek nuclear weapons
program back at the time as well (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for implementations).
Egypt follows a relatively vague nuclear nonproliferation policy. It plays a
leading role in nonproliferation conferences but does not dismiss the possibility of
proliferation from its national security agenda. Egypt keeps the possibility o f nuclear
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proliferation on the table to use it as leverage within the regional setting; primarily to
address potential threats from Israel and Iran. When compared to Egypt, Turkey follows
relatively transparent nuclear energy program whilst paying close attention to the Iranian
nuclear threat. Turkey currently is a supporter o f the nuclear nonproliferation regime
through institutional and organization settings; however, it does not have concrete nuclear
policy. This example shows that states from the same region may follow different nuclear
policies regardless o f a regional threat existence.
Since nuclear weapons are easily deployable and have different ranges, their
deterrent impact reaches beyond regions. The traditional security complex theory did not
respond to the challenges brought by these transnational issues. In other words,
traditional security complexes have territoriality baseline, whereas nuclear security
complexes have loose territorial foundation.
b- N um ber of States in N uclear Security Complexes: In the conventional
theory, a minimum o f two states form a security complex. Two states initiate the
necessary interaction and interdependence for collective security building. The result of
this interaction can determinate the main characteristics o f that security complex. In the
proposed model of nuclear security complexes, this characteristic is further developed.
The quasi-hegemonic nuclear security complex actually represents a micro
version o f the international system. Due to its hegemonic power to shift the international
nuclear regime and to influence other states, the hegemon represents a cluster by itself.
For this reason, the United States represents the quasi-hegemonic security complex.
The United States has the ability to mold and shape the nuclear proliferation
framework alone. Although the United States does not have the ability to prevent
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proliferation, it sets the bar on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament. It
also has the ability to transform states from one group to another. It has the power to shift
the debate from a national interest to a general focus, if it desires.
c- Mutual Exclusiveness in Nuclear Security Complexes: Similar to traditional
security complexes a state that is characterized in one security complex is exclusively
characterized in that complex. It can move to other security complexes when its nuclear
posture and state characteristics shift. However, a state cannot be a member o f two
security complexes at the same time. Mutual exclusiveness does not result from
geographical location per se; rather, it comes from state characteristics that identify and
describe a state. These characteristics become a part o f its identity. That is why, nuclear
security complexes are in constant change and need to be further developed over time if
policy remains adequate.
d- Mutual Recognition of Membership in Nuclear Security Complexes: The
traditional security complexes rest on mutual recognition. Because the members are not
geographically located in the nuclear security complexes, the mutual recognition
becomes nil. States do not need to recognize which state is in that security complex and
which is not.
e- Interaction within and among Nuclear Security Complexes: A state’s
nuclear posture may cause change in other states’ posture regardless o f the region. This
makes proliferation a transnational issue as it has security impact across the borders and
regions. The security complexes are just a starting point to identify this impact. The
interaction level between security complexes determines the future o f proliferation. The
United States, in this regard, is the main stakeholder because it has the ability to employ
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power over other states. This power does not have to rely on physical force projection.
All security complexes are in constant interaction with each other regardless o f the
region. This interaction makes the security complexes almost a living organism that is
subjected to change. Among the security complexes, interaction may be visible through
assistance, endorsement, coercive diplomacy approaches, and deterrence, persuasion and
compliance methods.

1")

PROPOSED STATE CHARACTERISTICS

This section groups states in terms o f their state characteristics that shape nuclear
posture. To achieve this end-state, a structure is established to describe each security
complex. First, I describe the variables that characterize each security complex. Second, I
briefly discuss the role o f nuclear weapons in that security complex. Third, I talk about
the theoretical link o f that security complex with the mainstream International Relations
theories— realism, liberalism, and constructivism—-with a connection to Alexander
Wendt and Robert Cooper’s grouping method that is discussed in Chapter 3. Fourth, I
identify several possible member states to each nuclear security complex. Fifth, I talk
briefly about the anticipated political implications for that particular security complex. I
conclude with significant points for each security complex.
States in the nuclear security complex o f 1, 3, and 5 are the core complexes. The
nuclear security complexes o f 2, 6, and 4 are composed o f nuclear transitional states. The

12 The level o f interaction is not explicitly discussed in this dissertation. The last chapter,
however, that lays out future issue areas to study, stresses a thorough examination o f interaction.
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first group’s nuclear posture is relatively stable compared to the second group. The
“quasi-hegemonic security complex” is composed o f only the hegemon in unipolar
system. States in one security complex may shift from one to another over time. If a shift
occurs, policies towards that state are also adjusted in line with its new positioning.

Security Complex #1: Material Nuclear Security Complex:
Variable—Threat Existence. The material security complex is composed of
states that have hostile relations with each other and negative patterns o f interaction with
the hegemon or neighboring states and are affected by the anarchic international system.
These states have the common security problems resulting from the patterns o f relations
with other actors. They securitize issues based on threat existence. Nuclear weapons are
an issue o f maximizing national interest through relative gains as well as a matter o f
national pride.
The threat existence is related to the endurance o f the regime or the government.
The authoritarian governments, literature shows, assume the mantle o f a peaceful nuclear
program to the domestic public, whereas, in reality, it follows a weapons grade nuclear
program. Due to the lack o f transparency, limited information sharing within the nation
and lesser network connectivity with other nations, public support for the nuclear
program is high in the material security complexes. The nuclear program, regardless o f
its intent, is a matter o f national pride. Nuclear weapons are an issue o f maximizing
national interest through relative gains.
Role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are a means o f power that provide
immunity from domestic and outside threats. An outside threat is a threat from another
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state or a non-state actor regardless o f proximity. An inside threat is a threat to the
survival o f the government and to the governmental regime where the government uses
nuclear weapons program to unite the population to its cause. In this security cluster,
decision-makers securitize their nuclear weapons program to protect their well-being.
Theoretical Link. Realism provides a theoretical understanding o f the material
security complex. Threat existence and lack o f trust are prominent variables to explain
state behavior to maximize national interest. Relative gains are important to explain the
security issues. States compare their military capability and power with other states.
These variables are given special importance in realism. The material security complex,
in realist terms, is a zone o f conflict. According to Robert Cooper’s three stages of
modernism, states in this security complex may resemble the pre-modem stage. In pre
modem world, positive interactions among two or more clashing actors are at minimum
level.
M em ber State. North Korea lacks institutional and international links with other
states within and outside the material security complex. The pattern o f interactions with
other security complexes is very limited because o f lack o f trust. It terminated the NPT
binding rules and regulations; consequently detached from the IAEA safeguards and
verification system since 2009. Today, North Korea claims to have a special NPT status.
North Korea has declared the purpose of its nuclear weapons program is to “deter a U.S.
invasion and hostile policy against it with South Korea.” 13 After all, there is a common
belief that the Western powers, particularly the United States, do not intervene nuclear

13 Kim, Duyeon. July 2013. Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic M issile Programs.
The Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. Accessed:
http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact sheet north korea nuclear and missile
programs/
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weapons states. It aims to increase its military capabilities at the expense o f other states;
mainly from the ones that it perceives threat. After conducting a third nuclear test in
February 2013, the North Korean ability to demonstrate a deterrent capability has
increased.
Political Implications (Anticipated). In the material security complex, state
policies are defined through power and military capabilities. The power struggle among
states has an impact on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Historically speaking it is not
only North Korea that shows non-compliance to the nonproliferation regime through
treaty compliance. Non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions
has been issued for six states, so far: Iraq in 1991l4, Romania in 1992, North Korea in
1993, Libya in 2004, Iran in 2005, and Syria in 2011. There are two more states that
received particular attention from the Board o f Governors, South Korea in 2004 and
Egypt in 2005. These two states latter signed the Additional Protocol and were observed
for compliance in 2007. There is no proof for nuclear material divergence in Egypt15 and
South Korea follows a policy o f “nuclear free Korean peninsula.” 16 On 2 February 2011,
Iran, Syria, and DPRK received caution from other states.17 IAEA safeguards system is
strengthened as a result o f non-compliance.18

14 IAEA. 18 July 1991. Iraq's Non-Compliance with its Safeguards Obligations. Edited by Board
o f Governors.
15 Pierre Goldschmidt. Safeguards Noncompliance: A Challenge for the IAEA and the UN
Security Council January/February 2010. Available from:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010 01 -02/Goldschmidt.
16 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Status o f Multilateral Arms Regulation and
Disarmament Agreements."
17 IAEA. 2 July 2012. International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards in Inventory o f
International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. Monterey Institute: Center for
Nonproliferation Studies.
18 Michael D. Rosenthal. April 2013. "Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance o f IAEA
Safeguards A Textbook." Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC. p. 13.
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To sum, states focus on relative gain on security issues. In this security cluster,
states compare their nuclear posture with other states within and outside o f their complex.
Third-party nuclear policies, therefore, should focus on the benefits that these states think
to gain from nuclear proliferation. Possible policy suggestion is to integrate these states to
the international system not through international treaties and institutions but through
trade and economic incentives. Creating economic dependency is the suggested method
to curb nuclear proliferation ambitions for this group o f states.

Security Complex #2: Material-Liberal Nuclear Security Complex:
Variable— Threat Existence & Regime Type. This security complex positions
in between the material and liberal spheres. Transitional security complexes are less
predictable compared to the core security complexes. States in this security complex face
threats to national security in traditional sense; however, they do not securitize threats at
the policy level like states in the material security complex do. These states do not totally
disregard the existence of threat but neither is their policy driven by the existent threats
around them.
Threats posed by competitors and enemies are assessed relatively. Bureaucratic
politics is significant in the decision-making process. Government agencies are able to
shape the national interest and further national policies regarding the nuclear
nonproliferation issues. This is not a stable security complex because member positions
are likely to shift depending on changes in government or as a result o f pressure from
outside the security complex. The member states are not stable democracies; they may be
ruled by autocratic regimes.
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Role of Nuclear Weapons. The possibility o f acquiring nuclear weapons has not
disappeared from this security complex. The material-liberal security complex assigns
asset value to nuclear weapons. It does not dismiss the reality o f possessing the nuclear
weapons, if conditions necessitate. This is a transitional stage because there is still a
possibility for nuclear proliferation, if the state in question perceives a significant threat
or makes a cost-benefit analysis in which the benefits outweighing the costs.
Theoretical Link. The theoretical link for the material-liberal security complex is
not defined in Alexander Wendt or Robert Cooper’s world systems. This transitional
phase has been dismissed from the theoretical literature. It is vitally important however to
acknowledge that states do not shift from one core security cluster to another within a
day. They may strategically choose to remain in a transitional stage. Thinking through the
lenses o f cooperation versus competition in state-to-state patterns o f interaction, the
material-liberal security complex would value competition in security issues, but would
value cooperation in economic issues.
Another characteristic o f this security complex is to keep the nuclear status-quo as
steady as possible. States do not sign or ratify new treaties if the competitor states are not
already party to a treaty. This creates a vicious circle, if two states are competitors and
belong to the material-liberal security complex. Egypt and Israel, where neither side
agrees to ratify new nuclear treaties are the good examples. Neither is party to the
Chemical Weapons Convention nor to The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Regionally, Egypt presses for nuclear weapons free Middle East with the inclusion o f
Israel. Politically, it presses for executing the Middle East Conference to create nuclear
weapons free zone even after the Arab Spring. In May 2013, the Egyptian delegation
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exited the talks on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), claiming, “the nuclear
weapons free zone process is too slow.” 19 An officer in the United States called this move
as Egyptian “theatrics.”20
Egypt is not a stable country and it does not have the democratic tradition most
liberal states have. It has been ruled in authoritarian regime for several decades.
Nonetheless, it has shared interests with the West; the United States in particular. The
United States provides foreign aid to Egypt and Israel with the expectation that the
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty following the Camp David Accords, holds. The United States’
army conducted joint exercises with the Egyptian army during President M ubarak’s
ruling. The pattern of interactions between the United States and Egypt enable the
latter’s security closer to the liberal security complex.
Policy Implications (Anticipated). States in the material-liberal hybrid security
complex are not party to major treaties on purpose. They maintain their nuclear posture
whilst assessing the regional and international security environment. These states have
the ability to either block or to press other states with their dubious nuclear posture.
These states benefit from an ambiguous nuclear posture and decision makers may
promote nuclear nonproliferation in some statements whilst hinting at a shifting national
policy in others, if and when the international structure changes.
Another policy implication is the pattern o f interaction that states within this
security complex have with the outsiders. The dubious nuclear status presses outside
parties— especially the ones in the material security complex and material-norms-based
security complex— to a level that creates tension in the nuclear regime. For instance,
19 Jenny, Nielsen. 2 May 2013. "Egypt Exits Non-proliferation Meeting."
20 Elaine M. Grossman. July 26, 2013. "Q&A: U.S. Envoy Derides Egyptian 'Theatrics' on
WMD-Free Zone Talks." Global Security Newswire.
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Egypt’s dubious nuclear posture— of not ratifying major treaties and signaling uneasiness
to the status quo in the Middle East— is a result o f the Israeli nuclear posture.
To sum, the role o f nuclear weapons is not dismissed, even though the desired
emphasis is given to nonproliferation. These states are likely to proliferate only when the
posture o f states in other security complexes changes.

Security Complex #3: Liberal Nuclear Security Complex:
Variable-Democracy in Nuclear Field. The members o f the liberal security
complex optimize the role of anarchy through regime type (democracy). The referred
regime type in this security complex is mainly democratic ruling with public will. The
pattern of relations in the liberal security complex is based on rivalry within the economic
setting. Even though states might face problems within and outside the liberal security
complex, they do not prioritize threat existence to acquire nuclear weapons, if they do not
already possess them. National interest prevails; yet, it is linked to the rights o f the
public. Under the democratic setting, the domestic society has the upper hand on the
states’ nuclear posture and choices. Nuclear-weapons states with democratic ruling are
also part o f this security complex. However, their nuclear policies do not correspond with
the liberal-democratic norms that these states should be preserving. The members o f the
liberal security complex follow main treaties and nuclear norms because these treaties are
associated with the liberal posture by default.21 Domestic accountability, public
knowledge and acknowledgement o f the nuclear program are crucial, regardless o f the

21 The international system is constructed through the Western ideals and norms. Any
international treaty that follows the liberal posture has the pattern to follow the hegemonic
posture as well as the main norms in the system.
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weapons related programs. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power program are discussed in
the public sphere; they are not used as a political power by governments.
Economic regulations and free trade are also another characteristic o f this security
complex. In states with nuclear power, there is a nuclear lobby that feeds the militaryindustry complex. Nuclear lobby, especially in states like the United States, is part o f this
economic cycle.
Role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have a role in the nuclear deterrence
in policy for nuclear-weapons states with democratic ruling. The non-nuclear weapons
states are mainly protected through the security assurances made by the nuclear weapon
states in this security complex. The role o f the nuclear weapons in this security complex
is not disappeared or diminished; however, there is a debate about the compatibility
between democracy and nuclear deterrence policies.
The main question in this security complex though is whether nuclear weapons
protect the public and does it serve the public will or not? In the nuclear-weapons states,
the nuclear projects are kept secret, claimed to be part o f the national security policy.
Public knowledge and involvement on the nuclear matters— such as arms control or
nuclear disarmament— is low because decision-makers claim that nuclear issues need
technical expertise, thus, public is mainly excluded from the nuclear debate.
The democratic settings merge all the members into an understanding o f shared
security. Nuclear weapons, as Deudrey claims, are despotic; therefore should not be in
the democratic agenda. They are despotic because “the decisions to use nuclear weapons
rely on a short decision-making time, the concentration o f nuclear use decisions are in the
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hands o f small group o f individuals, there is a lack o f accountability.”22 According to
Deudrey, reliance on nuclear deterrence produces nuclear despotism. The anarchic
international system has effect on the member o f the liberal security complex. Nuclear
policies o f the liberal non-nuclear weapon states however are transparent. The nuclear
material for peaceful energy usage is declared and subjected to international safeguards.
Theoretical Link. The theoretical link in this security complex is connected to
the debate between realism and liberalism in the question; does democracy impede
conflict? The democratic peace theory posture indicates that democratic states do not
fight with each other23 because “the greater the democracy level, the more constrained the
military usage.”24 Going further, democratizing states are the most “violent o f all because
o f the power competition in the country.”25
According to the democratic peace theory, the role o f nuclear weapons still exists
as a deterrent. Nuclear deterrence is a strategy that is employed by both nuclear weapons
states and states under the security assurances o f the nuclear weapons states. Considering
the liberal-democratic theoretical tradition, the nuclear weapons states collide with the
treaties and norms by possessing nuclear weapons. This argument states that nuclear
weapons are against the democratic tenets. Following, Robert Dahl for instance argued
that the issues of “national security policy, war fighting strategy and technology o f

22Daniel H. Deudney. 2007. "Anticipations o f World Nuclear Government." In Bounding Power:
Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the G lobal Village, 244-265. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
23 Michael, Doyle. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." The American Political Science
Review no. 80 (4): 1151 -1169.
24 Bruce Russett and John O ’Neal 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and
International Organizations, The Norton Series in World Politics. Barnes and Nobles: W. W.
Norton & Company.
25 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. 2007. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go
to War: Belfer Center Studies in International Security.
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nuclear weapons are above the pay grade” o f ordinary citizens.

Of t

In other words, voters

ignore the issue o f nuclear weapons. In Dahl’s words “we are living in a democracy
based on guardianship, not equality, when it comes to nuclear weapons.”27
Noting Dahl’s contribution during the end o f the Cold War, public knowledge in
nuclear issues (such as the nuclear safety and security issues, nuclear materials o f a state
as well as nuclear weapons possession sites, amounts etc.) are still limited in the 21st
century. Generally, nuclear weapons are an issue o f foreign policy rather than an issue of
domestic politics.
Elaine Scarry, Cabot professor o f aesthetics and the general theory o f value,
stresses this problem in the Thermonuclear Monarchy, addressing two problems with the
compatibility with the United States’ constitution and nuclear weapons. First
incompatibility is the fact that the Congress needs to declare war by law and the second is
the “requirement that distributes to the entire adult population shared responsibility for
•

•

•

use o f the country’s arsenal— the provision known as ‘the right to bear arms.”

28

According to the author, bypassing the Congress in the nuclear decision-making is
against the United States legislation. Although Scarry is off the point with regards to the
relationship on right to bear arms and the possession o f nuclear weapons, the author
makes a fair point that “in second amendment the civic stature and military stature goes

26 Robert A. Dahl. 1985. Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Dem ocracy versus Guardianship Frank
W. Abrams Lectures: Syracuse University Press.
27 Robert A. Dahl. 1985. Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Dem ocracy versus Guardianship Frank
W. Abrams Lectures: Syracuse University Press.
28 Elaine, Scarry. 2014. Thermonuclear Monarchy: Crossing Between Dem ocracy an d Doom.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
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hand in hand.”

Taking that point forward, then, in democracies the nuclear policies

expected to be transparent.
Nuclear weapons jeopardize the social contract between the citizens and the
government, when the population gives consent to the state for representation to create
security. This security aims to create peace and well being o f the individuals and it does
not have a clause of “at the expense o f others.” The possession o f the nuclear weapons in
a democratic state comes with that clause because the mere idea o f using nuclear
weapons comes with fatal consequences to another nation. Nuclear weapons are not a
good representative of peace, where a state’s main role is to protect people and create
peace— again not at the expense o f others— but with others. Although it is too much o f a
strech to claim that nuclear weapons diminish the likelihood o f major wars, quasi-wars or
small wars still take place. Nuclear weapons states fight without resorting to nuclear
weapons.
Policy Implications (Anticipated). The regime type, which is democracy in the
liberal security complex, matters because democratic leaders are accountable for their
decisions in the next electoral cycle. The pattern o f relations within the liberal
democracies creates a collective understanding of nuclear nonproliferation. The two
nuclear weapons states in Europe— Britain and France— are also in this complex because
their nuclear weapons proliferation is mostly eclipsed by the United States and Russia’s
nuclear weapons capabilities. Britain, Germany, and Italy have asked the United States to
remove its tactical nuclear weapons from the European theater. Britain as a nuclear state
clearly does not see the utility o f having the United States nuclear weaponry within its

29 Elaine, Scarry. 2014. Thermonuclear Monarchy: Crossing Between Dem ocracy and Doom.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
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theater o f operations. The main reason is that these weapons lack a deterrent capability
because o f the disappearance o f threat and unaccountability to sixty years old weaponry.
To sum, members o f the liberal security complex follow peaceful relations with
each other, which creates a pattern o f cooperation. The cooperative nature o f the
relationship leads to a longing the shadow o f the future.30 Inherently, the liberal security
complex is not a peaceful way to cope with proliferation but it is a utilitarian approach.31

Security Complex #4: Liberal-Normative Nuclear Security Complex;
Variable— Institutions. This hybrid security complex takes the liberal approach
to a further level and adds an institutional framework to it. The states are members o f a
particular institutional dyad and are part o f the routine IAEA inspections and verifications
system. They follow similar proliferation and nonproliferation policy postures through an
institutional link. The pattern o f relationships is cooperative engagement through
institutional membership. Economic or even security-wise rivalry is not common due to
the normative standing. Security o f the member states is shaped through the security for
all principle. States are involved in political actions that do not have necessarily had an
impact on their national security.

30 The shadow o f the future is the probability o f two actors (states) meeting under a similar
setting. When the actors are aware that the shadow o f the future is long, cooperation is more
likely. For the debate, see Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits o f Cooperation: A
Realist Critique o f the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization no. 42 (3);
Milner, Helen. 1992. "International Theories o f Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and
Weaknesses." World Politics no. 44 (3): 466-496; Oye, Kenneth A. 1986. Cooperation Under
Anarchy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
31 For a classical analysis on utilitarianism and the link to liberalism in the categories o f
individual rights o f privacy, property, and freedom o f speech, see Russell Hardin. 1986. "The
Utilitarian Logic o f Liberalism." Ethics no. 97 (1): 47-74.
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Role of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear weapons represent a liability in this security
complex. Based on the liability, states question the role o f nuclear weapons and they do
not generally follow a nuclear weapons program. None o f the state parties in the liberalnorms security complex possess nuclear weapons. In the past, some member states might
have followed a nuclear weapons research program but they have not continued due to
domestic and economic constraints and/or normative reasons. The norms however are not
as definitive as they are in the norms-based security complexes.
Policy Implications (Anticipated). The nuclear forces o f NATO serve to protect
the member nations in the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. NATO’s strategic nuclear capability
derives from the United States and United Kingdom’s nuclear forces. NATOs
institutional role to prevent the proliferation o f Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear weapons is a long-term process. Within NATO, the Nuclear Planning Group
(NPG) is a senior body, composed of 27 member defense ministers to discuss the nuclear
•

issues on an annual basis.

T9

«

•

France follows a nuclear policy but remains outside o f the

nuclear decisions within the Alliance structure. NATO defines deterrence through
conventional and unconventional means, but the member states within NATO’s
framework stress their commitment— figuratively— to nuclear disarmament. In the
NATO Strategic Concept 2010, however, “NATO remains a nuclear power as long as the
nuclear weapons exist.”

TT

This means NATO states will not be the initiator o f nuclear

disarmament policies but follow the suit o f others. This logic creates a loop that may well
jeopardize the logic o f disarmament.

32 NATO. The Nuclear Planning Group. Available from
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics 50069.htm
33 NATO. 19-20 November 2010. NATO Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security o f the
Members o f the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 5
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Security Complex #5: Norms-based Nuclear Security Complex:
Variable— Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and International Nuclear
Community. States in the norms based security complex follow the nonproliferation
regime regardless of their capabilities. The commitment to the nonproliferation regime is
an enabler for creating security communities. The nonproliferation regime is composed o f
characteristics like treaty compliance, nonproliferation norms, and voluntary actions for
transparency and openness through diplomatic engagements both at a bilateral or
international level. The pattern o f interaction among the states is through the established
nonproliferation rules and norms. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NT1) for instance, identifies
legal commitments, voluntary commitments, and nuclear security and materials
transparency as components o f the global nuclear norm s.34 Norms create an international
community, the English School argues, where the non-use o f nuclear weapons is a
“pattern of behavior” that is chosen even when there is no punishment.35
Role of Nuclear Weapons. The members o f the norms-based security complex
do not possess nuclear weapons or may have given up a nuclear weapons program.
Nuclear weapons are a burden rather than an asset for national security. They are
irrelevant, if not obsolete, for the international security environment in the contemporary
world. Nuclear nonproliferation is an internalized norm within this security complex. The
role o f deterrence is diminished because norms feed from “legitimacy” not from the
“threat o f punishment” through the use o f nuclear weapons.36

34The Nuclear Threat Initiative groups states into five categories (quantities and sites, security and
control measures, societal factors, and global norms) in terms o f assessing nuclear materials. See,
Nuclear Threat Initiative. January 2012. Nuclear Materials Security Index: Building a Framework
for Assurance, Accountability, and Action.
35Lawrence, Freedman. 2004. Deterrence, Polity Press. Malden, MA. p. 68.
36Freedman, Lawrence. 2004, Deterrence, Polity Press, Malden, MA, pp. 68-74.
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The members aim to delegitimize the role o f nuclear weapons through the
integration o f humanitarian and international law. In 1996, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) questioned the “legality o f the threat or use o f nuclear weapons”

T7

referring

to the Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the United Nations principle38. The 2010 NPT Review
Conference was the first attempt to refer to the “humanitarian consequences from the use
o f nuclear weapons” and the need to “comply with international humanitarian law.”39 The
attendees o f the 2010 Review Conference, aligning with the International Committee o f
the Red Cross (ICRC) called for a shift in the political “debate” on nuclear weapons from
its usual arena— “military sphere and power politics” to human security.40
In the Vancouver Declaration o f March 23, 2011 through the Simons Foundation,
“non-use” and “elimination” of nuclear weapons are stressed as the humanitarian aim 41
The experts initiating the Vancouver Declaration utilized human security and
environmental challenges as the framework for challenging deterrence through nuclear
weapons possession. In this regard, the Vancouver Declaration calls for the abolition o f
nuclear weapons.

37 ICJ advices, nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and non-proportional; therefore, they are not in
line with the international humanitarian law and customary international law. However, ICJ also
states that “it could not reach a conclusion the threat or use o f nuclear weapons would be lawful
or unlawful in an extreme circumstance o f self-defense, in which the very survival o f a State
would be at stake.” See Chapter I: Purposes and Principles. Accessed from:
http://www . un .org/en/documents/charter/chapter 1. shtm 1
38 The UN Article 2 Para 4 says: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use o f force against the territorial integrity or political independence o f any state.”
39 United Nations General Assembly NPT Conference. 2010. 2010 Review Conference o f the
Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation o f Nuclear Weapons: Final Document. Vol. 1
40 United Nations General Assembly NPT Conference. 2010. 2010 Review Conference o f the
Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation o f Nuclear Weapons: Final Document. Vol. 2: 335.
41 The Simons Foundation and the International Association o f Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms.
February 11, 2011. Vancouver Declaration: Law's Imperative for the Urgent Achievement o f a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. Edited by Simons Chairs in International Law and Human Security
at Fraser University. Vancouver, Canada.
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The norms-based security complex goes hand-in-hand with humanitarian norms
and laws. As nuclear weapons’ damage is indiscriminate and nuclear weapons have
uncontrollable effects, their usage is against the international humanitarian law. The
International Court o f Justice (ICJ) advises “a weapon that is already unlawful per se,
whether by treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason o f its being used for a
legitimate purpose under the Charter.”42 The Court also advises that “if the use o f force is
illegal for certain weaponry than the threat to use it should also be illegal.”43 This claim,
however, only challenges the role of nuclear deterrence from a legal standpoint. Nuclear
nonproliferation is a matter o f collective security rather than an individual choice.
Theoretical Link. Norms-based security complex connects to the Kantian
culture, described by Alexander Wendt. It is a form o f post-modern society. The norms
are shaped together through ideas and interests. The pattern o f relationships between the
nuclear weapons states signifies this logic, as not all nuclear weapons are same. The
“shared understanding” that constitutes nuclear weapons is as important as the material
power that revolves around the weapon. The United States is not concerned, in this sense,
about the United Kingdom’s nuclear weaponry or the latter’s nuclear trajectory for the
future. It is not the quantity o f weaponry that makes the United States to dismiss the
United Kingdom’s military capability; rather a “shared understanding” and common
vision over the nuclear weapons, which led to the development o f the United States
nuclear policy.44 Suffice to say, when nuclear is the issue at stake, there are strategic

42 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Legality o f the Treaty or use o f Nuclear Weapons, para. 39.
http://lcnp.org/vvcourt/opinion.htm,
43 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Legality o f the Treaty or use o f Nuclear Weapons, para. 47,
http://lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm
44 Alexander, Wendt. 1999. Social theory o f international politics, Cambridge studies in
international relations. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 253.
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nuclear allies o f the United States. The shared nuclear history from the 1950s onwards
links these states. As the ideas and cultures separate, the nuclear posture and interaction
also changes, as in the contemporary cases like North Korea or Iran.
In norms-based security complex, Germany and Japan’s nonproliferation posture
are two significant examples. Japan constitutionally prohibits a nuclear weapons
program. Germany follows a constructive foreign policy of non-aggression, which also
impacts its nuclear policy posture. The Swiss government particularly follows the
international humanitarian law to abolish nuclear weapons. There is special awareness in
the Scandinavian countries about the humanitarian consequences o f nuclear weapons.
The Norwegian government held a conference, addressing key points such as the
“regional and global effects of nuclear weapons regardless o f the detonated territory.”45
Humanitarian law does have consequences on policy making, even if it is very hard to
challenge the existing reliance on the nuclear weapons.46
Political Implications (Anticipated). One o f the aspects o f norms-based security
complex is to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans the nuclear
testing in all environments (from atmosphere, in space, underwater). By eliminating
testing, states will not rely on the accuracy and the credibility o f nuclear weapons.
Condemning nuclear testing also prevents “non-nuclear weapons states to build bombs”
as well as not to rely on the bombs.47 As o f March 24 2013, 159 states have ratified the

45 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs (Norway). 4-5 March 2013. Humanitarian Impact o f Nuclear
Weapons.
46 Nina Tannenwald; Elbridge, Colbry; Benno, Laggner; Li, Bin. 2013. Humanitarian Dimensions
o f Nuclear War, Deterrence, and Disarmament. Paper read at Nuclear Policy Conference, at
Washington DC.
47 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. Who We Are. Available from
http://www.ctbto.org/specials/who-we-are/.

108
CTBT.48 44 o f them are Annex 2 states. To be in force, the treaty needs to be ratified by
all 44 states. 8 out o f 44 states have not signed or ratified the CTBT yet. These 8 states
are the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Egypt, and North Korea. There
is a regional pattern on non-ratification in the case o f India-Pakistan-China, and IsraelIran-Egypt. However, China officially postulates neither India nor Pakistan but the
United States as threat to its national security. Therefore, even if there is regional pattern,
it transfuses to a global threat existence.49 Annex II states’ non-ratification blocks the
CTBT’s verification system to be in effect; consequently endangering the
nonproliferation regime in the long-term.50
Another aspect of the norms-based nuclear security complex is to follow IAEA
safeguards regulations. The members o f this complex abide not only to generic rules of
the Comprehensive Safeguards, but are also party to the Additional Protocol (AP). The
AP allows inspectors to conduct inspections without a state’s prior knowledge on the
whereabouts and timing o f the inspections. The AP enhances the rights o f the Agency.
States not only sign but also ratify the AP in order to give the amendment force. By being
part o f the AP, states voluntarily restrict their nuclear behavior, show good will, and
guarantee a transparent nuclear energy program. All these measures assure their
nonproliferation posture and create a pattern o f relationships within the security complex.
The AP that may pull the strings to prevent non-compliance; otherwise the whole

48 Annex 2 states have nuclear power and research centers but have enrolled in CTBT talks
between 1994-1996. Eight o f the 44 Annex states still need to ratify the treaty to enter into force.
49 James Acton, The Future o f Multilateral Arms Control Verification, 2013 CTBT Diplomacy
and Public Policy Course, 15-19 July 2013, Vienna, Austria
so c y b y o July 2013. CTBT Diplomacy and Public Policy Course. Vienna.
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verification approach, as El-Baradei explains, “rests only on declared nuclear material.”51
The United Nations should also focus on the undeclared material and the clandestine
activity, according to the former IAEA Director General, El-Baradei.
Another aspect o f the norms-based security complex is related to the conduct of
safeguards. There is an ongoing debate between the methods o f state-level safeguards and
traditional safeguards. The former approach incorporates state-level characteristics (e.g.
political and non-material methods); the latter counts nuclear material before reaching
broader conclusions at the IAEA level on a state’s compliance.

The state-level concept

aims to conduct an objective analysis o f state level factors by minimizing the allocated
resources o f the Agency and time o f the inspectors.53 The state-level concept groups
states as: “ ‘suspects,’ ‘good standing,’ and ‘nuclear weapons states.’”54This concept
caused drawbacks from states because it considers past compliance (through previous
safeguards implementation) for good standing.55 Recently, the Board o f Governors is

51 See Arms Control Verification Website,
http://w w vv.arm sco n tro lv e rilica tio n .o rR /2 0 0 9 /0 6 /elb a ra d ei-in terv en tio n -to -b o g .h tm l

52 Brookhaven National Laboratory. June 2013. Summer Course: Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century.
53 Beyza Unal, Domenic Vallone, Nic Wondra, Alankrita Sinha, and Sylvain Fanielle, June 2013.
Position on the IAEA State-Level Concept. Presentation in Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards
and Security in the 21st Century Course, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton: N ew York.
54 The material counting for safeguards is an objective approach based on certain “criteria”
whereas state-level concept analyzes all “nuclear activities and “nuclear technologies” o f states
regardless o f its relevance to technical capability. The latter approach uses acquisition pathways
for states as a method. For more information on state-level concept, see, Tape, James W. October
2008. "The State-Level Approach: M oving Beyond Integrated Safeguards." Tokyo INMM
ESARDA 1-8; Cooley, Jill. 17-20 October 2011. Progress in Evolving the State-level Concept. In
Future Directions for Nuclear Safeguards and Verification. Aix-en-Provence, France: Seventh
INMM /ESARDA Joint Workshop;
55 George, Anzelon. June 4-8 2012. The State-Level Concept: Tailoring Safeguards Activities to
Analysis o f the State as a Whole. Paper read at International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and
Information Analysis, at Monterey, CA.
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consulted on the “conceptualization and development” o f this concept, to assess and
advance its possible implementation.56
The norms-based nuclear security complex differentiates from the liberal nuclear
complex. The former prioritizes the nonproliferation regime whereas the latter rests on
rivalry among actors that result in cooperation and mutual discussion. This means the
nonproliferation regime has special value. States internalize the established nuclear
norms in their policies. As a result o f internalization, state interest and ideas merge.
To sum, members o f the norms-based security complex have internalized the
norms in their nuclear policy; therefore, their national security framework does not
project enmity.

Security Complex #6: Material-Norms Nuclear Security Complex:
Variable. The material-norms hybrid security complex is composed o f two
variables: threat existence and membership to international and regional nuclear
organizations and semi-compliance to nuclear treaties. States in this security complex are
not compliant to the international treaties, although they are party to these treaties. Noncompliance is a result o f national security concerns either from neighboring or non
neighboring states. These states find the option to proliferate appealing; however do not
want to go beyond the established international rules and norms because their economic,
defense, and security structure are likely to be affected from states in different security

56 IAEA Board o f Governors. 12 August 2013. The Conceptualization and Development o f
Safeguards Implementation at the State Level.
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complexes. The United States (the quasi-hegemon security complex) has the power to
impact these states’ nuclear policy through diplomacy, sanctions, and military action.
Theoretical Link. Since material-norms is a hybrid security complex, it
corresponds to the transition phase between the zone ofpeace and zone o f conflict. The
member states are in between the Hobbesian and Kantian cultures, a fine line between
aggression and non-aggression.
The main example is Iran. Although the Iranian nuclear program has not started
for weaponry purpose during the Shah period, it turned out to be a clandestine weapons
program after the Shah period.57 Iran does not follow a compliant nuclear posture that
corresponds with the international expectations. The facts o f such expectations are
provided through the UN Security Council Resolutions58 and Board o f Governors reports.
Iran, however, is still party to the NPT. This dual approach puts Iran in a transitional
nuclear stage.
In being party to the NPT, Iran is subjected to the IAEA safeguards and
verification system. The United Nations stated in 2006 that Iran should “build
confidence,” yet it does not follow this course o f action despite seven resolutions.59 The
UN Resolutions are operative to link the Iranian nuclear weapons quest to the wider
problem o f nuclear nonproliferation efforts. On 18 December 2003, Ambassador Salehi

57 Contrary to the argument above, Kibaroglu argues that it is not the Iranian ambitions that
changed but the Western approach to the Iranian nuclear quest. See Mustafa, Kibaroglu. 2007.
"Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude o f the West." Middle
Eastern Studies no. 43 (2): 223-245; Mustafa, Kibaroglu. 2006. "Good for the Shah, Banned for
the Mullahs: The West and Iran’s Quest for Nuclear Power." Middle East Journal no. 60 (2): 207232.
58 United Nations Security Council. 9 June 2010. Resolution 1929.
59 United Nations Security Council. 27 December 2006. Resolution 1737.
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of Iran signed the Additional Protocol but the Iranian government has not ratified the
agreement.60 Similarly, Iran did not ratify the CTBT.
According to former President Ahmadinejad, the Iranian nuclear program is not
the problem but rather the nuclear hierarchy that is established by possessing nuclear
weapons.61 To put pressure and to question the existing nuclear hierarchy, Iran follows an
objective o f “a Middle East free o f weapons o f mass destruction” that was formerly
stressed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2006.62
Political Implications. With regards to the Iranian example, the policy
implication is a bargaining process that ranges from negotiations to economic sanctions.
The problem with the economic sanctions is it is a feature and an outcome o f the liberal
nuclear security complex. The economic sanctions63 might not show effect in the long run

60 IAEA Staff Report. Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards 18 December 2003.
Available from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2003/iranap20031218.html.
61 Mahmoud, Ahmadinejad. May 3 2010. "Statement by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before the 2010
NPT Review Conference." International Atomic Energy Agency.
62 IAEA Board o f Governors. 4 February 2006. Implementation o f the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic o f Iran.
63 Economic measures can be used as either foreign aid or economic sanctions. Economic
sanctions do not work all the time because globalization pathways create new interconnection
areas. One o f these pathways is to have variety o f trade partners. States generally have sensitivity
interdependence rather than vulnerability to the break up o f the trade partnership. Also, when the
target population does not hold liberal democratic values then the imposer may receive negative
response from them because the targeted population would have clashing values with the imposer
state. Foreign sanctions are also a type o f economic power that the powerful side can imply on the
other to achieve what the former wants. For economic sanctions to be successful, the other side
should not be valuing the cause o f an action more than the costs associated to that cause. Harrison
Wagner (1988) argued on this subject. Wagner argues that if a state values the issue in concern
more than the costs that is associtated to it, then it would not give up that cause. In line with
Wagner, Parsi and Yetiv (2004) argued similarly on why Iran does not forgo its nuclear
ambitions. A quantitative study shows that 1/3 case, economic sanctions do not work (Hufbauer,
Schott 1985). This study is later explored further as the authors suggest a change saying that out
o f 115 cases 34% had success (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990). In Why Economic Sanctions
do Not Work, Robert Pape (1997) criticized the findings o f Schott et al. suggesting a qualitative in
depth analysis. Pape argues that only in 5 cases economic sanctions actually work. It is quite less
than what Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot found out. Nossal (1999) argues that to have economic
sanctions work, the targeted state needs to be a liberal democratic country as 12 out o f 14 cases
show positive to econom ic sanctions in liberal states. Drezner (2000) follow s a realist explanation
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when and if the concerned party values the cause more than the costs associated to it. Iran
does not have direct link to the liberal nuclear security complex. The liberal normative
grounds are not established with Iran. This is one o f the flows o f the current United States
policy towards Iran that may need revision at the group level.
To sum, the members o f this group do not respond well to the commonly
established nuclear regulations because o f threat existence. The policies derived from the
liberal security complex, such as employing economic sanctions or creating
interdependence, may not be applicable, because these states may simply value nuclear
weapons more highly than the costs or the norms associated to non-possession.64

Security Complex #7: Quasi-Hegemonic Security Complex— The United States:
The quasi-hegemonic security complex is the micro version o f the international
system. The name refers to the current power by the United States o f the international
system. Under the condition o f a unipolar world order, this security complex finds form.
It is “quasi” because what the United States can do is limited because of the existence of
other nuclear states in the system. Still, with that limited power, the United States is the

suggesting that economic sanctions work only when it is complemented with military action.
Licklider (1988) and Yetiv and Parsi (2009) argue when the cause is important then the sanctions
would not work. For the comprehensive debate, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott.
1985. "Economic Sanctions and U.S. Foreign Policy." American Political Science Association no.
18 (4): 727-735; Robert A. Pape. Autumn 1997. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work."
International Security no. 22 (2): 90-136; Nossal, Kim Richard. 1999. "Liberal-democratic
regimes, international sanctions, and global governance." In Globalization and Global
Governance, edited by Raimo Vayrynen, 127-49. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield; Mani
Parsi, Steve Yetiv. August 2008. "Unequal Contest: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation Between
Economic and Value Symmetry." Contemporary Security Policy no. 29 (2): 322-337.
64 The value o f the nuclear weapons is linked to the materiality aspect o f which the destructive
capability o f the nuclear weapons is linked to.
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credible power to change the nuclear proliferation course o f action through persuasion
and coercion in the nuclear arena.
Variable. There are three interconnected variables to consider in the quasihegemonic security complex. The first one is power. The hegemon attains hard and soft
power at the maximum level. The hegemon can use this power through capability to
persuade and/or punish states, or it can use to impact the nuclear nonproliferation course
o f action through diplomatic and engaging means. The hegemon possesses political,
economic, and military power. Stemming from the capability, the second variable is the
leadership. The hegemon initiates the nuclear nonproliferation posture and should show
leadership ability for arms control and disarmament agreements. Connected to the
leadership, the hegemon also shares this “public good” with other states. For this public
good sharing, the issue at stake should have two inclusive tenets: non-rivalry and non
exclusiveness. In issues of non-rivalry, states do not compete with each other to be better
off. Free riding the hegemon’s power is acceptable. As part o f non-exclusiveness, the
hegemon cannot exclude others from the public good. In a simple sense, pollution, for
instance, is a public good where states do not act in terms o f rivalry.
Theoretical Link. The nuclear umbrella is the main public good that the United
States shares with its allies and partners. It, therefore, provides collective goods to the
allied countries.65 Theoretically, the debate on the American decline66 is visible in the
nuclear realm as well. The political positioning o f the United States in the nuclear field is
and will be challenged. The U.S. has the ability to shape other security complexes, but
65 See Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2011. Power and Interdependence. 4th ed.:
Pearson.
65 For the debate regarding hegemony in decline, see Ikenberry, G. John. 2002. America
unrivaled: the future o f the balance o f power, Cornell studies in security affairs. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
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has done poorly so far because it has pursued tailored deterrence, with a focus on nuclear
threshold countries, at the expense o f utopian realism.67 The stagnated decision whether
to intervene in Syria even after the alleged use o f chemical weapons by the Assad
government contributes to a narrative o f declining power. The British Parliament’s vote
to prevent its government from any sort o f intervention in Syria created a break in the
United States-United Kingdom strategic alliance as well. As a consequence, the United
States’ ability to shape decisions is jeopardized.68
Policy Implications. The United States’ nuclear umbrella is provided through
extended deterrence, and the deterrence capability is in three folds: “the nuclear triad,”
“deployed” strategic nuclear weapons in the European theater, and nuclear weapons on
United States soil.69 The pattern o f relationships between the hegemon and other security
complexes is shaped through the buying power o f the sides in the political realm. The
hegemon is likely to relate with others collectively. It can lead the security communities
and can create the order (ordungmacht) through “influence, rulemaking, and
leadership.”70 This argument suggests that the United States’ nuclear preferences find
form in the international system. Alternatively, the hegemon’s power might be
challenged, such as in the Syrian case. When the preferences o f the hegemon are not

67 Utopian realism is to lead states towards a common achievable vision and away from hollow
commitments to disarmament. See Booth, Ken. 1991. "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in
Theory and Practice." International Affairs no. 67 (3): 527-545.
68 Initially Robert Pape has written on soft balancing the hegemon. The Iraq War in 2003 is one o f
the cases. In the case o f Syria, although the allies do not challenge the United States, due to
domestic choices, they could not assist the United States. See Robert Pape. 2005. “Soft Balancing
Against the United States” International Security, V ol.30, N o .l, pp. 7-45.
69 Department o f Defense. April 2010. "Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR)."
70 See John G. Ikenberry. 2002. America unrivaled: the future o f the balance o f power, Cornell
studies in security affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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fulfilled, it is not only the United States interests that are hurt but also the whole nuclear
international system and regime that is established around it.

CONCLUSION

This chapter builds the nuclear security complexes model, stemming from the
major works o f Buzan and Waever. The nuclear security complexes propose to group
states in terms o f their state characteristics and current nuclear posture. This grouping
needs updates when a state’s nuclear posture or state characteristics change. The change,
however, should be durable rather than being effected from daily politics.
The changes in the international system, such as a shift in the power o f the
hegemon or shifts in the nuclear posture or state characteristics o f a state may necessitate
to revise that state’s membership in a security complex. Change might be temporary
rather than permanent; therefore, the new nuclear posture o f a state necessitates a tedious
analysis o f its decisiveness to change.
How can change in nuclear posture and state characteristics can be analyzed
objectively? To explain it with an example, Iranian decision to halt its nuclear program
and to come to the negotiation table with the P5 +1 is a result o f the successful economic
sanctions that the United States and Europe employ over Iran. The change o f nuclear
policy in Iran would not make Iran to shift from material-norms based security complex
to another complex just yet because it is a single policy decision without any preceding,
comprehensive, and futuristic policy implications. To reassess Iran’s nuclear ambitions,
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an analysis o f steady, progressive nuclear non-proliferation policies should follow. This
whole process is time-bound.
This chapter has outlined the nuclear security complexes model. It identified
seven nuclear security complexes with regards to state characteristics that forms nuclear
posture. In simple terms, nuclear security complexes are a method o f grouping states
regardless o f regional conditioning. The shift o f focus from regions to state
characteristics is the difference between traditional security complex theory and proposed
nuclear security complexes.
The nuclear security complexes model applies for finding the best level policies to
nuclear nonproliferation by comparing states in the same group and following a similar
international policy to the ones in the same group. The next chapter will identify and
group selected nuclear capable states— Iran, Israel, Turkey, United States— in terms o f
state characteristics that shape nuclear posture. The model will be applied as follows:
(1) Identify the 44 nuclear capable states that are defined in Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
(2) Group selected states in terms o f state characteristics based on threat
existence, democracy in the nuclear field, membership to nuclear organizations and
compliance in treaties.
(3) Analyze selected states in terms o f nuclear proliferation and nuclear
disarmament policies.
(4) Identify problems with existing nuclear policies and discuss the United States’
role.
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CHAPTER 5
MODELING NUCLEAR SECURITY COMPLEXES WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES

This chapter groups nuclear capable states in terms o f the state characteristics that
lead to nuclear posture. This grouping is conducted in a non-regional manner and as such,
states in the same region end up in different groups (complexes). That being said, two
states from the same region can end up in the same security complex (group) because of
similar state characteristics. Regional understanding is considered only through
identifying a characteristic of a certain complex. For instance, threat existence is the main
variable for the Material Security Complex. While identifying threat existence for the
material security complex, hostility with neighboring states is taken into consideration
through historical wars or crisis situations. Examining membership o f the European
Atomic Energy Community, a regional organization, could also result in what might
appear a regional grouping on first sight.
This chapter aims to show the practice o f the proposed model in Chapter 4. There
are forty-four nuclear capable states1 as o f January 2014. These are Annex II non
signatory states, defined under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All o f these states
can be grouped into seven categories. To show this application, the chapter rests on four
nuclear capable states as case studies. Three o f the cases are selected from the Middle
East (Israel, Iran, and Turkey), and the last case is the United States. The reason to select
the first three cases from the same region is to demonstrate how traditional security
1 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Dem. Republic o f Congo, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, M exico, Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam.
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complex theory is not capable o f explaining different nuclear policies. Since the
amendment o f the regional security theory for nuclear nonproliferation studies is the main
thesis o f this dissertation, this selection is vital. United States is the last case because the
supplementary argument of this dissertation is that the United States has the power— even
if it is limited to a certain degree— to influence and shape other state’s nuclear posture.
The particular reason to choose Israel is because o f the nuclear exceptionalism
that it has in the international arena. The nuclear ambiguity in Israel’s policy may also
lead us to expect that there should be many proliferators in the Middle East, if the
assumption of regional dynamics held. Its nuclear posture; therefore, is significant in
understanding the regional and non-regional patterns in nuclear policies. Iran is a
significant case because it is one o f the non-compliant parties to the non-proliferation
treaties and norms today. It follows clandestine nuclear activities and an opaque nuclear
posture. Turkey is selected because its power and military capabilities are similar to Israel
and Iran. All are middle-power states that seek to assert power in the Middle East.
This chapter relies different sets o f data. The first one is The World Factbook by
the U.S. Center for Intelligence Agency. Main and general information about a country,
such as its history, natural resources, exports, imports o f materials and partners as well as
energy capacity and capability levels are gathered from the CIA World Factbook. The
second information comes from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Index, prepared by
the Economist Intelligence Unit and voluntary country feedback. The NTI Index uses five
variables: quantities and sites, security and control measures, global norms, domestic
commitments, and risk environment. The third source is the analysis o f the Preparatory
Committee Meetings in the Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
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Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. I have analyzed the country positions o f Iran, Turkey,
and Israel through the working group statements o f the each delegation. The forth data is
the analysis o f the declassified documents— memorandum o f conversations, cables, and
leaked sources, on the Israeli nuclear weapons program.
In this chapter, I specifically look at the application o f the nuclear security
complex model. By application I mean the implementation o f the proposed model to the
real world practices. The application, in other words, is to put states into one o f the
groups in the nuclear security complex. In the material security complex, the model looks
for nuclear capable states with clear threat identification to national interest and survival
as these states render proliferation as a get away from the threat existence. This threat
existence can be from domestic powers, neighboring countries, or from international
actors. In the material-liberal security complex, the model looks for nuclear capable states
with both threat existence through national policies and liberal-democratic posture. These
states have high defense spending and less transparency in their nuclear policies. Threat
existence is acknowledged by the parties but not prioritized in foreign policy. In the
liberal material security complex, the model looks for states with liberal nuclear policies;
such as transparency and public accountability in nuclear energy or weapons program.
This group of states prioritizes nuclear nonproliferation over nuclear disarmament.
In the liberal-norms based security complex, the model looks for states that follow
both liberal-democratic policies and have integrated nuclear norms and regulations into
national policy. These states value nuclear norms and treaties and they internalize
international nuclear posture through their national nuclear policy. In the norms based
security complex theory, the model looks for states that ratify almost all nuclear
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agreements, prioritize nuclear disarmament over nuclear nonproliferation, and internalize
nuclear agreements in the national nuclear posture. In the material-norms based security
complex, the model looks for states that are signatory to some nuclear treaties but do not
rigidly follow them. These states value threat existence over compliance to treaties.
Therefore, they seek for security assurances. In the quasi-hegemonic security complex,
the model looks for the structure o f the international system, whether it is bipolar,
unipolar, or multipolar and it situates the state(s) depending on their power in the
international arena.
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Table 1. Variables in Main Nuclear Security Complexes
Iran

Israel

Turkey

United States

Threat Existence

Yes

Yes

Partially

No

Nuclear Democracy

No

Partially

Partially

Yes

Party to Main
Nuclear Treaties

Yes

No

Yes

Partially

Compliance to
Nuclear Treaties

Partially

N/A

Yes

Yes

Hegemonic Power

No

No

No

Yes

Nuclear Security
Complex

Material
Sec.
Complex

MaterialNorms Based
Sec.
Complex

MaterialLiberal Sec.
Complex

QuasiHegemonic
Sec. Complex

Table 1 summarizes the selected cases (Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the United
States) using the variables threat existence, democratic values, nuclear transparency,
being party to main nuclear treaties, internalized nuclear treaties through national
policies, compliance to nuclear treaties, and being a hegemonic power, in a dichotomous
measurement (Yes/No). The “yes” labeling in every variable determines the security
complexes of Israel, Iran, Turkey, and United States.
The purpose o f this grouping is to show biases in current nuclear policy, which
are driven mainly by the United States. The United States policies are generated through
national interest but these policies are presented in an international setting. Such
presentation is not problematic if it is followed and replicated for each state that has
similar nuclear posture. If not, then not only the United States but also the whole
international nuclear order is jeopardized. What I am trying to say is that a nuclear Iran is
as unhealthy as a nuclear Israel in the Middle East and the international organs,
regardless o f the United States’ power to influence the decision-making, should make an
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unbiased judgment in both o f the cases. This grouping makes explicit for the United
Nations or IAEA’s Board o f Governors, to make fair assessment, regardless o f a thirdparty national interest.
When nuclear capable states are grouped in this way, a group-level policy can be
employed with states such as North Korea and Israel, as they end up in the material
security complex. National interest based calculations prevent the United States from
following similar policies with both states, because foreign policy usually stems from a
dichotomous division: an ally versus an adversary. The traditional foreign policy
perspective feeds ongoing nuclear policy, which has become fixed. This policy; however,
is not helpful in changing nonproliferation dynamics. It is not helpful in directing states
either towards nonproliferation or to disarm.
There are at least two advantages in grouping states for practicality:
(1) Grouping states decreases biases that emerge from national security
calculations. Grouping, therefore, opens up room for international organizations like
United Nations (UN) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or states like the
United States to reconsider existing policies and revise them for a fair approach to all
state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
(2) Grouping states allows a non-regional approach and shows that states in the
same region may follow different nuclear proliferation policies regardless o f threat
existence or existing nuclear states in the region. The preferences o f states can change
regardless o f regional nuclear threat. In the Iranian case, for instance, even if Iran where
to acquire nuclear weapons and their delivery capability, we might not necessarily expect
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this to trigger nuclear proliferation across the Middle East. Later in this chapter, Israel is
used to demonstrate this point.

IRAN: MATERIAL-NORMS BASED SECURITY COMPLEX

Since Iran has an ongoing nuclear deal with the IAEA, its nuclear posture is
analyzed in this chapter through its past commitments and present activities. Iran is a
nuclear transitioning state. It does not have an explicit non-proliferation policy. On the
contrary, considering its ambitious nuclear investments and nuclear power plants, it tilts
towards acquiring at least the nuclear weapons technology if not the weapons themselves.
Whereas the Western powers specify a focus on preventing nuclear proliferation, Iran
focuses on nuclear disarmament as its policy objective. By following a nuclear
disarmament policy, Iran tries to accuse nuclear weapon states for non-compliance to the
revised Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) o f 1995.
Iran’s nuclear posture stems from contradictory tenets. Threat is a significant
motivation for following a nuclear weapons program. Yet, Iran still abides by
international treaties, at least, it continues to be party to major nuclear treaties. Whilst
Iran’s nuclear policies are not transparent and shared with the Iranian public in a
transparent way, the public does support a peaceful nuclear energy policy. These entire
factors (threat existence, party to international treaties and non-transparent nuclear
posture) place Iran in the material-norms based security complex.

125
History of Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Iran’s nuclear program dates back to the late 1950s. This program is a result o f the
Atoms for Peace initiative, initiated by President Eisenhower to encourage peaceful
nuclear programs. The United States and Iran made agreement on civil nuclear
cooperation in 1957 under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s rule. Iran researched nuclear
energy production at Tehran University during this period. In November 1967, the
Tehran Research Reactor, which was originally commissioned for medical radioisotope
production went critical, “using 93 percent enriched uranium supplied by the United
States.’’2
Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970 through parliamentary consent.
The comprehensive safeguards agreement was in place started by 1974.3 In the same
year, the Atomic Energy Organization in Iran was established. Later in 1975, the West
German company Kraftwerk Union A.G. started two Siemens 1,200 megawatt nuclear
reactors at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Likewise, Iran signed a contract with
France for two 900-megawatt reactors and the provision o f training for Iranian
technicians in 1977. Both Germany and France agreed “to supply enriched uranium o f ten
years’ worth of supply.”4
The history shows that Iran and the Western countries had good nuclear relations
until the fall o f the Shah. Even though Israel started its nuclear weapons program in

2 Anthony Cordesman, Khalid R. Al-Rohdan. 2006. Iran's Weapons o f Mass Destruction: The
R eal and Potential Threat. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 101.
3 International Atomic Energy Agency. 13 December 1974. The Text o f the Agreement Between
Iran and the Agency for the Application o f Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. In INFCIRC/214.
4 Anthony Cordesman, Khalid R. Al-Rohdan. 2006. Iran's Weapons o f Mass Destruction: The
R eal and Potential Threat. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 101.
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1960s, Iran did not pursuit this ambition. The United States’ alliance with Iran during the
Shah’s period was insurance against Iran following a nuclear weapons program.
When the Shah lost power, nuclear policy shifted into the hands o f the
Ayatollah’s regime. This Islamic cadre was believed to reject nuclear weapons at first,
claiming it was against Islamic law. Later however, it started to pursue nuclear research
once again. The newly reestablished regime opened a nuclear research center with
Chinese assistance in 1984.5 Iran’s fuel cycle facilities received foreign assistance from
China, and Russia. The Iranian public supports the nuclear program, and the regime
claims that because Western powers do not want a powerful Iran they refuse the country
a “peaceful nuclear program.” This claim, however, does not reflect the facts, most o f
which support the argument that Iran is engaged in clandestine nuclear activities with the
aim o f producing nuclear weapons.
This dissertation places Iran in the material-norms based security complex. The
national security decisions o f Iran are seen through the calculation o f threat to the Iranian
regime, economic benefits, and its decision to remain party to the international nuclear
order, even if it does not fully support all the treaties and norms.
a- Threat Existence: The nuclear ambiguity behind Iran’s nuclear program can be
explained through domestic and external threat identification. The Iranian leadership
aims to hold the Islamic regime intact, and the technically complex and prestigious

5 Anthony Cordesman, Khalid R. Al-Rohdan. 2006. Iran's Weapons o f Mass Destruction: The
Real an d Potential Threat. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 101.
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nuclear program are perceived to indicate Iranian superiority and power. Domestically,
this posture resonates with the public, supporting the nuclear program.6
First o f all, Iranian leaders explicitly state threats against the survival o f the
Islamic regime. Iran claims these threats are from Israel and the United States. The threat
identified from Israel is a result o f the power struggle in the Middle East and the threat
from the United States rests on a historical animosity, originating from the toppling on a
secular Iran in 1970 by the current religious regime.
From the fall o f the Shah, the relationship between the Iranian decision makers
(Iranian Presidents and Clerics/Ayatollahs) and the United States has declined. The
United States started to employ sanctions on Iran; which was followed by United Nations
sanctions. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions called Iran to adhere to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as Iran was accused o f “seeking nuclear weapons
program”, “not complying to the International Atomic Energy Agency Comprehensive
Safeguards agreement” in which it should allow inspections in declared nuclear facilities
and “not suspending its enrichment and reprocessing programs.” 7
The Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 further cultivated Iranian nuclear ambition.
During this war, Iran suffered from a lack o f international interest, even after Iraq used
chemical weapons against Iranian civilians. Iraq attacked the Bushehr nuclear power
plant several times during this war. Iran safeguarded the material in Bushehr through
IAEA observation, claiming, “no country has the right to attack the nuclear

6 Christine Fair and Stephen M. Shellman. 2008. "Determinants o f Popular Support for Iran's

Nuclear Program: Insights from a Nationally Representative Survey." Contemporary Security
P olicy no. 29 (3): 538-558.
7 United Nations Security Council. 9 June 2010. Resolution 1929; United Nations Security
Council. 27 December 2006. Resolution 1737.
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establishments of another country.”8 This rhetoric was later used over and over again in
the speeches of Iranian leaders, to assert Iran’s “inalienable right” to develop a peaceful
nuclear program. The term inalienable rights, originates from Article IV o f the NPT. So,
Iran legitimizes its nuclear activities using NPT terminology.
Over the passing years, Iran failed to assure and build confidence concerned
parties and as a result, it was subjected to heavy sanctioning. The lack o f consensus on
Iran’s capabilities and intention to build a nuclear weapons program created international
disputes as well. In 2003, Iran wanted to negotiate its nuclear program but the Bush
administration dismissed it. The European states (Britain, France, and Germany) stepped
in from 2003-2005, but Iran continued its enrichment program. Turkey and Brazil sought
to play a middle-power role and arranged an immature nuclear fuel swap deal with the
Tehran Declaration in 2010. President Obama criticized the deal in a letter to Prime
Minister Erdogan and to President Lula da Silva.9 In the same year, the United Nations
issued Resolution 1929, the Congress passed additional sanctions and the United States
and the European Union agreed to employ additional sanctions.
Threat identification continued when Iran discovered a computer virus, named
Stuxnet, had infected Iranian nuclear centrifuges in 2010. The United States and Israel
were said to be behind the Stuxnet virus. Later, the United States was identified as the
perpetrator.10 As a counter-proliferation method to slow down the Iranian nuclear

8 Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rohdan. 2006. Iran's Weapons o f Mass Destruction: The
Real an d Potential Threat. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 101.
9 In his letter, President Obama clearly states the United States will continue to sanction Iran and
the only possible negotiation way is through the IAEA proposal because the Turkish-Brazilian
fuel deal still leaves room for proliferation for a year at least. See: The White House. April 20,
2010. To: Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva-President o f the Federative Republic o f Brazil. Washington.
10 David E. Sanger, June 1, 2012. "Obama Order Sped Up Wave o f Cyberattacks Against Iran."
The New York Times.
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program in general and specifically in introducing a new type o f warfare (cyber warfare)
to the nuclear arena, Stuxnet was a significant milestone.
All these efforts could not convince Iran to stop enrichment. As a result, Israel
started to threaten an attack in the name o f counterproliferation on Iranian nuclear
facilities.11 Iranian leadership, in return, responded by blocking the Strait o f Hormuz,
through which 20% o f the worldwide oil supply is transported.

i2

In 2011, the Nuclear 5

(United Nations Permanent 5 countries) met, but the outcome o f the Istanbul Initiative
has not proved significant. In April 2012, the parties met again and negotiations
continued at a low level. In the 2012 United Nations General Assembly, Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu made his famous speech, a “clear red line for action”, as he predicted
that within a year Iran would have enriched enough uranium to make a bomb.” 13 Before
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech, former Iranian President Ahmadinejad stressed the
unfair international structure that “hegemonic powers” possess through “nuclear
weapons.” The Iranian former President stayed away from directly mentioning the
Iranian nuclear program.14
Until the election o f Hassan Rouhani in June 2013, the multilateral negotiations,
with two rounds o f talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, failed and no progress was achieved.

11 Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu addressed the U.S. Congress for two times during

the Obama administration. The second speech in 2011 majorly focuses on the Iranian nuclear
proliferation and said “Israel has the right to defend itself.” See: Jerusalem Post Staff. 24 May
2011. "Text o f Binyamin Netanyahu's Speech to the US Congress." The Jerusalem Post This
view in later years is extended at least in words to the right to defend by counter-proliferation
attacks to nuclear facilities o f Iran.
l2Mark, Thompson. 28 December 2011. "Can Iran Close the Strait o f Hormuz." Time U.S
13 Benjamin, Netanyahu. 27 September 2012 (67th Session). Shared Goal o f Middle East Peace at
Center o f General Assembly Debate, edited by General Assembly o f the United Nations. New
York: Department o f Public information-News and Media Division.
14 Mahmoud, Ahmadinejad. 26 September 2012. Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
New York: United Nations General Assembly.
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After Rouhani’s election talks restarted at the foreign ministerial level, Javad Zarif—the
new face of Iran in nuclear talks— met John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary o f State, and
negotiations started to warm up. The negotiations in Geneva heralded a new phase as
European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton and Zarif signed the Joint Action
Plan on November 24, 2013. The plan has initiated the first step o f negotiations and is
time bound to months, voluntarily asking Iran “not to enrich uranium over 5% for 6
months, to stop the production o f 20% enriched uranium, to stop further activities at the
Natanz enrichment Plant, Fordow, and at the Arak reactor, not to establish new locations
o f enrichment, not to install new centrifuges, not to reprocess and to allow enhanced
IAEA monitoring and inspections.” 15 In return, the United States and Europe agreed to
lift sanctions on “petrochemical exports, gold and precious metals, auto-industry.” Most
importantly the agreement states that no “new United Nations Security Council sanctions
or EU nuclear related sanctions,” will be issued and that “the United States’ Congress
will refrain from imposing new sanctions.” 16 Regardless, the U.S. Senators MenendezKirk initiated the “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act o f 2013,” a bill (S I881) to expand
sanctions on Iran, which was initially signed by more than 50 Republican and Democrats
in the Senate.17
Cognizant o f the damage o f such a bill if passed, Senator Dianne Feinstein, a
California Democrat and the Intelligence Committee Chairman, stated crucial facts about
the ongoing negotiations before the Senate. Believing that “state policies can change
through diplomacy,” Feinstein pointed out that P5 +1 (the United Nations Permanent

15 European External Action Service (EEAS). 24 November 2013. Joint Plan o f Action. Geneva.
16 European External Action Service (EEAS). 24 November 2013. Joint Plan o f Action. Geneva.
17 Kirk, Menendez and Schumer et al. 20 December 2013. Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act o f
2013. US. Congress.
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Members plus rotating member: Germany) had agreed to “lift sanctions only o f $7
billion,” which is mostly composed o f the “Iranian repatriation o f 4.2 billion, o f its own
money.” 18 Senator Feinstein also pointed out Iran’s continued “loss o f $4-5billion a
month o f the oil” that could not be sold in international markets due to sanctions.19
Sixty-two organizations also issued a joint letter to the Senate to stop the bill.
Non-governmental nuclear organizations, such as Global Zero, have initiated a “hotline
call” to Senators asking them to “stop jeopardizing the nuclear diplomacy.”

71

These

initiatives pressured President Obama into addressing this point in the State o f the Union
2014 speech.22 As hoped, President Obama said, he would veto the “new sanctions bill
that threatens to derail” the negotiations with Iran.23 President Obama made it clear that
the existing sanctions will remain in place and that if Iran did not comply with the Joint
Action Plan terms then he would directly implement new sanctions. The President’s firm
stance must have been heard, as the bill halted in the following days.
The historical process o f the Iranian nuclear program is significant in
understanding and analyzing the transition in Iranian nuclear politics. There is a clear
difference between the policies o f former Iranian President Ahmadinejad with the
policies of current Iranian President Rohani. However, the status o f the clerics and

18 C-Span. 14 January 2014. Sen. Feinstein (D-CA) on US-Iran Diplomacy. In Senate Session,
Part 2.
19 C-Span. 14 January 2014. Sen. Feinstein (D-CA) on US-Iran Diplomacy. In Senate Session,
P art 2.
20 Jamal, Abdi. Letter To: Members o f the U.S. Senate. National Iranian American Council, 14
January 2014. Available from
http://www.niacouncil.org/site/MessageViewer7em id= 35341,0& amp;dlv_id=42041.
21 This is an e-mail that has been received from John Michael Donahue, U.S. Campaign Manager
o f the Global Zero movement in January 27, 2014. Donahue, Joh-Michael. 27 January 2014. An
Urgent Call.
22 Barack, Obama. 28 January 2014. President Barack Obama's State o f the Union Address.
Washington DC: The White House-Office o f the Press Secretary.
23 Barack, Obama. 28 January 2014.
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Ayatollah o f the Islamic regime remain the same. The Iranian nuclear rapprochement
with the Joint Action Plan, although positive in the short-run, does not reflect Iran’s
nuclear posture in the long term. Iran’s state characteristics, such as consistent threat
identification and hostile relationships with neighboring states, as well as its weakened
and loose relations with the Western economy are all significant obstacles that will need
to be overcome for policy to change. In this respect the value that Iran associates with
nuclear weapons may continue to exceed the economic costs, such as sanctions, from the
Iranian perspective.24
Due to its ongoing hostility with Israel, Saudi Arabia and other G ulf countries, as
well as its assistance to the military branch o f Hezbollah, a Shi’a terrorist organization
mostly based in Lebanon, and its assistance to the Syrian regime, Iran is a state that faces
constant threats to its national security, if not to its survival. To some extent, the ongoing
state policies perpetuate these threats. Due to its membership to the nuclear agreements
and its very recent commitment to employ the IAEA Safeguard measures that enable
increased confidence on the peaceful structure of the Iranian nuclear program through
verification and inspection systems, Iran follows the international rules. It does not totally
comply with the treaties, however.
b- Non-democratic Nuclear Program: There are multiple concerns with the
Iranian nuclear program. One o f them is related to a lack o f transparency around the
knowledge shared with international authorities. The other one is the lack o f transparency
around the knowledge shared with the Iranian domestic public. Lack o f transparency in
Iran’s nuclear weapons program coupled with a history of establishing clandestine

24 Mani Parsi and Steve Yetiv. August 2008. "Unequal Contest: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation

Between Economic and Value Symmetry." Contemporary Security Policy no. 29 (2): 322-337.
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nuclear infrastructure without notifying the IAEA, results in a non-democratic character
to the Iranian nuclear program.
In 2003, IAEA investigation revealed undeclared fuel cycle activities in Iran. Iran
was not transparent on the “two new facilities located at Natanz.” This occurred at the
same time as Iran “confirmed heavy water production plant” in Arak.25 As the NTI points
out, Iran later acknowledged the allegations for “small scale enrichment experiments,
planned to construct an enrichment facility, a heavy water production plant, a heavy
water-moderated research reactor, and a fuel fabrication facility.”26 All o f these are parts
of the nuclear fuel cycle that could result in clandestine nuclear weapons activities. These
undeclared activities put Iran in a difficult situation with IAEA as the latter found Iran in
non-compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards agreement for the timely declaration
of nuclear activities. Iran failed to declare nuclear materials including where and when
they are received, stored, and processed, or timely update the IAEA with design
information for MIX Facility, or the waste storage at Esfahan.

97

On the domestic side, the Iranian public does not have complete knowledge o f the
Iranian nuclear weapons program. A study conducted to find the “public support for
Iran’s nuclear program”

9X

revealed that the Iranian public supports a “full nuclear fuel

cycle” which does not need to be a nuclear weapons program both for “energy needs”

25 Board o f Governors. June 19, 2003. Implementation o f the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the

Islamic Republic o f Iran. In GOV/2003/40, International Atomic Energy Agency.
26 National Threat Initiative. Iran November 2013. Available from http://www.nti.org/country-

profiles/iran/nuclear/.
27 27 Board o f Governors. June 19, 2003. Implementation o f the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic o f Iran. In GOV/2003/40, International Atomic Energy Agency.
28 This study uses the data from United States Institute o f Peace in which the institute followed
face-to-face interviews to address public opinion divergent points from the Iranian government.
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and “to deter countries from economically and politically dominating Iran.”29 The authors
o f this study also questioned the reasons for Iranian public support o f the full nuclear fuel
cycle, comparing military threats to expected economic benefits. The polling showed that
77% o f the respondents regard “the United States’ foreign policy as an important threat”
to Iran.30 The authors run a quantitative analysis as well on the U.S. Iranian relations.
When opinion on the United States is positive, individuals are less likely to support Iran’s
fuel cycle program.

31

Additionally, the polling showed that a nuclear Israel does not

“drive support” for Iranian nuclear ambitions.32
Based on the above polling and data, the Iranian domestic public supports the
government’s nuclear policies. This polling, did not ask the respondents specific
questions about the nuclear weapons program, rather it used the term “full nuclear fuel
cycle,” due to domestic considerations in Iran. It would be good to see the results o f a
question regarding the Iranian government’s transparency with regards to its nuclear
program. How much information is shared with the public about undeclared material or
satellite imagery that discovers new nuclear infrastructures, for example, needs further
evaluation.
c- Party to Nuclear Organizations/ Partial Compliance to Nuclear Treaties:
Regardless o f the ambiguity o f the Iranian nuclear program, Iran is part o f the
international nuclear regime. It has been party to the NPT since 1970 and fiercely pushes
forward the nuclear disarmament agenda. The Iranian Representative’s speech in the

29 Christine Fair and Stephen M. Shellman. 2008. "Determinants o f Popular Support for Iran's
Nuclear Program: Insights from a Nationally Representative Survey." C ontemporary Security
P olicy no. 29 (3): 543.
30 Christine Fair and Stephen M. Shellman. 2008. p. 545.
31 Christine Fair and Stephen M. Shellman. 2008. p. 550.
32 Christine Fair and Stephen M. Shellman. 2008. p. 553.
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2005 Review Conference was focused mainly on the “ 13 practical steps to implement
Article VI o f the treaty.”

In later years, Iran consistently criticized nuclear weapon

states for not following the treaty regulations, such as not reducing their tactical nuclear
weapons.
Over the NPT statements, the Iranian Representatives explicitly state the role o f
NPT extension to the non-party states, particularly to Israel, since it is a “real threat to all
countries in the Middle East and to the international peace and security.”34 Iran
particularly asks for an end to “nuclear sharing,”35 accusing the United States o f “noncompliance” to the NPT, by sharing nuclear knowledge with the “Zionist Regime of
Israel”36 and has shown the “top secret document dated 23 August 1974” between Israel
and the United States.37 The Iranian delegation stresses “full support” to the Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and regards Israel as “the only obstacle”

33 The 13 practical steps are implemented with the 2000 Review Committee for the nuclear

weapon states to follow. These steps are ratification to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), banning nuclear testing, banning the fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, need for
a subsidiary body in Conference in Disarmament, irreversibility o f nuclear reductions,
elimination o f nuclear arsenals to total nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, entry
into force and implementation o f the START II and START III, completion o f the Trilateral
Initiative between U.S., Russia, and the IAEA, other steps that nuclear weapon states to follow
such as diminishing the role o f nuclear weapons in security policies, reduce non-strategic nuclear
weapons, unilateral reductions and so on, to put excess fissile material into verification,
reaffirmation o f ultimate objective o f nuclear disarmament to be general, regular reports on the
disarmament process, verification o f capabilities for assurance reasons. See The Representative o f
the Islamic Republic o f Iran. 19 May 2005. Before NPT 2005 Review Conferences, Main
Committee I On Nuclear Disarmament, edited by Islamic Republic o f Iran Permanent Mission to
the United Nations. New York: United Nations.
34 The Representative o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran. 19 May 2005. Before NPT 2005 Review
Conferences, Main Committee I On Nuclear Disarmament, edited by Islamic Republic o f Iran
Permanent Mission to the United Nations. New York: United Nations.
35 Representative o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran. 30 April 2007-11 May 2007. NPT 2010 Review
Conference, On Nuclear Disarmament. Vienna: United Nations.
36 Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 25 April 2008. Nuclear Disarmament-Working Paper,
edited by Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. Geneva: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
37 Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 26 April 2012. Nuclear Disarmament. Vienna.
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to this zone.

The Iranian claim, in this regard, captures the international norms and

regulations, when the Iranian Representative says:
“The Regime’s [Zionist Regime] clandestine development and possession o f
nuclear weapons not only violate basic principles o f international law, United
Nations Charter, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, and
numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, but also clearly
defy the demands and concerns o f the overwhelming majority o f the UN member
states and constantly and obstinately disregard the international community which
have time and again, called the regime to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.” 39

Iran asks for a non-discriminatory and non-selective approach, based on the terms
o f nuclear equality, in which nuclear weapon states abolish their nuclear arsenal as part of
Article VI o f the NPT. Otherwise, according to the Iranian logic, non-nuclear weapon
states would have the right to proliferate. The latter part is not explicit in the Iranian
official statements; however, the clandestine nuclear weapons program o f Iran supports
this point. Iranian delegation continuously stresses the “inalienable right” o f Iran to
acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.40
Similar to the North European countries like Norway, Iran highlights that “usage
o f nuclear weapons is against the rules o f international law;” therefore Iran takes the
“advisory opinion” o f the International Court o f Justice as a “universal disarmament

38 Islamic Republic o f Iran. 26 April 2012. Establishment o f a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the

Middle East, edited by Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. Vienna.
39 Representative o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran. 9 May 2007. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the
Middle East Region, edited by Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons: United
Nations.
40 Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 26 April 2012. The Inalinable Right to Develop Research,
Production, and Uses o f Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes, edited by Preparatory Committee
for the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear
Weapons. Vienna.
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obligation.”41 For the 2015 Review Conference, it “proposes to establish an ad hoc
committee to work on the illegality o f nuclear weapons” and to create negative security
assurances42 This approach, however, is against, for instance, the nature o f NATO’s
existence, which is to provide security to its member states (collective defense). By
extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella to all parties, the established alliances will loose
power. Iran, furthermore, presses especially the United States to adhere to its
commitments under Article VI o f the NPT, and proposes to establish a “standing
committee for monitoring and verifying the implementation o f the nuclear weapon states”
for reduction of nuclear arsenal and total disarmament.43
Iran, in conclusion, is in the material-norms security complex and the ongoing
negotiations through the Joint Action Plan are very significant for the Iranian nuclear
posture in the future. Iran is not a state that does not adhere to the international norms. It
has a very different nuclear policy than Democratic Republic o f Korea or Israel.

41 Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 24 April 2008. Implementation o f Article VI: Report

Submitted by the Islamic Republic o f Iran. Edited by Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. Geneva:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference.
42 Islamic Republic o f Iran. 26 April 2012. Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat o f Use
o f Nuclear Weapons—Working Paper, edited by Prepatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. Vienna.
43 Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 26 April 2012. Implementation o f ArticlevVI. edited by
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. Vienna.
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ISRAEL: MATERIAL SECURITY COMPLEX

Mr. Warnke: “Then in your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device is not
a nuclear weapon. ” Ambassador Rabin44 said: “Yes, that is correct. ”45

The dominant variable is threat existence in the case o f Israel. This is also the
main reason that Israel is grouped in the material security complex rather than in other
groups. Below I examine the existence o f threat in Israel’s nuclear rhetoric from its
establishment as a state onwards, and its nuclear posture that does not correspond to
democratic values.

History of Israel’s Nuclear Posture:
Israel neither confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons officially. This
policy is called nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s nuclear program is known to have started
around 1963 with French assistance. The holocaust rhetoric and war with Arab states
have been considered the catalysts for the Israeli nuclear project. Consistent with the
nuclear ambiguity policy, then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said, “Israel will not be the
first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.” Israel’s opacity in the
possession of nuclear weapons is the result o f threat existence from the neighboring
countries. Israel does not want to be the state that generates conflict but also does not
want to be caught empty handed either. This policy was generated in 1948 and became
part of the Israeli national security program through time.

44 Declassified conversation between Ambassador o f Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin

and Assistant Secretary o f Defense (ISA), Paul C. Wamke, regarding the meaning o f
“introducing” a nuclear weapon. See
45 Memorandum o f Conversation. November 12, 1968. Negotiations with Israel—F4 and
Advanced Weapons. Washington DC: Assistant Secretary o f Defense.
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How did the policy o f nuclear ambiguity begin? In 1968, Paul Wamke, U.S.
Assistant Secretary o f Defense, and Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador o f Israel, had
conversations about the meaning o f the “introduction” o f a nuclear weapon. This
correspondence’s main aim was to settle 50 F-4 Phantom aircraft sales from the United
States to Israel, when the United States wanted to clarify that these aircrafts would not be
used to carry nuclear warheads.46 The agreement was reached without a consensus on the
meaning o f an introduction of a nuclear weapon.
According to the United States, an introduction o f a weapon meant the “physical
possession and control o f nuclear arms by any Middle Eastern power,”47 whereas for
Rabin an introduction o f a nuclear weapon was when the weapon is “actually tested”

48

and “advertised.”49 The United States’ was worried how the “world would see” the Israeli
nuclear weapons and not the physical existence o f the weapons.50 Two months after,
Israel had shifted its discourse; suggesting that Israel would not be the first to introduce
nuclear weapons and that it would remain a non-nuclear state. Kissinger then said “what
Israel has done now is to define the word “introduction” by relating to NPT”
46 The United States’ official position in this era was to keep the U.S.-Israeli cooperation limited

in purpose and to encourage Israel to make military agreements and sales with European states, so
that Soviet Union would not get into rapid arms deals in the Middle East with other countries.
The U.S. delegation asks three assurances from Israel with regards to the sale o f F-4s: 1- Israel,
not to deploy nuclear warheads to an aircraft sold by the United States, 2- no development or
manufacturing o f nuclear weapons, 3- Israel to sign Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). See
Memorandum o f Conversation. November 4, 1968. Negotiations with Israel-F4 and Advanced
Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Assistant Secretary o f Defense; Memorandum o f Conversation.
November 8 , 1968. Negotiations with Israel - F4 and Advanced Weapons. Washington, D.C.:
Assistant Secretary o f Defense. (Third Session).
47 Assistant Secretary o f Defense. November 27, 1968. Paul C. Wamke to Ambassador Yitzhak
Rabin. Washington, D.C.
48 Memorandum o f Conversation. November 12, 1968. Negotiations with Israel—F4 and
Advanced Weapons. Washington DC: Assistant Secretary o f Defense. (Fourth Session)
49 Joseph J. Sisco to the Acting Secretary. July 28, 1969. Talking Points for Initial Meeting with
Israelis on Nuclear and SSM Issue July 29. Washington, D.C.: Department o f State.
50 Joseph J. Sisco to the Acting Secretary. July 28, 1969. Talking Points for Initial Meeting with
Israelis on Nuclear and SSM Issue July 29. Washington, D.C.: Department o f State.
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terminology.51 The diplomatic cables revealed that Israel did not want to state non
possession of nuclear weapons in their nuclear discourse, as that terminology would
disserve the policy o f nuclear ambiguity. The Israeli nuclear policy was established in
these years, when decision-makers, both from the Israeli and the United States’ side, were
trying to figure out how to respond to Israel’s nuclear program.
The United States was divided on whether to pressure Israel not to acquire nuclear
weapons, and if so, how far to pressure them? The democrats, from Johnson’s
administration, noticed the possibility o f acquiring nuclear weapons when Israel asked to
have “two CDC 6400 computer systems, which are critical” for a nuclear weapons
program.52 Pentagon officials, such as the Deputy Secretary o f Defence David Packard,
wrote a memorandum to Secretary o f Defence Melvin Laird to put more pressure on
Israel, but that request failed. Henry Kissinger, according to William Burr and Avner
Cohen’s analysis, was convinced that it was in the best interests o f the United States “if
Israel kept their nuclear activities secret.”53
By June 30, 1969, only the United States’ top officials knew Israel’s nuclear
capability. At the Review Group meeting, The Under Secretary o f State, Mr. Richardson
listed the objectives o f the United States, one o f which was “to create circumstances in
which Israel would not “announce” a nuclear capability and would maintain secrecy on
its research and development activity.” The choice o f the phrase, “maintain secrecy”

51 Henry A, Kissinger to the President. November 6 , 1969. Israel's Nuclear Program. Washington,

D.C.: The White House.
52 Henry Owen to the Secretary o f State. March 17, 1969. Stopping the Introduction o f Nuclear

Weapons into the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: The Secretary o f Defense. This document does
not refer Israel as the buyer state. However, the subject o f the memorandum, “introduction” o f
nuclear weapons is directed to the Israeli nuclear posture, as it is the only state that uses
“introducing” a weapon as part o f its policy.
53 William, Burr and Avner Cohen. NSSM 40 and R elated Records R eleased in Full fo r First
Time. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.485 September 12, 2014.
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rather than “maintain ambiguity or opacity,” discloses the United States’ knowledge o f
Israel’s activities by that time.54 The group advised Israel “not to deploy its produced
missiles but to hide them” since missiles technology is an expensive program and no state
would acquire this weaponry without considering attaching a nuclear warhead to it.55
Consistently, General Cushman from the CIA, noted that Israel had “eleven missiles” by
that time and was expected to have nearly thirty by the end o f 1970, “ten, reportedly, with
nuclear warheads.”56 In 1979, the Vela satellite program detected a double flash on the
ocean, which turned eyes towards Israel and South Africa. Today, speculation favors a
joint South African-Israeli test.57 Israel has not declared any responsibility for this
nuclear test and kept its nuclear ambiguity policy in tact.
Avner Cohen, a Professor at the Monterey Institute o f International Studies,
indicated that the United States during the Nixon Administration made a deal with Israel,
known as the Nixon-Golda W eir secret deal.58 There is no publicly disclosed recording
available for this deal. According to Cohen, “Israel agreed not to make unilateral changes
in its nuclear ambiguity” policy and in return the United States accepted the Israeli
nuclear weapons program.59 This policy is in direct opposition to the United States’
nuclear posture on nuclear transparency and nuclear non-proliferation. However, a

54 Rodger Davies to Mr. Austin et al. June 26, 1969. Review Group Consideration o f Response to

NSSM -40.
55 Rodger Davies to Mr. Austin et al. June 26, 1969. Review Group Consideration o f Response to
NSSM -40.
56 Rodger Davies to Mr. Austin et al. June 26, 1969. Review Group Consideration o f Response to
NSSM -40.
57 Carey, Sublette. September 1, 2001. Report on the 1979 Vela Incident. Nuclear Weapon
Archive.
58 It is through Avner Cohen and William Burr, that we reach these documents now. There are 31
declassified material and Cohen and Burr originally published the article “Israel crosses the
threshold” based on this documentation.
59 Avner, Cohen. 2010. The W orst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain With the Bomb. N ew York:
Columbia University Press.
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strategic ally like Israel needed security assurances and it was in line with the United
States’ national interest not to take an action against the Israeli nuclear ambitions o f the
time.
a- Threat Existence: Israel’s security concerns date back to the Holocaust. The
idea o f survival when there is an existential threat is bred into the bones o f the Israeli
national discourse in history. Today, Israel is in the material security complex because of
threat identification and not being party to major nuclear treaties. The threat identification
dates back to the formation o f the Israeli state. Below, I will examine the role o f threat in
Israel’s nuclear ambiguity.
The Israeli Defense motto o f “never again” serves a collective response to the
Holocaust and is an analogy that has been used in the nuclear setting. This has
consequences for Israel’s nuclear secrecy. Israel learned in history that national interest
prevails any kind o f coalition, and if Israel is going to survive, it needs to be powerful.
This understanding dates back to the historical instances that Israel has faced not only
with its Middle Eastern neighbors but also with the western allies.
In the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, Israel learned by experience that the United States
would not support Israel in all circumstances. During the Suez Canal Crisis, the United
States accused France, Britain, and Israel o f aggression, and sided with Egypt when
Nasser was nationalizing the Suez Canal. Following this crisis, French-Israeli military
cooperation in arms deals strengthened. In 1958, Israel started to build the Dimona
reactor with French assistance.60 This was, unlike the Soreq reactor for peaceful nuclear

60 December 19, 1960, President Eisenhower and his defense group decided to ask for an

“inspection” to the Dimona reactor. The reactor, as President Eisenhower sayid, should have
“cost $100-$200 million dollars,” which was an amount that Israel could not afford without
diverting public and private aids from the United States. In the declassified documents examined,
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energy production, a secret project. The United States’ intelligence could not make a
timely assessment o f the reactor, as the intelligence unit learned about the project only in
I96061 when Dr. Gomberg, a whistleblower who visited Israel as a guest o f the Israeli
Atomic Energy Commission, leaked the information to the United States Secretary of
State, saying “France intends to do anything to regain its place as a major power.”62 Dr.
Gomberg said that Israel was calling the project a “large agricultural experimental
station” and explained the possible French assistance with nuclear forensics.

AT

This

corresponds to the establishment o f the Dimona Reactor.
The Dimona reactor was a secret plutonium production nuclear facility. The
reactor was a result of Israel’s national security paradigm in the Cold War. The bipolar
international system and instability in the Middle East brought about the maximization o f
power and capabilities in Israel’s national policy. Uncertainty also played role in the
Israeli decision. Israel today is believed to have 100-200 nuclear warheads, reprocessed
in the Dimona reactor. Table 2 shows the estimated numbers o f Israeli nuclear weaponry
from different sources64:

Israel refuses all the requests o f the United States to “inspect” the Dimona reactor. Israeli
response, in this regard, was sharp and clear, stating that the U.S. could only “visit” the reactor
but not to “inspect” it. The United States conducted one-day visits per year to this reactor;
however, the memorandum conversations stated the limitations that the group faced in each visit.
The visits were also not conclusive to examine the Israeli nuclear program. See: President
Eisenhower, Secretary Herter, Asst. Secretary Berding et al. December 19, 1960. "Memorandum
o f Conference with the President."
61 Avner, Cohen. 1998. Israel and the bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 81-85.
62 American Embassy in Paris. November 26, 1960. Incoming Telegram. Department o f State.
63 Memorandum o f Conversation. December 1, 1960. Israeli Atomic Energy Program.
Washington, D.C.: Department o f State.
64IISS Strategic Dossier. 2008. "Israel: Nuclear Monopoly in Danger." in Nuclear Programmes
in the M iddle East; in the shadow o f Iran, 119-140.

144
Table 2. Estimates o f Israeli Nuclear Arsenal
Sunday Times (1986)
Frank Bamaby (1989)
Seymour Hersh (1991)

Anthony Cordesman (1996)
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control (1996)
Jane’s Intelligence Review (1997)
US Defense Intelligence Agency (1999)
David Albright, Institute for Science and
International Security (2005)
Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (2007)

As many as 200 nuclear weapons
100-200 weapons worth o f plutonium;
up to 35 thermonuclear weapons
Hundreds o f nuclear weapons, ranging
from low-yield, enhanced radiation
‘neutron’ designs, mines and artillery
shells to thermonuclear weapons
60-80 nuclear weapons
Up to 175 bombs worth o f plutonium
Over 400 nuclear weapons
60-80 nuclear weapons
510-650kg o f separated plutonium (by
end o f 2003)
100-200 warheads

The existential threat identification to the Israeli state’s survival continued into
the late 1960s. Israel started to lose Western support. French restrictions started on
Israel’s supply o f uranium in 1963. Israel then turned into Argentina as an alternative
supplier. The Israeli government acquired 80-100 tons o f Argentine uranium oxide
(yellowcake), which is a vital process in the uranium enrichment program.65 Two-days
before the Six-Day War in 1967, French President Charles de Gaulle issued a partial arms
embargo on Israel. On December 29, 1968, France “suspended all arms deliveries,” after
an Israeli raid on an airport in Beirut, which destroyed Lebanese planes, o f which onethird was owned by Air France.66

65 For more information on the Argentinian-Israeli nuclear assistance, visit William Burr, Avner

Cohen. The Israel-Argentina Yellowcake Connection. The National Security Archive June 25,
2013. Available from http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb432/.
66 European Jewish Congress. France-Israel: from de Gaulle's Arms Embargo to Sarkozy's
Election June 23, 2008. Available from http://www.eurojewcong.org/improving-eu-israelrelations/2165-france-israel:-from-de-gaulles-arms-embargo-to-sarkozys-election-.html.
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The relations deteriorated further when Israel destroyed the Osirak reactor in Iraq,
which was designed through Iraqi-French cooperation. The Six Day War, then, was a war
o f survival for Israel. This time, however, Israel annexed Sinai Peninsula and Golan
Heights. Israel’s “never again” motto was reconfirmed to work through these
expansionist policies, which were condemned by Western powers. These historical
records show the threat identification in Israel, which creates consequences for other
parties in the region. During the Lebanon War (July War) in 2006, for instance, Iran
supported the Lebanese paramilitary group against Israel. In these circumstances o f
ongoing threat survival, keeping the nuclear weapons is the only guarantee for the Israeli
government.
b- Non-Democratic and Transparent Nuclear Program: Democracy is another
variable that affects Israel’s nuclear posture. Although Israel is said to be a democratic
country by the Polity IV report o f 2010, it does not follow a democratic nuclear policy.
The Polity IV dataset ranks Israeli democracy with the highest score (+10 points, in a -10
to +10 scale).67 In textbooks such as the Essentials o f Comparative Politics, Israel is
considered as an advanced democracy as well. According to O ’Neil, the author o f this
book, the degree and institutionalization o f participation, competition, liberty, openmarkets, private property, and the high level o f gross domestic product at purchasingpower parity and small agricultural sectors” are indicators o f an advanced democracy.68
Although the above-suggested indicators are necessary, they are not sufficient to be a
democratic state with regards to nuclear matters. If Israel is a full democracy then how

67 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Israel 2010. Available

from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Israel2 0 1 0 .pdf.
68 Patrick H. O'Neil. 2013. "Advanced Democracies." In Essentials o f Com parative P olitics, pp.
226-228. N ew York: W. W. Norton & Company.
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one can explain its nuclear ambiguity policy? This policy clearly clashes with tenets such
as public knowledge, transparency, and accountability in democratic states. Only when
the national public is cognizant o f and as a result, supports national security policies, can
democratic rule prevail. In democracies, the public has the upper hand over the
government because governments come and go with elections. Nuclear secrecy or nuclear
ambiguity cannot be a policy in a full democracy. In Israel, even the Israeli
representatives do not have fully-fledged knowledge o f the Israeli nuclear undertaking.
Israel’s nuclear discourse, based on ambiguity/opacity, has democratic
consequences. Nuclear policy is not an issue in Israeli public policy debates and has not
been discussed outside closed doors. As Cohen and Burr say: “Israel’s nuclear posture is
inconsistent with the tenets o f a modem liberal democracy.”69 The Israeli government
follows a nuclear policy based on malformed relations with neighboring countries and
Western powers. The fluctuation o f relations with France from the Cold War onwards,
decline in relations with Turkey after the Mavi Marmara Flotilla Incident, and long-term
problems with Egypt, Iran and other neighboring countries are some o f the reasons for
Israel’s continuation o f its nuclear policy. If Israel could normalize relations with
neighboring countries, it could eventually result in the normalization o f nuclear policy.
The United States’ nuclear policy towards the material security complex is significant in
this aspect.
c- Non-party to Major Nuclear Treaties: Israel is not party to major nuclear
agreements and organizations. The Israeli nuclear ambiguity policy prevents the Israeli
state from signing and ratifying any major treaty that could jeopardize its long-

69 Avner Cohen and William Burr. April 30, 2006. "The Untold Story o f Israel's Bomb." The

Washington Post'. 1-3.
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established nuclear stance. Membership o f the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), in
this regard, is a must for creating mutual trust through treaty obligations. The United
States Administration in late 1960s demanded Israel to ratify NPT in order to limit a
possible nuclear outbreak in the Middle East and to prevent the Soviet confrontation.
In July 28, 1969, Joseph Sisco created the talking points for the Acting Secretary,
and reiterated the United States’ request for Israel to sign and ratify the NPT. This time,
the discourse changes to stress the N PT’s power over “unilateral assurances at the highest
governmental level or in private meetings.”70 At first, the Israeli government responded
to the request with a delay in NPT ratification, then the Israeli delegation asked to wait
for the election o f the new government because NPT ratification was a hot topic that
could not be handled during the election year. Four months after the elections, in
February 23,1970, Rabin, Ambassador of Israel, said to Kissinger, “Israel did not have
intentions to sign NPT.” According to Kissinger, this was “the end o f the long decayed
U.S. effort to stop the Israeli nuclear program.”71
Israel, today, is still not a party to NPT and this is highly criticized by other states.
It is not party to Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)72, Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and Missile
Technology Control Regim e.73 The CWC is a universal treaty that is ratified by majority

70 Joseph J. Sisco to the Acting Secretary. July 28, 1969. Talking Points for Initial Meeting with
Israelis on Nuclear and SSM Issue July 29. Washington, D.C.: Department o f State.
71 Avner Cohen and William Burr. April 30, 2006. "The Untold Story o f Israel's Bomb." The
Washington Post: 1-3.
72 Angola, Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, Somalia, and Syria
are not party to CWC.
73 Nuclear Threat Initiative. Israel December 2013. Available from http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/israel/.
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of the states in the world.74 There are only six states,75 including Israel, that have not
acceded the CWC.76 By not ratifying CWC, Israel damages the disarmament and
cooperation efforts o f the international arena. This leaves Israel outside nuclear
regulations and norms much like North Korea.
As a result o f projected threat existence, non-democratic nuclear policies, and not
being party to major nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, Israel causes
unrest in the Middle East’s nuclear dynamics as well. The likely proliferators in the
region legitimize their nuclear policies in reaction to the Israeli policy. This nuclear
rhetoric results in a self-perpetuating nuclear policy. The Israeli nuclear program,
therefore, has grand consequences compared to its small value. The nuclear deterrence
strategy where Israel rests its nuclear policy on the value o f nuclear weapons is not
shown to be effective in limiting non-proliferation because nuclear weapons cannot be a
bargaining chip between geographically close neighbors as they can result in mutual
destruction.

74 The universal adherence to CWC is practiced recently in the Syrian case, where Bashar al-Asad

agreed to become party to the treaty and return its chemical stockpiles to the United Nations. The
Organization for the Prohibition o f Chemical Weapons helps Syrian government to transfer the
stockpile.
75 Israel and Myanmar signed the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty in 1993 but never
ratified, whereas Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan do not even sign the treaty.
76 Organization for the Prohibition o f Chemical Weapons. 14 October 2013. Status o f
Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 14 October 2013. In S/I 131/2013:
Office o f the Legal Adviser.
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TURKEY: MATERIAL-LIBERAL SECURITY COMPLEX

Turkey is in the material-liberal security complex because threat existence and
democratic rule have an impact on its nuclear decision-making. Turkey still identifies
threats from domestic actors and/or outside powers. In terms o f nuclear policies, Turkey
has the potential to acquire a nuclear weapons program but it is not interested in it. Its
existing nuclear policy is a result o f balancing threats and maximizing economic interest
through diversifying energy routes with nuclear energy programs. Iran’s nuclear
ambitions do not turn Turkey towards nuclear weapons projects, although they are in the
same region. However, the Turkish government clearly states that it would not let any
country acquire nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
a- Threat Existence: Turkey possesses the characteristics o f material-liberal
security complex because there is a clear definition o f threat in Turkish domestic and
foreign policies. Although the AKP government tried to create a policy o f ‘zero problems
with neighbors’, unexpected circumstances due to the Arab Spring rendered a new threat
setting. The Turkish government has significantly increased its defense expenditure in
recent years. The Turkish government states Bahar Al-Assad o f Syria as a clear threat to
Turkey. Turkey, after Syrian forces shot down a Turkish aircraft, requested from NATO
to deploy ground-to-air guided Patriot missile defense batteries to protect Turkish air
space.77 The North Atlantic Council responded positively to the request, stating that it
would deploy six batteries for defensive purposes.78 The gathering o f terrorist groups in
Syria (such as ISIS or Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist cells) is also seen to be threat in the
77 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 4 December 2012. Press Release Regarding the North Atlantic

Council's Decision to Augment Turkey's National Air Defence. Ankara: Republic o f Turkey.
78 Germany, Netherlands, and the United States provided two Patriot batteries each to Turkish air
defense. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. February 2013. Fact Sheet: Patriot Deployment.
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long run to Turkish security and stability. ISIS captured forty-nine Turkish citizens,
including a Turkish Ambassador, after a raid to Turkish Consulate in Mosul. Before,
Turkish forces shot down a Syrian warplane, claiming that it violated Turkish air space.79
Additionally, a leaked tape from a conversation among Ahmet Davutoglu, the Foreign
Minister, Hakan Fidan, Chief o f the National Intelligence Organization, and top military
officers, indicated that Turkey considered— allegedly as an alternative scenario— to
attack Turkey from Syria to legitimize war, if necessary.80 This conversation also
revealed fears of instability on the Turkish-Syrian border for years to come and the
possible repercussions this might have on Turkey’s national interest and security.
Threat is identified not only from outside actors. There is a domestic unrest and
the Turkish government has been challenged by both the Turkish youth and also from the
Hizmet group that serves the Fethullah Gulen, an Islamic scholar living in Pennsylvania.
This power struggle is visible between the government and different domestic actors,
such as the police department, armed forces, judiciary, the Hizmet movement, and PK.K
(officially claimed to be an ethnic terrorist organization). This power struggle was
explicit when demonstrators clashed with the police forces in the Gezi Park. Before Gezi
Park, there were demonstrations against Internet censorship at Taksim Square, and
demonstrations against government control o f lifestyles; the government took none of

79 Turkish Foreign Ministry states that Turkey has acted in accordance with the Article 51 o f the
Charter o f the United Nations, which is self-defense. See, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 23 March
2014. Press Release Regarding the Engagement o f a Syrian Warplane Violating Turkey's
Airspace. Ankara: Republic o f Turkey.
80 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 27 March 2014. Press Release Regarding the Illegal Exposure o f
Certain Audio Records with Regard to the Tomb o f Suleymansah Memorial Outpost. Ankara:
Republic o f Turkey.
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those seriously. This clash caused instability in the regime when the Hizmet group began
the alleged graft probe that involves high-cadre government officials and their sons.81
The changing landscape o f the Middle East due to the Arab Spring is also an
underlying factor in threat perception. Before the start o f the Arab Spring, the threat
identification was kept at the lowest level. Turkish foreign policy, as President Gul
described, was “proactive” rather than “reactive” in the first years o f the AKP ruling.82
AKP’s foreign policy was to follow a zero problems with neighbors approach, a term
coined by the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. This approach was “visionary” rather
than “crisis-oriented” and was “consistent and systemic”

to initiate tools o f soft power

and alignment in the “Western axis, Middle Eastern axis and Eurasian axis.”84 Within the
zero problems policy economic initiatives and diplomatic maneuvers were the tools for
employing soft power. The Arab Spring shattered this policy since Turkey could not use
these tools to shape events in neighboring counties. Western powers proposed Turkish
governing structure as the two countries dismissed a model to Egypt and Tunisia, but
these states dismissed this proposal. Kirisci indicated the problem in the Middle East
foreign policy as from “zero problems with neighbors” to “zero neighbors with
problems” approach.85

81 Robert, Siegel. 25 December 2013. Turkish Leaders Resign In Anti-Graft Probe, Erdogan

Claims Conspiracy. National Public Radio.
82 Abdullah, Gul. 2007. Yeni Yiizyilda Turk Di§ Politikasi Ufuklari: Horizons o f Turkish Foreign
Policy in the New Century. Ankara: T.C D 15 tjleri Bakanligi Yayinlari. p. 16.
83 Ahmet, Davutoglu. May 20 2010. Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy
Magazine.
84 Abdullah, Gul. 26 February 2007. Yeni Kuresel Duzen Arayi§lari, Yeni Ortakliklar: Turk
Perspektifi. Paper read at Rusya Federasyonu Di^i^leri Bakanligi Diplomasi Akademisi, at
Moscova.
85 Kemal, Kirisci. The Rise and Fall o f Turkey as a M odel fo r the Arab World. The Brookings
Institute August 15, 2013. Available from
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/08/15-rise-and-fall-turkey-model-middle-east.
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Although Turkey’s foreign policy was based on seeking opportunities, the new
context required a new regional risk assessment that the AKP government failed to
conduct.86 The loss of power in the neighborhood and increased hostility, especially with
the Assad regime in Syria, shifted Turkey’s threat perception and identification as well.
Prime Minister Erdogan has given explicit messages and asked for support from the
United States for military intervention to Syria. Considering Turkey’s Kemalist policy of
non-violence — the peace at home peace in the world motto — and non-expansionist
policy, the new policy against the Syrian regime captured the attention and protest o f the
domestic public as well.
b- M ixed Democratic and Transparent Nuclear Posture: Turkey enjoys the
liberal economic international order and follows an approach where economic benefits
are linked to security needs. In this sense, the Turkish government encourages foreign
direct investment and increased level o f trade in Europe and the Middle East.
Regardless o f the threat identification, Turkey does not follow a nuclear weapons
policy because it values economic benefits as highly as it does the nation’s security.
Turkey, moreover, does not have natural resource fields (uranium and plutonium). The
zero problems with neighbors approach was based on intensive trade, to decrease the
likelihood o f tensions and crises; because states with mutual economic ties are less likely
to enter into conflict with each other.87

86 Abdullah Gul states that the new foreign policy is based on opportunities rather than assessing

risks. This claim holds only when Turkey lies at the center o f all the events, and it is the one that
shapes the events. To have such power, Turkey needs to be a regional hegemony— which was not
the case— when one considers Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel to have equal powers in the
region. Turkish foreign policy failure then is a result o f a self-centered and focused policy without
taking into consideration the external factors and dynamics that surrounds Turkey.
87 This approach that links trade and conflict is examined in Chapter 4 while characterizing the
liberal security complex.
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The economic incentives rest mainly on an increasing thirst for energy resources
DO

as Turkey imports almost 90% o f its oil.

Natural gas consumption is also high in

Turkey, where the country uses gas for the electric power sector and as an alternative
resource for transportation.

80

In terms o f gas import, Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan are the

top choices for Turkey. Turkey’s demand for nuclear energy, technological knowledge on
dual-use weaponry, and its military doctrine o f not being transparent do lend Turkish
policies some ambiguity. Turkey wants to decrease its dependence to third parties by
investing in a nuclear program. While following this policy, Turkey also wants to acquire
scientific knowledge on missile programs, which complicates the issue.
To decrease the demand on natural gas and to create an alternative and cheap way
to meet electricity demand, Turkey works on two nuclear power plant deals— four
nuclear reactors in each— with Russian and Japanese companies, in Akkuyu and Sinop
respectively. These nuclear deals are extremely costly90, around $20billion - $22billion
each, and obvious technical problems (such as the prospect o f the nuclear waste in the
Japanese deal is not known, although the Russian company will receive the waste in the
Akkuyu nuclear program.) Spent fuel— which is the nuclear waste— is one o f the
proliferation pathways, if a state wants to acquire a nuclear weapons program.
In terms of dual-use weaponry, as part o f its Long-Range Ballistic Missile and Air
Defense System (T- LORAMIS), Turkey signaled an agreement with a Chinese

88 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Turkey: Analysis February 1, 2013. Available

from http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TU.
89 Sinan Ulgen et al. 2012. Nukleer Enerjiye Geciste Turkiye M odeli—II. In Ekonomi ve D is
Politika A rastirm alar Merkezi. Istanbul.
90 The reason given for being costly is because Turkey’s bidding system is different than others.
Turkey follows “build-operate-transfer” system in its procurements where a foreign company
builds and operates the system for certain years and then transfers its agreed percentage to
Turkey. In this way, Turkey nationalizes and expected to profit from the foreign investment in the
long run.
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company, sanctioned by the United States, for a HQ-9 ballistic missile system. Compared
to the European (EUROSAM) and American (Patriot) missiles, the Chinese system is
claimed to be cheaper and technologically satisfactory. One o f the benefits that Turkey
receives from this agreement is to acquire the technological know-how o f the ballistic
missile system through the involvement o f a Turkish national company in the process.91
HQ-9 missiles, however, are not interoperable with NATO forces and they need
“interface data” for interoperability.92 Not only do they lack interoperability but also
losing a NATO member state to competing markets is against NATO’s collective security
understanding. If NATO members do not show solidarity in the market economy and
defense sector, it will be easier to go elsewhere for security needs in the future, thus
undermining the alliance. All these actions worried the NATO Allies as they pressured
Turkey to change its decision. Turkey backed down from the agreement with the Chinese
company and extended the deadline for the bidders until April 30, 2014.93
Interdependence through NATO and the defense sector, in this sense, creates certain level
of trust, binds the members and also limits the members in diverting to find other ways of
achieving security. Interdependence is one of the features o f the liberal economic
understanding and has place in the liberal security complex. Turkey’s call for an

91 Historically, Turkey showed interest to the Israeli Arrow missiles because their effectiveness in
the neighborhood is tested. However, in 2008 the United States opposed the agreement between
Turkey and Israel, supporting the fact that missile technology cannot be exported to third parties.
92 Sinan, Ulgen. February 2012. "Turkey and the Bomb." Carnegie Endowment fo r International
Peace: The Carnegie Papers.
93 Burak Ege, Bekdil. 30 January 2014. "Turkey Extends Deadline for US, European M issile
Bidders." Defense News.
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independent defense sector is alarming, especially when the Turkish parliament has
approved a 6.71% increase in its defense budget.94
Turkey does follow most of the liberal tenets but its democratic posture in defense
agreements is problematic. The tender system is not transparent in Turkey. Koc Holding
for instance, known to support the Gezi protests by sheltering the protestors in Divan
Hotels and awarded to design six corvettes in the MILGEM (National Ship) project had
to step down, after Sedef Limited, a company said to have close ties with AKP, opposed
the bidding. The court acknowledged this concern and cancelled Koc Holding's contract.
Later, Sedef Limited, with a Spanish company, won the next round o f bidding. As of
March 6, 2014, the Prime Minister Erdogan admitted his interference in the project, after
leaked tapes o f his correspondence with Metin Kalkavan— the owner o f Sedef Limited—
were revealed to the public.
There is clear reluctance to share information related to defense and security with
Turkish public, which also endangers the democratic values. The Turkish National
Security Policy is a secret document and cannot be shared with the public.95 Only the
highest officials know the national policy; not even the elected parliamentarians. Turkish
Court o f Accounts Law should have sent audits to the Parliament regarding the
expenditures that include defense sector.96 However, this democratic procedure does not

94 Zhongguo, Xinwen. 25 Aralik 2013. "Turkiye'nin Savunma Butcesi Artti." T.C. Basbakanlik

Basin Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel Mudurlugu.
95 My efforts through requesting at least the unclassified parts o f the Turkish National Security
Document were to no avail. I have received a bureaucratic response to my e-mail from the
Secreteriat-General o f The National Security Council that “no parts o f the document are open to
public.” Personal Communication: Republic o f Turkey, Secretariat-General o f National Security
Council. 10 February 2014. Bilgi Edinme Basvurusu: Information Act.
96 Betul Akkaya, Demirbas. 29 January 2013. "Turkey Needs Stronger Laws to Boost
Transparency in Defense." Today's Zaman.
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take place in Turkey. The opposition parties or the media cannot check the defense
expenditures
c- Party to Nuclear Organizations and Compliance to Nuclear Treaties. Despite
problems with the democratic settings o f its defense sector and identifying threats to
national security, Turkey still follows the nuclear treaties. It has a good standing in all of
the nuclear treaties. Turkey ratified the Additional Protocol in 2001 to voluntarily give
consent for supplementary access to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors.
Regardless, Turkey does not internalize these treaties. Internalization o f treaties means to
employ the international treaty regulations to domestic structures and to follow a single
nuclear nonproliferation policy both at home and abroad. Turkey’s eagerness for energy
independence and its ambitious defense projects, such as to make its first national
Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV), and successful projects like Turkish drones, named
Anka, put Turkey in a hard position. SLV’s are known as dual-use systems and the
technology opens up new routes for ballistic missile proliferation. The two-nuclear power
plant deals are also open to nuclear proliferation risks. Last but not the least, Turkey’s
wish to acquire the know-how in ballistic missiles technology by initiating agreements
with Chinese companies, is worrisome since it is party to the Missiles Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) which is a voluntary group with the aim o f creating a common
export policy to limit transfer o f materials, including the technology97 that could
go

contribute to making weapons o f mass destruction delivery systems.

Although Turkey

97 M issile Technology Control Regime. 17 October 2013. Equipment, Software, and Technology

Annex.
98 For the general guideline for the M issile Technology Control Regime, see: M issile Technology
Control Regime. Objectives o f the MTCR. Available from:
http://www.mtcr.info/english/objectives.html.
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does not export technology to other states to jeopardize it’s standing in MTCR, it would
like to receive the technology. This shows the gap in the current voluntary agreement.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: QUASI -HEGEM ONIC SECURITY
COMPLEX

The United States is the only state in the quasi-hegemonic security complex. It
has the ability to reach to the nuclear capable states in other security complexes and has
the ability to transform their nuclear posture in the short-run. The power o f the United
States in the nuclear field comes from its military, economic and political capabilities,
and its power to drive nuclear nonproliferation; disarmament and arms control policies in
the international arena. In the traditional Cold War sense, it also has sufficient stockpiles
o f nuclear weaponry to deter a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies.

History of the United States Nuclear Program:
The United States has a “stockpile o f 4,650 nuclear warheads for delivery by
more than 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft.”99 It follows also a nuclear weapons
modernization project to be accomplished in thirty years, which will cost $1 trillion, to
“maintain the current arsenal, but replace systems, and upgrade existing nuclear bombs

99 Hans M., Kristensen; Robert Norris. 2014. "US Nuclear Forces, 2014." Bulletin o f the Atomic
Scientists no. 70 (1): 85-93.
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and warheads” in three decades.100 The modernization o f the nuclear weaponry is a must,
if the United States government does not agree to dismantle them.
In the domestic setting, there is a debate to cut off one leg o f the nuclear triad—
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launch Ballistic Missiles
(SLBMs), or Heavy Bombers— but to remain as a credible nuclear deterrent.101 The
Obama Administration, responding to this debate, stated its policy to keep the nuclear
triad, acknowledged in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

All the legs o f the triad,

however, need modernization and thus are costly to the United States. Some suggest there
is no need for “three separate systems for deterrence” 103 in the post-Cold War
environment.104 In the global arena, the United States decided to cut the strategic nuclear
weapons arsenal to a maximum o f 1,550 deployed warheads, as part o f the New START
Treaty with Russia.105 However, there are problems with the initiation o f this treaty.
The United States has “destroyed 90% o f its non-strategic nuclear weaponry so
far” with the exception o f the withdrawal o f its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.106

100 Jon B., Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, Marc Quint. January 2014. "The Trillion Dollar Nuclear

Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization Over the Next Thirty Years." James Martin Center
f o r Nonproliferation Studies.
101 D ebating the Cost o f the Nuclear Triad. November 14, 2013. Available from
http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2013/November% 202013/November% 2014%20
2013/Debating-the-Cost-of-the-Nuclear-Triad.aspx.
102 Department o f Defense. April 2010. "Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR)."
103 Mark, Thompson. June 21, 2013. "Triad and True..." Time U.S.
l04Although ICBMs are less costly, SLBMs have better chance to survive in a nuclear attack,
whereas heavy bombers can be recalled after launch. For an analysis on the risk assessment o f the
each leg o f the triad, see Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp, Kirk Bansak. May 16, 2013. "Pruning the
Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons o f Submarines, Bombers, and Missiles." The Center fo r Arms
Control an d Non-Proliferation.
105 U.S. Department o f State. January 3, 1993. Treaty Between the United States o f America and
the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation o f Strategic Offensive Arms
(START II). Bureau o f Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.
106 Russia, in return, destroyed 75% o f its non-strategic nuclear weaponry, according to
Kristensen. See, Kristensen, Hans M. May 2012. "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons " Federation
o f American Scientists (3), p. 8 .
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These were deployed to five countries— Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and
Turkey, during the Cold W ar and still stay in European territory, as part o f the Cold War
legacy.
The United States’ tactical nuclear weapons through the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in the European territories are an example o f the United States’
commitment to the European countries. To assure the United States’ authority over these
warheads, a dual key procedure was established. Within this procedure, both a U.S.
custodian and an officer in the host country hold a key. The system works only by
“inserting two keys to the launch control panel.” 107 There are almost 200 nuclear
weapons deployed in European territory today within the NATO command. This number
is a “nearly matched with the declared Chinese nuclear stockpile.” 108 Host countries
either lack political leadership or the nuclear expertise to ask for the withdrawal o f these
nuclear weapons; which are in essence obsolete.109 The tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe need modernization and are not reliable after more than forty years of
deployment.
The European countries are still eager to host these weapons because they create a
sense o f security and limit threat, by their mere existence. These weapons have never

107 Office o f the Assistant to the Secretary o f Defense (Atomic Energy). February 1978. History
o f the Custody and Deployment o f Nuclear Weapons (U) July 1945 Through September 1977. pp.
65; 8 6
108 Hans M. Kristensen, Status o f W orld Nuclear Forces. Federation o f American Scientists 2013.
Available from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.
109 Obsolescent weaponry is not completely useless; therefore it differs from being obsolete.
According to John Mueller for instance nuclear weapons are obsolete and they do not serve any
purpose; neither political nor military. Obsolescent technology, still serves a purpose, at least an
idea o f protection even if the reality o f that weapon’s “usage” is obsolete. Obsolescent technology
or weaponry is the one that persists in some areas and regions o f the world but its utility
diminishes in countries that drive that technology. In this sense, tactical nuclear weapons are
outmoded and have limited functioning, but they preserve the impression o f the U.S. existence
and security umbrella in European peninsula.
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been operationalized, not even in the Cold War. The United States’ role in the nuclear
policy then, is to protect the Europeans and to create positive security assurances through
NATO. This policy has not been changed from the Cold War, although the threat— which
was the Soviet Union— has dissolved.
In his famous Prague Speech, President Obama stated non-proliferation,
disarmament, and peaceful use o f nuclear energy as the three areas o f the United States
nuclear policy.110 All these areas have direct links to the IAEA Statute (Article II) and
NPT Articles (Article I, II, III, and IV mainly). The United States claims to follow all the
three areas in equal measure. In reality it favors nuclear non-proliferation over nuclear
disarmament policies.
The United States’ nuclear posture is a combination of threat identification,
nuclear democratic policies, and its partial following o f the international nuclear treaties.
This makes the United States rest at the heart o f the model. The United States’ national
nuclear interest finds form in the international nuclear order as well. The United States
has veto power in the United Nations Security Council; it has power in the Board of
Governors as most o f the IAEA budget is funded through the United States; and it has
military power in the NATO structure. All o f which give the United States the power to
drive the nuclear non-proliferation agenda and dismiss the disarmament field. As
Senators Carl Levin and Jack Reed had once said “the nonproliferation is being
advocated by the United States as a ‘do as I say, not as I do’ policy.” 111

110 Barack, Obama. April 5, 2009. Remarks o f President Barack Obama, edited by Embassy o f the

United States: Czech Republic: U.S. Department o f State.
111 Carl, Levin and Jack Reed. January/February 2004. "A Democratic View: Toward a More
Responsible Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy." Arms Control Association.
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a- Threat Existence: The United States’ doctrine during the George W. Bush
administration was based on the “war against terrorism,” a term later criticized during the
Obama Administration. George W. Bush’s famous axis o f evil speech112 at the State of
the Union in 2002 established from this doctrine. As a result, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea
were clearly stated as the enemies o f the United States. A year later, former President
George W. Bush began the Iraq war, based on a false intelligence report that Saddam
Hussein had weapons o f mass destruction. Eleven years later, on December 2013, the
Obama Administration pulled US troops out of Iraq. Yet, the doctrine that started as war
against terrorism was going to continue as war against weapons o f mass destruction, as
Obama started to pressure Iran and North Korea with sanctions.
The Obama Administration, regardless, does not follow a foreign policy approach
that pinpoints enemies of the United States. That being said, North Korea and Iran are
defined as threats to the international nuclear order. In this regard, it is difficult to
differentiate the United States’ national security agenda from the international security
agenda because the United States is involved in all regions o f the world, even though it is
geographically isolated. Since many threats cross borders easily in the 21st century, the
United States’ national interest is also stretched to a non-geopolitical understanding.
The United States does not identify threats to its security in the nuclear field
because it is the initiator o f the internationally accepted nuclear code of conduct from the
very beginning. The United States follows a hegemonic nuclear strategy not in terms o f
quantitative superiority with its nuclear arsenal, but in terms o f the political and strategic
upper hand it has in the nuclear field. It is this political-strategic stretching that gives the
112 George W. Bush. January 29, 2002. President Delivers State o f the Union Address.
Washington, D.C.: The While House.
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United States the dominance to be an influential force in nuclear issues. Additionally, the
usage o f nuclear weapons is a taboo for all parties after Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
although the political and symbolic power o f the weapons have not diminished in
international relations.
b- Democratic/Transparent Values in the Nuclear Field: The free market
approach through the liberal economic policies of the U.S. is limited in the nuclear area
because national security is prioritized over economic gains. The United States
government, bilaterally, follows an export control approach against the transfer o f nuclear
materials, dual-use materials, equipment, or components from U.S. companies to third
parties. This is conducted through Section 123 Agreements o f the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 to “adhere the U.S. to mandated nuclear nonproliferation norms.” 113 The United
States have nuclear cooperation agreements with twenty-two states and two international
organizations114 as of February 2014.115 Contrary to the government’s restrictions via
export control measures, national security experts that support the U.S. domestic nuclear
lobby argue that 123 Agreements are against the national interest and the U.S. nuclear
market share is damaged by these protective policies because there are “alternatives to
U.S. sources o f supply.” 116 Then again, these agreements are affective in preventing

113 House o f Representatives o f the United States o f America. January 30, 2013. Atomic Energy
Act o f 1954.
114 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, European Atomic Energy
Community, International Atomic Energy Agency, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic
o f Korea, Morocco, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates.
115 For detailed information on these states, visit National Nuclear Security Administration. 2014.
123 Agreements fo r Peaceful Cooperation. U.S. Department o f Energy [cited March 10 2014],
Available from
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsf
orpeacefulcooperation.
116 Senator William S. Cohen, General Brent Scowcroft et al. 25 April 2013. Joint Letter from
Eight National Security Experts to President Barack Obama. Washington D.C.
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proliferation through enrichment, reprocessing, and transfer o f U.S. materials. These
agreements are bilateral in nature, have limited duration and need revision.
The Obama Administration has started to follow a more democratic nuclear
policy, compared to its predecessors. The Department o f Defense with The Department
o f Energy published seventy-two pages o f the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report in
2010. During the Bush Administration, only a three-page report was unclassified.
Rule of law is an international obligation for a liberal democratic state. Within the
rule o f law, adhering to the international laws is important. The United States, ratifying
the NPT, agreed to the Article VI obligations under which nuclear weapon states agreed
to cease the nuclear arms race and follow nuclear disarmament policies. The United
States, however, dismisses this moral and legal obligation, by switching its focus to
nuclear non-proliferation in order to prevent other states joining the nuclear club. As
Walker states “the United States views the NPT as a ‘static instrument o f disciplinary
confinement’ rather than a “dynamic instrument o f cooperative engagements for arms
control and disarmament.” 117 Doyle criticizes the United States’ NPT approach, for
“hardening the existing power asymmetries.” 118 The United States selectively chooses
which Articles o f the NPT to abide by and which ones to neglect, and by this is not a
liberal-democratic posture. Doyle pictures this dilemma with an ethical concern, saying
that the United States and other nuclear democracies shifted the NPT discourse from
“nuclear arms control and disarmament to a disciplinary institution in which the nuclear

117 William, Walker. 2007. "Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment." International
Affairs no. 83 (3): 439.
118 Thomas E. II, Doyle. 2013. "Liberal Democracy and Nuclear Despotism: Two Ethical Foreign
Policy Dilemmas." Ethics & Global Politics no. 6 (3): 167.
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haves can effectively disregard their legal obligations and the nuclear have-nots are
punished if they entertain nuclear aspirations.” 119
The United States follows both a civilian nuclear program as well as well as a
military nuclear program. IAEA inspections are limited to the item specific counting for
verification purposes. The United States’ public associates nuclear weapons with national
security strategy in which sole responsibility is given to the government by consent. The
United States in return follows a selective policy, which is to eliminate possible nuclear
ambitions from third parties through non-proliferation and counter-proliferation policies.
This, however, jeopardizes the United States Article VI obligations in which it should
seek to cease arms races and seek nuclear disarmament. The modernization o f nuclear
weaponry and maintenance o f nuclear stockpiles are contrary to this legal obligation.
c- Partially Party to Major Nuclear Treaties: The United States is a follower of
nuclear treaties and organizations that serve its national interest and it refuses to ratify
treaties that would damage its power in the nuclear field. The United States supports
peaceful nuclear energy in the international arena through national funds. The IAEA
budget for instance is composed o f regular and voluntary funding. Whereas verification is
funded through regular budget, Technical Cooperation Program is based on a voluntary
funding. The United States was the “largest single contributor,” with allocating $22
million in 2012 to the latter program.

120

119 Thomas E. II, Doyle. 2013. "Liberal Democracy and Nuclear Despotism: Two Ethical Foreign
Policy Dilemmas." Ethics & Global P olitics no. 6 (3): 169.
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The technical cooperation program “consists of projects that support research and
development of peaceful nuclear technology”

121

in the areas o f “human health,

agriculture and food security, water and environment, nuclear energy, safety and security
and industry and technology.” 122 After the United States has established technical
assistance program to improve safeguards, “ 19 other states and the European
Commission developed supplementary programs that provide technical assistance”
following the U.S. lead.123 This demonstrates the transformative and shaping power of
the United States over other states decisions and shows the U.S. commitment to the IAEA
Statute.124
The technical cooperation program is important for developing countries. There
are 125 countries that receive technical cooperation assistance today. Iran, for instance,
benefits from the program, yet, due to non-compliance to United Nations Security
Council Resolutions; its benefits are considered through a case-by-case assessment. 125 As

121 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Topic: IAEA Budget: What Budget M atters

Will the General Conference Consider In this Session? September 2013. Available from
http://cns.miis.edU/stories/pdfs/l 30911 _cns_iaea_factsheet_budget.pdf.
122 Board o f Governors. 25 November 2002. The Technical Co-Operation Strategy: The 2002
Review. In GOV/INF/2002/8/Mod. I, edited by International Atomic Energy Agency.
123 United States o f America. 24 April 2013. Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f
Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear non-proliferation. Geneva: NPT, Preparatory Committee for the 2015
Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
124 The IAEA Statute Article II states the role o f the Agency “to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution o f atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.” See,
International Atomic Energy Agency. 1989. The Statute o f the IAEA: As Amended Up to 23
February 1989.
125 The economic sanctions to Iran have also affected the technical cooperation area as well. The
IAEA Board o f Governors decided that “any technical cooperation provided to Iran by the
Agency, or under its auspices, will be limited to activities that are, prima facie, in the Secretariat’s
judgm ent...” This led to limitation o f technical cooperation projects that Iran benefits from. More
specifically, Iran’s technical cooperation projects decreased from fifteen to eleven national
technical projects, and thirty-four regional and six international projects to twenty regional and
two international projects. See Director General. 8 March 2007. Cooperation between the Islamic
Republic o f Iran and the Agency in the Light o f United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737
(2006). In GOV/2007/7, edited by IAEA Board o f Governors.
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the large contributor o f this program, the United States has a weighted say in the
decision-making as well.
As part o f the peaceful use o f nuclear energy, the United States poses its
commitment to NPT Article I as one where it does not transfer any nuclear weapons,
material, nuclear technology, and equipment for nuclear weapons purposes
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cooperates in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Following the main rules o f the NPT
and IAEA, the United States still chooses which Articles o f the treaty to follow and
which ones to postpone for future debates. One o f these issues is nuclear disarmament.
The United States receives harsh criticism from the NPT Preparatory Commission
Working Groups, some o f which are in the Non-Aligned Movement, De-Alerting Group,
and the New Agenda Coalition.
The New Agenda Coalition is composed o f countries from different regions,
Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa. It promotes nuclear
disarmament through General Assembly Resolutions. This group was formed in 1998,
after the indefinite extension o f the NPT in 1995. This Coalition’s first proposal was to
call both de jure and de facto nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear capability,
reminding them o f their legal commitment to NPT.127 India, Israel, and Pakistan were
against the proposal.128 This proposal does not include non-deployed nuclear stockpiles.
Disarmament projects do not receive much attention from the Obama
Administration, as nuclear disarmament clashes with the status quo. The De-Alerting

126 United States o f America. 24 April 2013. Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f
Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear non-proliferation. Geneva: NPT, Preparatory Committee for the 2015
Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
127 New Zealand. 1998. Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a N ew Agenda. In
A/C.J/54/L.18, edited by General Assembly o f the United Nations Resolution/Decision 54/54 G.
128 A side note is that the United States did not involve in this process.
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Group, which is composed o f Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Switzerland, proposed to
“lower the operational status of nuclear weapons systems as a step leading to
disarmament” reminding that “high alert o f readiness was a Cold W ar policy.”

129

This

resolution was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Reminding that the
United States and Russia are “estimated to keep 1,800 strategic nuclear warheads in high
alert status,” this resolution aimed to keep the disarmament agenda alive.130 Although
President Obama stated his commitment in this area, he has not taken any concrete steps.
In fact de-alerting has not become an issue in the U.S. nuclear politics so far.
Non-Aligned States members (NAM) calls for a “nuclear weapons convention” in
a “specific time frame.” 131 This group stresses the “lack o f progress” in disarmament due
to the lack o f interest o f the nuclear weapons states.
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Stressing the necessity for active

action through the Conference on Disarmament (CD), NAM accuses the nuclear weapon
states’ for following “inflexible nuclear posture.” 133 The United States is one o f the
parties that oppose alternative solutions.134 Pakistan, however, continues to block the CD,

129 United Nations General Assembly. 4 January 2013. 67/46 Decreasing the Operational
Readiness o f Nuclear Weapons Systems. In A/RES/67/46, edited by United Nations.
130 Hans M. Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie. 19 June 2013. "De-alerting Nuclear Forces." Bulletin
o f the Atomic Scientists.
131 Group o f Non-Aligned States. 21 March 2013. Nuclear Disarmament Working Paper. In
NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/W P.14. Geneva: Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference
o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
132 Group o f Non-Aligned States. 21 March 2013. Nuclear Disarmament Working Paper. In
NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/W P.14. Geneva: Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference
o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
133 Group o f Non-Aligned States. 21 March 2013. Nuclear Disarmament Working Paper. In
NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14. Geneva: Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference
o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
134 Diane, Bames. 6 March 2013. "Nuclear Powers Reaffirm Opposition to Special Disarmament
Talks." Global Security Newswire.
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showing its strategic vulnerability against India if it agreed to the Fissile-Materials Cutl i t

O ff Treaty

|

at the Conference on Disarmament.

Another pressure on nuclear disarmament comes from The Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament Initiative, composed o f Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs started this initiative that calls for specific education programs to promote
disarmament and nonproliferation with the participation o f “civil society,” through
multiple outreaching tools such as “internet-based social network services.”

137

The aim

o f this initiative is to “promote the consequences o f the use o f nuclear weapons,” thus to
create global awareness.138 The Initiative uses “testimony from an atomic bomb survivor
designated by the Government o f Japan,” as an example for nuclear disarmament
education.139 In 2013, it launched the Young Communicators o f a World Without Nuclear
Weapons program to initiate ideas for eliminating nuclear weapons.140 This is an implicit
and untraditional way o f pressuring the nuclear weapon states, especially the United
States, as it is the only state that has actually used atomic bombs in history.
135 This treaty calls for commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons and

nuclear explosive devices.
136 Viyyanna, Sastry. 29 January 2010. "Pakistan Will Oppose the Fissile Materials Cut-Off
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The United States is not a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
which is a concrete step for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Being party to
the CTBT shows commitment to the global norm o f not conducting nuclear testing. Since
1992, the United States has not conducted nuclear testing, yet it is not also party to this
treaty. This shows tacit commitment while the U.S. Senate claims to wait for ratification
o f other states first. In return, non-members legitimize their posture by showing the
United States as an example.
Contrary to nuclear disarmament or peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non
proliferation is the area that the United States pays most of its attention to. Nuclear non
proliferation as a policy aims to prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation and ensures
that nuclear energy is not diverted to nuclear weaponry production. Part o f the non
proliferation approach, the United States calls for states to adhere to the Comprehensive
Safeguard Agreement and enroll in the voluntary Additional Protocol within the IAEA
framework. Both these verification techniques aim to increase confidence on non
diversion o f nuclear material. United States is not subjected to Comprehensive
Safeguards for IAEA inspections, since it already possesses nuclear weapons. It follows
an item-specific safeguards procedure, like other nuclear weapon states.
The Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) plays an important role in the United
States policies through international treaties. The U.S. government supports the
establishment o f the Middle East and South Asia nuclear free zones, specifically. This
policy does not resonate well in reality due to problems in these regions. In the Middle
East, for instance, the NWFZ cannot take place when “states are at war” in the region,
when states do not “politically recognize” each other, like in the case o f Palestine and
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Israel, and when states do not “comply with the safeguards agreements.” 141 The Obama
Administration stresses that a NWFZ is composed o f “all states whose participation is
deemed important to participate.” 142 This brings Israel in to the equation in the Middle
East. Israel, in this regard, is the comer stone o f establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East;
because NWFZ cannot be established when there is a nuclear party in the region that
others feel threatened from.
Regardless o f the statements regarding equal posture to all parties, the United
States does not follow a clear NWFZ policy in the Middle East due to its close ties with
Israel. In 2013, the United States unilaterally ‘postponed’ the Helsinki Conference to an
undefined time, which had the agenda to establish a nuclear-weapons free zone in Middle
East, including Israel. The U.S. favors Israel’s national security over the issues in the
Middle East.143 The United States and Israel prioritize Israeli security; whereas Arab
states, Iran, and Turkey aim to neutralize the power imbalance in the Middle East.
Contrary to the United States’ position, a European Parliament resolution highlighted the
“good intentions” o f the Arab states to “break the stalemate” in this process and asked for
the European Union to “remain actively engaged in supporting this process.” 144 The
United States’ unilateral action shows its power to shape the nuclear agenda in the

141 Pierre, Goldschmidt. 5 November 2012. "A Top-Down Approach to a Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone in the Middle East." Carnegie Endowment f o r International Peace.
142 United States o f America. 24 April 2013. Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f
Nuclear Weapons: Peaceful Uses o f Nuclear Energy. Geneva: NPT, Preparatory Committee for
the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear
Weapons
143 Kelsey, Davenport and Daniel Homer. December 2012. "Meeting on Middle East WMD
Postponed." Arms Control Today.
144 European Parliament Resolution. 2013. Recommendations o f the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference Regarding the Establishment o f a Middle East Free o f Weapons o f Mass
Destruction. In P7 TA-PROV(2013)0028.
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Middle East, even though this agenda does not serve many Middle Eastern states’
interest.
Although the United States has the power to shape the nuclear nonproliferation
realm, international organization bodies, such as the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) adopt resolutions regarding the risks o f proliferation in the Middle East.145 The
main parties, such as Egypt and Iran, cite Israel as the main obstacle to establish the zone
in the Middle East. These states pressured by Israel through the General Assembly to
ratify NPT with a non-nuclear weapons state status.146 At the 2013 Review Conference,
for instance, the Egyptian delegation left the session as a sign o f protest o f the frustration
in the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution.147

Conclusion
In conclusion, Israel is in the material security complex because it is not party to
any o f the major nuclear treaties and identifies consistent threats to its survival. The
threat existence is a major political discourse in Israel, starting from the Holocaust years
onwards. This policy has nuclear consequences and leads to an illiberal nuclear posture.
Turkey is in the material-liberal security complex. It is not likely to proliferate;
however, it does aim to be a nuclear power in order to diminish its nuclear energy
dependency on other powers. It also aims to keep its options open by following a defense

145 General Assem bly o f the United Nations. 3 October 2013. The Risk o f Nuclear Proliferation in
the Middle East. In A /68/124 (Part II).
146 General Assem bly o f the United Nations. 16 September 2013. Establishment o f a NuclearWeapon-Free-Zone in the Region o f the Middle East. In A /68/124 (Part I)/A dd.l.
147 General Assem bly o f the United Nations. 16 September 2013. Establishment o f a NuclearWeapon-Free-Zone in the Region o f the Middle East. In A /68/124 (Part l)/A d d .l. pp.6-7
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policy for dual-use weaponry. Turkey’s nuclear energy policy feeds from the liberal
economy tenets; which is based on maximization of profit and security at the same time.
Iran, on the other hand, is in the material-norms based security complex. It
identifies threat to its national security, particularly from the United States and Israel.
Iran differs from Israel, in the sense that it is still party to the international agreements
and treaties. The Preparatory Committee Working Group statements o f the Iranian
Delegation showed that Iranian nuclear posture in the international arena is very similar
to some o f the West European countries, such as Norway and Sweden, all o f which ask
for nuclear disarmament.
The United States’ nuclear posture is fundamental for all parties because it is the
one that forms and shapes the nuclear policies o f all through its hegemonic capability.
The United States’ policies are problematic in the nuclear disarmament arena, as it does
not follow the NPT obligations for arms control and disarmament. Due to different
understanding and interests in the nuclear field, policies do not coincide to create
alternative cooperative solutions. Chapter 6 is the analysis of the nuclear security
complex theory in respect to these four states.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This dissertation began by arguing that nuclear nonproliferation is a transnational
issue; therefore, it requires an approach broader than regional solutions. Secondly, it
argued that traditional security complex theory is not capable of explaining nuclear
proliferation due to its regional basis. Regional dimensions in the security complex
theory clash with the transnational nature o f nuclear issues. With this in mind, I have
posed a model o f nuclear security complexes without regional boundaries but rather,
based on state characteristics and nuclear posture. In other words, I have grouped nuclear
capable states in terms o f threat existence, regime type, membership and compliance to
international treaties and observed nuclear posture o f selected nuclear capable states.
Based on this model, I analyzed the nuclear posture o f the United States and three
countries in the Middle East— Iran, Israel and Turkey. After an examination o f
government sources and data from the working groups o f the NPT 2015 and 2010
Review Committees, I found out that all three countries in the Middle East (Iran, Israel,
and Turkey) belonged in different nuclear security complexes. In the hegemonic system,
the United States is placed in a different nuclear security complex as well.
In this chapter, I will conduct an analysis o f the suggested model by touching
upon the general concepts in International Relations. The idea behind linking
International Relations concepts to the analysis is to show to general contribution that this
model brings to the International Relations scholarship. When I examined the role of
nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation through a theoretical lens, I realized that
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nuclear issues are actually transnational in origin. This dissertation, therefore, supports
the literature on transnationalism and globalization in the 21st century at its very core. To
address this point, I ask the following question in this chapter: What are the implications
o f transnationalism in nuclear studies? In other words, what does transnationalism bring
to nuclear studies?
Power is another concept that scholars o f International Relations discuss at all
times. The role o f power relations in the nuclear security complexes has not been
discussed at length in this dissertation. Interaction among actors, however, is one o f the
main characteristics of Buzan and W aever’s traditional security complexes. Interaction
and level o f influence is also significant when a cross-analysis is conducted regarding
different security complexes. To address this point, I ask the following question: “What
are the conditions that make a state change its nuclear practice?”

IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSNATIONALISM TO NUCLEAR SECURITY
COMPLEXES

I would like to extend the discussion on nuclear security, safety, proliferation, and
disarmament as a transnational matter. In this dissertation I proposed that nuclear
proliferation is a transnational issue rather than a regional one. It is transnational due to
following factors:
(1)

Nuclear weapons cross borders and regions easily. Simply, the present range

o f nuclear capabilities endows nuclear weapons with a transnational nature.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for instance, linked the Soviet Union and the
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United States geopolitically during the Cold War. The bipolar world system was a result
o f the nuclear age and foreign policy in every region was shaped by the rivalry between
those two states. Nuclear weapons are transnational but may also have regional and local
implications. Focusing on regions particularly however, minimizes the problem and does
not let the researcher observe larger patterns.
(2) Nuclear security is a transnational issue because a state’s decision to acquire
nuclear weapons goes beyond regional concerns. In the post-Cold war era, more countries
were expected to acquire nuclear weapons. This expectation did not hold true; some
states even rolled back their nuclear weapons programs. Today, nonproliferation is
almost a universal norm, as 190 countries, including five nuclear weapon states, have
ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This universal treaty provides a
global context o f nonproliferation. The three cases (Iran, Israel, and Turkey) discussed in
Chapter 5 also indicated that nuclear proliferation in one country does not necessarily
present a motivation to proliferate for the other two countries. In this case, Israel has been
believed to have a nuclear weapons program in place since the late 1960s; yet Iran did not
begin a nuclear weapons program until the fall o f the Shah and Turkey has never sought
nuclear weapons.
(3) Nuclear proliferation is a transnational issue because establishing an
indigenous full nuclear fuel cycle program is very difficult. A nuclear fuel cycle is
composed o f mining, milling, fuel fabrication, power reactors, conversion plants,
reprocessing facilities, power reactors, repositories, weapons fabrication. To follow a full
nuclear fuel cycle, a state still needs to extract ore, produce and enrich uranium, or
reprocess plutonium. It also needs dual-use materials to use in the fuel cycle. Without
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assistance, it is hard to maintain a full nuclear fuel cycle. This suggests that nuclear
ambitions require third-party assistance. Albright, Shire, and Brannan’s analysis in 2009,
for instance, indicated that Iran had exhausted its yellowcake stock, which was acquired
through South Africa in 1960s.1 Regardless o f Iran’s claims to be self-sufficient, it needs
third-party assistance to endure its nuclear weapons program.
Even the United States’ nuclear weapons program was based on nuclear
espionage and external assistance. Simultaneous discovery2 occurred because scientists in
different parts of the world worked on similar issues or assisted each other in these
discoveries. Britain and France, for instance, had assisted the Manhattan Project that
produced the first atomic bombs. Similarly, nuclear espionage led the United States to
acquire information from German scientists in the late 1940s.
When nuclear security is grasped as a transnational issue, the implications are also
framed transnationally. Here are the implications that nuclear security, as a transnational
issue, has brought to this dissertation:
a- Role of Interdependence: Transnationalism takes us back to the issue of
interdependence. Interdependence comes with costs associated to it. Nuclear security,
safety, and proliferation lead states to be mutually dependent on each other. This mutual
security dependence, like in economic interdependence, is not equally distributed to all
parties. Nuclear weapon states are relatively less dependent on non-nuclear weapon
states, while making foreign policy decisions. In other words, whilst nuclear weapon
states are sensitive to nuclear proliferation, non nuclear weapon states are vulnerable to
1 David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, Paul Brannan. February 11, 2009. "Is Iran Running Out o f

Y ellowcake?" Institute f o r Science and International Security no. Rev. 1.
2 Simultaneous discovery or inventions are common because scientists work on similar issues in

different part o f the world. For simultaneous discovery see Malcolm, Gladwell. May 12, 2008.
"In the Air: who says big ideas are rare?" The New Yorker.
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nuclear proliferation. Similarly, all nuclear weapon states also have immense
conventional weaponry that provides an alternative route for policy making. The level of
vulnerability is related to the relations between nuclear weapon states and non nuclear
weapon states. For instance, if a potential nuclear weapon states diminish the security of
non-nuclear weapon states and creates insecurity in its region, it may lead to a possible
breakout o f nuclear proliferation. The neighboring non-nuclear weapon states are
vulnerable, at least at the foreign policy level, to a potential nuclear weapon state; while
nuclear weapon states will be only sensitive to proliferation.
Whether interdependence due to sensitivity or vulnerability, nuclear weapons
have depreciating value in the post-Cold War era. Although most o f the NATO allies
have not acquired nuclear weapons, they are protected by NATO’s nuclear policy. Today,
the same principle holds; however, nuclear weapons are not considered for their usevalue but for their symbolic value, which can be used as a tool for policy bargaining.
Two examples are prominent to frame sensitivity and vulnerability security
interdependence in nuclear proliferation. One example is from the Cold War era to
describe the type o f interdependency between two nuclear powers. During the Cold War,
the Soviet Union was vulnerable to the United States’ supremacy in nuclear weapons
(qualitatively and quantitatively). The United States had intercontinental ballistic missiles
in the 1950s whereas the Soviet Union lacked that capability. With the perception of
vulnerability, the Soviet Union covertly deployed intermediate-range ballistic missiles to
Cuba in order to equalize its power with the United States. John F. Kennedy prevented
this equalization of power by blocking Cuba with U.S. naval forces.3 The Cuban Missile

3 For an extensive foreign policy analysis o f Cuban M issile Crisis see Graham T. Allison and

Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence o f decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New
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Crisis decision-making showed the increased level o f security interdependence as the
crisis dissolved. The United States agreed to withdraw the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and
Soviet Union removed its nuclear establishment in Cuba, at the end o f the crisis. The
parity in vulnerability and the costs associated to a nuclear exchange led the parties to
back down.
When nuclear weapons are considered in a transnational setting, the possibility of
escalation stops each state from acting because both know that escalation would damage
their national security. This makes nuclear weapon states dependent on each other’s
decisions; and creates a type o f unintended consequence based on rational calculation in a
conflict situation. Consequently, nuclear policies examined in a transnational context
indispensably carry the idea o f ‘security fo r all
Second example is between a nuclear weapon state and a non-nuclear weapon
state to describe another type o f interdependency through nuclear issues. In Chapter 5, a
detailed analysis was conducted regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program in the
post-Cold war era. The analysis has shown that Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions due
to the high level of threat that it perceives from regional and global actors. Nonetheless, it
continues to implement nuclear treaties. Iran does not follow an overt nuclear weapons
program like North Korea; because it is, to some extent, integrated into the international
economic system. The positive result o f the economic sanctions o f the United States,
European Union and allies, targeting the Iranian energy sector, for many years show
Iran’s economic vulnerability very well. As a Congressional Research Service report
indicated “sanctions reduced Iran’s oil exports from 2.5 million barrels per day to about 1
York: Longman. For an alternative examination o f Cuban M issile Crisis, see James G. Blight,
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., David. A. Welch. 1987. "The Cuban M issile Crisis Revisited." Foreign Affairs
no. 66(1): 170-188.
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million barrels per day.”4 Keeping in mind that oil export is half o f the Iranian
government’s income, this drop immensely affected the Iranian economy. Likewise, “loss
o f oil revenues and cut-off from the international banking system,” caused inflation of
almost 50%.5 All these factors and the change o f leadership in June 2014, led Iran to
come into the terms o f the Joint Action Plan made to halt its nuclear enrichment
activities. This example shows that an actor, more or less integrated to the international
economic and security system, cannot pursue its nuclear ambitions without loosing its
economic benefits.
Being exposed to economic sanctions and not having alternative routes to boost
its economy, caused a change in Iranian nuclear policy for the short-term. In the case of
Iran, economic dependence played a great role in forcing cooperation in the nuclear field
and to shift its nuclear policy posture. As Hirschman suggested the more foreign trade a
state has, the more vulnerable it is, because trade can be used as leverage.6 Iranian
dependency on the energy sector induced conflict with the Western world and facilitated
cooperation as economic sanctions broke up its will; and sanctions were too costly for the
value o f continuing the nuclear program. Iranian case suggests that economic integration
has security outcomes for parties. This also suggests that alienating states from the
economic system may not be beneficial in the long run; because economic integration can
be the bargaining chip or a major stick in order to change an aggressor state’s policy.
b- Role of Cooperation and Conflict: Transnationalism literature touches upon
the debate on conflict and cooperation through a setting o f interdependence. The question

4 Kenneth, Katzman. May 7, 2014. "Iran Sanctions." Congressional Research Service.
5 Kenneth, Katzman. May 7, 2014. "Iran Sanctions." Congressional Research Service.
6 Albert O., Hirschman. 1945. National P ow er and the Structure o f Foreign Trade\ University o f
California Press.
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becomes does transnationalism facilitate cooperation, or not? The realist and liberal
camps provide opposite positions for this question; realist scholars defend that
cooperation is not impossible but war or conflict will always prevail. Waltz, for instance,
said that institutions are subordinate to national purposes.7 Realists assume that relative
gains always prevail.8 Nonetheless, sometimes states gain more from cooperation than
they do engaging in conflict. Nuclear weapons proliferation is one o f those cases. Nuclear
weapons may be leverage for foreign policy bargaining; but they do not exist for actual
usage. As the “incentives to cooperate increased” 9 through nuclear security assurances, a
cooperative environment became possible in the nuclear age. Suffice to say, cooperation
is possible because nuclear wars are too costly.
As Axelrod and Keohane suggested for cooperative environments in a
transnational world order, the number o f actors, iteration, and shadow o f future are
important concepts for nuclear dealings as w ell.10 For this reason, I restated the debate on
nuclear proliferation between Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan in Chapter 2, highlighting
that the former stated the more the nuclear weapons the more stable the international
system should become; whereas Sagan stated that nuclear proliferation would cause
instability and conflict. The number o f actors is clearly an important factor in nuclear
studies. Iteration is also another factor for cooperation. In a transnational world, states
face each other more than once, which force them to cooperate in the present. The tense

7 Kenneth Waltz. 2000. "Structural Realism After the Cold War." International Security no. 25
(1): 5-41.
8 Joseph M., Grieco. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits o f Cooperation: A Realist Critique o f the
N ewest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization no. 42 (3).
9 See Robert, Jervis. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics no. 30 (2):
167-214.
10 Robert, Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions." World Politics'. 226-254.
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Cold War environment is a good analogy for mitigating future conflicts over nuclear
weapons as both the Soviet Union and the United States learned from Cold War.
A third-approach in this debate is to state that cooperation is issue-specific. In
other words, states cooperate in some issues, while not in others. For instance, Lipson
argued that states cooperate easily on economic issues but not on security issues.11
Contrary to Lipson, though, in a global world, transnational issues affecting many actors
force those states to cooperate, since their interest merges over the some causes. Thinking
through the nuclear security complexes model that 1 created in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5,
cooperation would depend on which security complex a state is placed. In the material
security complex, as discussed earlier, threat existence is the dominant variable. When
states’ nuclear decisions and policies are shaped through existence of threat to national
security, it is tremendously hard to expect cooperation between these states and states in
different security complexes. I stated in Chapter 2, for instance, that North Korea is in the
material security complex— it is not a member o f any major nuclear treaty and it is not a
liberal-democratic state that values public participation— therefore, it is not easy to
engage in cooperation with North Korea. States in the material-security complex are not
likely to engage in cooperation. Nevertheless, cooperation is possible in liberal security
complex and norms-based security complex, due to a high democracy level and the
nuclear norms that these states possess. This means the nuclear security complex model
suggests both cooperation and conflict over nuclear issues, depending on the grouping o f
an individual state.

11 Charles, Lipson. 1984. "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs." World
P olitics no. 37 (1): 1-23.
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c- Role of Transnational Organizations and Actors: The transnational
dimension is visible in nuclear issues. The nuclear security complex model assumed that
certain groups o f states follow nuclear treaties and norms. These states are grouped in the
norms-based security complex. The norms based security complex, then, inhibits the
transnational dimension o f nuclear issues and follows a relatively international nuclear
policy.
When nuclear security is considered as a transnational issue, it feeds directly to
the international/transnational organizations. Nuclear issues involve multi-lateral
cooperation to ameliorate the existing conditions and this cooperation can be achieved
through transnational actors. These actors are not only the traditional ones like states, but
also Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and activist organizations. When applied
to the nuclear realm, organizations such as the International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) or Global Zero are effective to change government policies.
These activist movements, for instance, take a stance on political issues and can affect
government policies through awareness campaigns. In Chapter 5 , 1 provided the
Menendez-Kirk pro-sanctions bill against Iran as an example o f a reaction from activist
movements that could be considered to have been successful. Activist movements, think
tanks, and institutions provided different types o f memorandum and asked President
Obama to veto this bill. As a result, President Obama affirmatively addressed the issue in
the 2014 State o f Union speech.
Transnational organizations, especially NGOs and activist movements promote
principled ideas as well as critical alternative perspectives o f nuclear nonproliferation and
disarmament. Similar works for transnational advocacy networks. Transnational
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Advocacy Networks are composed o f “activists that build bridges across borders through
i

the use o f information to promote social change.”
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) do not possess traditional power as
most o f the other actors do in international politics. Their power is considerably limited
compared to states. However, activists give a moral and emotional force to a cause. In the
nuclear field, disarmament is an issue that most o f the states— mainly nuclear weapons
states— neglect. States in the norms based nuclear security complexes, as argued in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 though, pay special attention to the moral dimension of nuclear
possession. The moral and emotional force, which is the humanitarian dimension, behind
banning nuclear weapons is a political cause o f states in the norms based nuclear security
complexes, such as Norway.
There is no doubt that states are still the most powerful actors on nuclear dealings.
TANs, however, have methods o f persuasion and power o f influence in international
politics. As Keck and Sikkink argued, individuals and groups may influence not only the
preferences o f their states via representation but they also affect the preferences of
individuals and groups elsewhere through a combination o f persuasion, socialization, and
pressure.13 Keck and Sikkink discussed four methods that TANs can adopt to influence
politics. The first method is “information politics. TANs mobilize information quickly
and dramatically. Global Zero reposted The New York Times’ 1989 report, and let us re
learn that “since 1956, at least 50 nuclear warheads have been lost at sea because of

12 Center on Law & Globalization. H ow D o Transnational A dvocacy Networks Work? 2014.
Available from https://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=l 14.
13 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. A ctivists B eyond Borders: A dvocacy Networks in
International P olitics: Cornell University Press.
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accidents.” 14 Not only do TANs collect information but they also diffuse it through
effective methods. Global Zero publishes awareness photos from the Cold War years and
initiates nuclear disarmament campaigns, such as Bike Around the Bomb, asking
participants “to cycle around a “small” nuclear weapon blast in Washington D.C. and
London.” 15
The second method is symbolic politics, also known as framing. TANs link one
idea to another and show both ideas to the public in the same discourse. Framing takes
place through symbols, pictures, or placards to resonate with the audience. When Global
Zero is considered, the use of symbolic politics is obvious. In one o f their campaigns for
instance, the Global Zero movement said “ instead o f investing $355 billion into weapons
o f mass destruction, we should be investing in our future doctors, teachers, scientists,
engineers, and activists.” The campaign stated that spending $355 billion on nuclear
weapons is enough money to pay for more than 3 million full-ride scholarships to a fouryear public university, pay for more than 6 million k-12 teacher’s salaries, and build more
than 50,000 new elementary schools. The symbolic politics with this example is the link
between the money spent on nuclear weapons and the money that could be spend on
education.
Another example for supporting nuclear disarmament is to frame nuclear weapons
within human rights. While addressing the nuclear security complex model, I argued that
states in the norms-based security complexes are directly involved in this type o f framing
by showing support to International Criminal Court’s advisory decision. These states,
such as Norway and New Zealand, also establish working groups at the Nuclear
14 Andrew, Rosenthal. June 7, 1989. "Dozens o f Atomic Warheads Lost in Sea by Superpowers,
Study Says." The N ew York Times.
15 For further information, visit Global Zero’s official Facebook page.
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Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission sessions and lobby for disarmament.
Symbolic politics (framing) combines unique information in a very subtle way to change
perceptions about one issue.. This framing twists perception and reality on the concerned
issue (non-humanitarian aspects o f nuclear weapons) and makes public to question the
priorities o f the government policies.
Third method is the leverage politics that TANs use. Leverage politics links
causes to things that public value a lot, such as money or prestige. By showing the
economic downsides of a considered issue, TANs aim to realize their causes. Global Zero
estimated “the energy from all explosives used in WWII, including nuclear weapons used
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is totaled 3 Megatons. The energy from 1MT o f TNT could
power average U.S. house for about 103,000 years.” Whole idea o f this leverage politics
is to create public awareness through the use o f energy that directly affects citizens’
pocketbooks.
The fourth method is the accountability politics o f which companies or states
show commitment and support to causes o f TANs. TANs can assess and observe the
given commitment and hold these actors accountable for their non-action. ICAN, for
instance, revealed 300 banks, pension funds, and insurance companies in 30 countries to
invest in nuclear weapons manufacturing, development, maintenance, and testing.16
Edgar examined Ireland, for instance, and concluded although government policy
supports nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament at the international level; Irish
investment policy clashes with this norm. As pointed out by the author, state funds and
pensions in Ireland are invested in companies that manufacture, develop, and/or test

16 ICAN. October 2013. "Don't Bank on the Bomb: Global Report on Financing o f Nuclear
Weapons Producers." IK V P ax Christi.
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nuclear weapons. This creates an indirect assistance to the nuclear weapons industry and
clashes with the nuclear posture o f Ireland at the international level.17 The accountability
policy is visible in the ICAN Reports, especially towards the nuclear weapons states.
Edgar, chairman o f the Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, aims to create
awareness and change Irish policy, specifically.
d- Role of Socialization: An implication o f transnationalism is socialization.
Socialization is “a general process of acquiring culture” 18; inheriting norms, customs, and
establishing ideologies through the interaction o f people and groups. In other words,
socialization is a learning process that occurs in each culture differently. Socialization is a
concept in International Relations, especially within the institutional understanding.
States in the same institutions socialize through an established identity, roles, and norms
in a transnational setting. Regarding nuclear issues perspective, socialization occurs
within nuclear institutions— CTBT, Pugwash Conferences, as well as nuclear
proliferation and disarmament offices within organizations, such as in the United Nations
and NATO. Pugwash Conferences, for instance, have been platform since 1957, aiming
to create a “world free o f nuclear weapons and other weapons o f mass destruction”
through “creating opportunities o f dialogue.” 19 Two hundred scientists and leading policy
makers attended the last Pugwash Conference held in Istanbul, where they participated in
seven working groups. This initiative was a great opportunity to find a common
denominator and to search for alternative ways to handle nuclear issues. It is a great
opportunity o f the socialization for decision-makers and scientists. Yet, it should not be

17 Edgar David, Hutchinson. 2012. "Ireland, Irish Finance and the Nuclear Weapons Industry."
Irish Campaign fo r Nuclear Disarmament.
18 Denis, O'Neil. Socialization 2011. Available from http://anthro.palomar.edu/social/soc l.htm.
19 See Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Available from http://pugwash.org/.
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forgotten that all agents have a common goal, which is to eliminate nuclear weapons.
This common goal creates the norm and the main cultural setting o f the Conference.
Nuclear socialization is a part o f learning. In this dissertation, I indirectly argued
that nuclear learning is possible as states in one security complex can shift to another in
time through interactions with other actors. The United States—within the quasihegemonic security complex— has power, to change the course o f nuclear issues through
this interaction. This is an aspect that I observed especially in the case o f Iran. However,
the working group reports o f the United States and other primary documents such as 2010
Nuclear Posture Review o f the United States show that the United States has a problem in
separating national interest from international interest. As a hegemonic power, United
States should establish the expectation that international interest (nuclear disarmament)
could override its national interest (nuclear non-proliferation) for long-term benefits.
Nuclear learning is not about “how I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb”
anymore, but it is “how I relearn the bomb.” The relearning is a process and necessitates
alternative theories and considering the political implications for critical thinking. In the
next section, I will discuss the modeled nuclear security complex theory for this purpose.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CONVENTIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY

What does conventional regional security complex theory convey about
proliferation? Conventional security complexes are based on three significant points that
this dissertation modified to shape the nuclear security complexes. First, traditional
security complexes follow a grouping pattern, where states in the same geopolitical
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region are grouped in one security complex. Security problems and their effects on the
neighboring countries are shown as the main reason for this grouping. In this respect,
Buzan and Waever stated that not only issues o f high-politics (terrorism and nuclear
proliferation) but also issues o f low-politics (migration, human rights and the
environment) are important in shaping foreign policies. Issues of low-politics are security
matters in a regional context, even if not at the international level.
In the end grouping states is a methodological choice. In nuclear studies, from
Waltz to Sagan, the grouping methodology is implicitly utilized for answering different
questions. This dissertation revealed this implicit grouping approach in nuclear studies
and its consequences. In Chapter 3 , 1 stated the nuclear literature based on: groupings in
terms of legal possession, grouping in terms o f theoretical posture, grouping in terms of
advantages versus disadvantages o f proliferation, grouping in terms o f regional and
global considerations, and grouping in terms o f nuclear policy preferences (deterrence,
non-proliferation, disarmament). I then proposed a method, grouping in terms o f state
characteristics, that led to nuclear posture and nuclear policies.
The second point that conventional security complexes reveal is the regional
understanding that underlines so many o f the security issues in foreign policy. This
regional approach is the key component o f the theory as it is a mini-system or substructural level o f analysis that challenges the mainstream International Relations theories
that are based on systems level approaches. The middle level analysis is, therefore, found
in regional classification in the conventional security complexes. This is visible in
nuclear studies as well.
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Taking out the regional part o f the equation, mid-level, sub-systemic analysis
delivers a new interpretation to nuclear studies. Nuclear security complexes are more
than their parts. In other words, examining a state by itself is not the same as examining a
state in a group (security complex). When states are examined through the security
complexes, generalizations are easier to make for policy purposes. Otherwise, third-party
policies suffer from a tailored approach that is skewed towards national interest would be
neglected. Suffice to say, this dissertation did not neglect the sheer fact that most o f the
state policies are based on national interest. While following these policies, however,
states should be cognizant o f the fact that their existing policies might generate conflicts
due to conflicting policies towards states in the same, or similar, security complexes. The
United States policy towards states that prioritize threat, such as Iran and North Korea for
instance clashes with its policy towards Israel, which is also a state that follows a nuclear
policy based on threat identification. This dual approach is appraised under the disguise
o f national interest even though eliminating nuclear proliferation would be in the United
States’ long-term interest. Iran and North Korea, in return, hold the United States
responsible for their nuclear ambitions. Following a group level policy, like a mini
system approach, or at least being aware o f the state characteristics and nuclear posture of
states would benefit the United States’ policy in the long run.
The third point is that regional security complexes reveal the role o f a security
interdependence that creates interaction among states in the same complex and different
security complexes. This bond is not voluntary, but based on security necessities. In
traditional interdependence literature, mostly due to economic matters, states are
dependent on each other. Buzan and Waever shifted this understanding by developing
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the idea o f security-based interactions resulting in cooperation rather than conflict. The
third point is, essentially, about the securitization o f issues. The debate here suggests that
neglected security issues need securitization, which is a conscious policy-making process
to prioritize an issue. I call this debate securitization versus politicization because some
issues are politicized rather than securitized. Buzan & Waever argued that issues in lowpolitics (migration, environment, human rights, and so on) generally stay in the policy
realm but they can be securitized; meaning they can be given a special attention. I argued
that issues o f high politics, such as nuclear security, do not necessarily become a security
matter. The examination o f the United States’ nuclear posture in Chapter 5 showed this
case clearly.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM NEW MODEL

What does the amended theory bring to understanding nuclear proliferation?
Throughout the dissertation, I argued that traditional security complex theory is too
focused on regions and that it cannot explain transnational issues, such as nuclear
proliferation. Not only regional security complex theory, but also other theoretical
explanations (mainly realism, liberalism, constructivism) fail to explain nuclear issues
comprehensively. The reason for this theoretical failure is that each theory prioritizes a
different set o f variables and each suggests a single variable that is prioritized over
others. Realism stresses the role o f power and prestige; liberalism focusses on domestic
explanations, such as decision makers or the role o f scientific cadre; while constructivism
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prioritizes the role of identity, roles, and norms to explain nuclear proliferation,
nonproliferation, and disarmament.
All three theories— realism, liberalism, and constructivism— have explanatory
power and should not be dismissed; however, none o f the theories are above another.
Buzan and Waever favor constructivism over other theories while introducing traditional
security complex theory, for instance. This is what I try to avoid in this dissertation,
although like all researchers I have a theoretical preference. Nuclear security complex
theory is built upon the idea that states can be categorized in different groups within
different theoretical undertakings. These groups feed from major theoretical assumptions.
Material security complex is composed o f states that follow realist nuclear posture, for
instance. The name ‘material’ comes from the core concept o f materialism over idealism,
where a state’s capabilities are structured through tangible factors.
The model o f nuclear security complexes is an amalgamation o f theories; but it is
not an eclectic posture. Eclectic scholars in International Relations explain a phenomenon
through different theories. In eclectic explanations, Indian nuclear proliferation can be
explained through balance o f power strategies against China and Pakistan, but also
though identity formation, mainly as a result o f post-colonial history. A scholar
explaining Indian nuclear ambitions through a combination o f variables from different
theories, for example, follows an eclectic approach. Eclecticism can be favorable to
understand a phenomenon as it borrows across different theories. Eclecticism, therefore,
answers ‘why’ questions. Eclectic approaches are not helpful, however, to answer how to
approach a problem in order to mitigate its consequences in a succinct way. Nuclear
security complexes are not an eclectic model in that sense, but it does utilizes particular
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variables for each group of states. Israel, for instance, is in the material security complex
because of its threat identification; call for power, and because it is not party to nuclear
treaties. Israel’s nuclear posture then is in the realist setting. I do not try to explain this
posture through liberal or constructivist theory as well. Therefore I am not utilizing an
eclectic approach.
The amended theory brings a new understanding to nuclear studies. I do not claim
in any part o f this dissertation that this new understanding— grouping states— is superior
to former approaches. I claimed, rather, that this is an alternative approach that the policy
cadre could benefit from. What does this new understanding do then? The nuclear
security complex theory expressed and found out:
(1) Non-Regional Posture for Nuclear Non-proliferation: States in the same
region follow different nuclear policies; therefore regional approaches to nuclear
proliferation, disarmament, safety and security necessitate a broader non-regional
understanding. When Iran, Israel, and Turkey’s nuclear posture are examined, these
different nuclear policies become visible. Israel proliferated in 1960s, yet Iran did not
follow this route during the Shah’s ruling. Turkey, on the other hand, does not hold any
nuclear weapons ambitions but aspires to be self-sufficient in the energy sector.
(2) Country profiling through state characteristics and nuclear posture may
generate alterative nuclear policies. Two states that have nuclear weapons
ambitions/nuclear weapons program do not necessarily have same nuclear posture.
Nuclear weapons programs may be generated from the different needs and vulnerabilities
o f a state. North Korea and Iran’s nuclear ambitions differ from each other; although, the
end-state, to proliferate, is the same. The United States, lying in the quasi-hegemonic
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security complex, follows similar a nuclear non-proliferation policy to all other states;
although, it claims to have tailored deterrence approach. The United States’ nuclear
policy towards North Korea and Iran were almost identical up until the interim agreement
that the European partners brought to the table. The United States’ policy identified
possible options and sorted out different policies but in the end it employed a similar
policy regardless of Iranian or North Korean state characteristics. In the end, the policy
implications were identical; which was to issue United Nations Security Council
Resolutions and employ economic sanctions. Yet, the nuclear ambition and practices of
these two states differ drastically. In a nutshell, Iran is still responsive to the institutional
pressures whereas North Korea does not follow the IAEA inspections as part o f rule of
law. It is problematic to expect a single policy to work for two distinct states. The nuclear
security complex theory has stationed these two states in different groups. North Korea is
suggested to be in the material security complex theory whereas Iran is in the materialnorms based security complex theory. The European diplomatic initiative with President
Rouhani works because o f the characteristics that Iran still holds to some o f the ‘norms’
based security complex. From this example, nuclear security complex theory suggests
examining state characteristics first and then to employ nuclear policies. These policies
differ from tailored deterrence.
(3)

Mid-level policies for nuclear non-proliferation: It is suggested that tailored

deterrence is an inductive approach that is too particular for any particular state. General
deterrence, on the other hand, is too broad to result in a meaningful nuclear policy.
Nuclear security complexes are a middle approach that favors group level policies.
Nuclear security complexes are non-territorial, issue-focused grouping o f states. The
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group-level policy options that nuclear security complex theory suggests for groups are as
follows:
a- Promoting Economic Integration to world economic system for the
Material Security Complex: Policies should focus on integrating states in the material
security complex theory into the international system; perhaps not through international
institutions and treaties; but through economic incentives. States in this security complex
favor relative gains over absolute gains. If employed carefully, economic regulations
would be a visible relative gain for these states. These incentives should not be in the
form of economic aid or in the form o f economic sanctions. Literature, as discussed in
Chapter 4, shows that economic sanctions are not effective in every situation. The role of
transnationalism is important in this respect. If a state is economically integrated in the
international system, it will be pressured later, to follow international norms and rules
due to economic gains and loses.
b- Promoting Transparency and Openness in Material-Liberal Security
Complex: Policies should focus on transparency and openness in the material security
complex theory. States in this security complex suffers from non-transparent nuclear
policies, especially the nuclear weapons states. Although these states follow economic
liberal policies, they do not transmit the same understanding to nuclear issues. It is a
common premise that nuclear weapons program are disguised under national security
parameters. In this security complex, public consent and awareness play a great role in
continuing existing policies. Therefore, civil society movements and transnational
advocacy networks should flourish in these countries. Any policy o f a third party should
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focus on the role of transparency in the security and defense sector, and to the integration
of society into nuclear dealings.
c- Promoting Internalization Policies in Liberal Based Security Complex:
Policies should focus on the role o f international organizations and institutions while
considering the liberal based security complexes. States in this security complex should
be able to internalize international nuclear policies to their domestic laws and policies.
This internalization is a process where socialization plays a great role. Non-nuclear
weapon states in this security complex can prioritize disarmament over nuclear
proliferation. Any third-party policy should focus on the disarmament portion when
handling negotiations with these states.
(4)

Degrees of Cooperation and Conflict Vary in Each Security Complex: The

three core nuclear security complexes (the material security complex, liberal security
complex, and norms-based security complex) have different degrees of distance to
conflict and cooperation. States in the material security complex are highly likely to
choose conflict over cooperation and to prioritize nuclear proliferation over non
proliferation and disarmament. States in this security complex prioritize relative gains.
States in the liberal security complex link economic gains to security policies. These
states are less likely to proliferate in the 21st century but the ones already possessing
nuclear weapons are unlikely to renounce their nuclear capability. States in the norms
based security complex are highly unlikely to proliferate and less likely to acquire
nuclear weapons because these states are concerned with following international nuclear
norms (such as nuclear disarmament). These differences are also visible in the interaction
o f states with the different security complexes.
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(5)

Interaction among states in a security complex and interaction among states in

different security complexes are related to the expected outcomes and level o f influence
over one another. The level o f interaction among states in the same security complex is
based on state characteristics. Interaction among states from different regions is related to
the concept o f power in International Relations. Power, in the nuclear security
complexes, varies from coercion, deterrence, compellence, inducements, and persuasion.
In the material security complex, states have similar nuclear posture, but this does
not necessitate a level o f interaction based on assistance. North Korea and Israel for
instance are in the same security complex but they do not assist each other in nuclear
deals and even have opposite nuclear posture due to their relative relations with the
United States (the quasi-hegemonic security complex). The level o f interaction from a
state in material security complex to another state in the same complex then changes in
line with its relations to the United States The relations o f states from the material
security complex to the liberal security complex and norms based security complex and
vise versa are through coercion, deterrence, and inducement strategies. On July 29, 2014,
for instance, Hwang Pyong-So, a North Korean military official, “threatened a nuclear
strike on the White House and Pentagon after accusing Washington o f raising military
tensions on the Korean Peninsula.”20 Although North Korea does not possess a longrange ballistic missile capability, this discourse is based on linking one issue to another to
achieve a desired outcome through verbal coercion.

20 Raziye, Akkoc. North K orea Threatens Nuclear Strike on White House The Telegraph 29 July
2014. Available from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10997161/North-Korea-threatensnuclear-strike-on-White-House.html.
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States in the liberal security complex states have relations with each other and
states in the norms based security complex through persuasion methods. The level o f
influence through persuasion is related to the question ‘which nuclear policy should
prevail the international nuclear arena?’ States in the liberal security complex wants to
persuade others that they value nuclear non-proliferation and reduction o f nuclear
weapons; whereas states in the norms based security complex wants to persuade others
that the value should be given to nuclear disarmament and abolishment o f nuclear
weapons. The contention between these two visions does not generate aggressive policies
rather it generates room for dialogue in an international institutional setting. In this
regard, aggressive policies are not viable due to shared liberal-democratic values and
norms in each security complex. In Chapter 5 , 1 have stated extensively about the rivalry
between nuclear nonproliferation supporters and nuclear disarmament supporters. I also
suggested that the United States’ policy suffers from a balance between these two
policies.

States in the liberal security complex may favor coercive diplomacy

methods against the states in the material security complex. In Chapter 5 , 1 also stated
that the current policy against Iranian nuclear proliferation is an example o f coercive
diplomacy. Economic sanctions against Iran have coercive power, whereas the talks
aimed at establishing a comprehensive agreement play a diplomatic role.
States in the norms based security complex endorse each other’s nuclear
disarmament policies through international settings. The interaction level among these
states is high, compared to other countries because they regard nuclear disarmament as a
vision and an end-state. States like Norway and New Zealand socialize through the
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences Working Groups. This socialization
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follows with a pro-active policy to pressure nuclear weapon states in the liberal security
complex. Likewise, states in the norms based security complex value diplomatic
engagements and economic inducements to states in the material security complex in
order to assure nuclear nonproliferation; stating the role o f nuclear disarmament in the
world order. In Chapter 5 , 1 gave examples o f groups that promote nuclear disarmament
in international settings. The Vienna Group o f 1021, for instance, promotes and takes
action on safeguards, verification, and compliance matters through “the broadest possible
amount o f consultation and dialogue.”

11

Table 3. Interaction Level Between Security Complexes
Interaction
Material SC

Material SC
Assistance
Endorsement

Liberal SC
Coercive
Diplomacy
Deterrence

Norms-based SC
Diplomacy
Compliance

Liberal SC

Coercive Diplomacy
Deterrence
Diplomacy
Compliance

Assistance
Endorsement
Persuasion

Persuasion

Norms-based
SC

Assistance
Endorsement

21 Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, and Sweden.
22 Vienna Group o f 10. 30 April 2012-11 May 2012. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear
Weapons, edited by Preparatory Committee. Vienna: Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
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FINDINGS

What is expected to come out o f the suggested approach? The expected outcome
o f this approach is to realize the nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation process
through a different perspective. I do not claim that this is the best perspective to study
nuclear issues. I argued, however, that this approach aims to create an alternative reality
through a systematic analysis o f country positions. This alternative approach can generate
a critical analysis and open up new policies to handle nuclear issues.
An expected outcome from this approach for the United States, for instance, is to
realize that prioritizing nuclear nonproliferation over nuclear disarmament damages not
only international nuclear standing but also creates resistance from likely proliferators,
such as Iran. Interestingly, this analysis, through the grouping approach shows that Iran’s
nuclear posture is close to states like Norway, Sweden, or the Netherlands. Although an
extensive analysis on all these states would be valuable, through a brief observation, we
can say that all these parties favor nuclear disarmament over nonproliferation. Iran favors
disarmament to pressure nuclear weapon states and to legitimize its nuclear weapons
program and nuclear actions, whereas the latter group is in favor o f nuclear disarmament
due to their confidence in international institutions, rules, and norms.
What do the cases tell us about nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation? All
four country profiles, which I also call cases, (Iran, Israel, Turkey and the United States)
revealed certain facts about nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation:
1-

Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies do not necessarily rest on

regional security calculations. Although state security is linked to relations with
neighboring countries and on increasing power capability in the traditional sense, the case
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analyses showed that vulnerabilities are not necessarily covered by material capabilities.
Iran’s peaceful nuclear energy policies during the Shah period, even though Israel
followed nuclear weapons policy in 1960s, are a fact to indicate non-regional nuclear
policies. Iran’s peaceful nuclear policies, when it had close relations with the United
States, before the Islamic Revolution, is an indicator o f the role o f hegemony or
superpowers to shape the international nuclear agenda. Likewise, Iran’s nuclear weapons
program does not simultaneously start proliferation efforts in neighboring countries. On
the contrary, Turkey’s national nuclear policy is based on non-proliferation efforts in the
Middle East, especially against Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
2-

The United States’ policy o f nuclear disarmament is only for the eyes. Concrete

steps are not taken and initiatives from the European partners, calling for nuclear
disarmament are blocked at the United States’ governmental level. The United States
needs to establish a nuclear disarmament road map that is not limited to and subjected to
its relations with Russia. Russian-U.S. nuclear cooperation is bound to other parameters.
The Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s annexation o f Crimea showed this case very well. The
Malaysian civilian air flight taken down in Eastern Ukraine was also another indicator
that Russia cannot control its missiles. Likewise, last month, the United States claimed
Russia’s violation o f the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by testing
cruise missiles.23 Russian generals denied this immediately.24
The renewed report by the U.S. State Department on Adherence and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments

23 Diane, Barnes. July 31, 2014. "Russia May be Deploying M issile Tied to Treaty Violation."
G lobal Security Newswire.
24 Sergei, Karpukhin. Russia's Top General Says M oscow Com mitted to Nuclear M issile Treaty.
Reuters July 31, 2014.
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on July 2014, is not comprehensive and does not open up discussion space with Iran. The
report admits that it does not include an analysis o f the ongoing Joint Plan o f Action
(JPOA)— interim agreement— with Iran and thus it starts with the tone that Iran does not
comply with NPT.

ye

My analysis regarding Iran’s dialogue within the JPOA and its

membership to the nuclear treaties, contradicts the United States’ posture. The United
States does not want to draw conclusions from the ongoing dialogue, which is in line with
my suggestion not to shift Iran from material-norms security complex to another one too
easily.
3-

Turkey is not an actor in the nuclear deals, negotiations, and issues because it

does not have a concrete national nuclear policy. Turkey’s nuclear nonproliferation
posture is accurate but Turkey does not take sides on nuclear issues. Turkey’s nuclear
rhetoric under the AKP government can be summed up in a sentence: Turkey will not
allow Iran to have nuclear weapons in the region. Turkey, a country in the materialliberal security complex, shares similarities with Iran, a country in the material-norms
based security complex. Both states are aware o f the regional threat conditions and have
nuclear energy programs. The difference between the two states in the 21st century is
Turkey’s close ties with the United States and with the liberal world. As I stated for Iran
previously, the fall o f Shah and formation o f the Islamic Republic itself was not the cause
o f Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The ongoing hatred and ‘feeling o f betrayal’ in
Iranian discourse within the working group discussions indicated that it is the degraded
relations with the United States that triggered Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Turkey,

25 U.S. Department o f State. July 2014. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Washington D.C.: Bureau o f
Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.
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however, lacks an overall nuclear policy; therefore, it does not become an actor in the
nuclear agreements.
In the NPT Preparatory Commission working groups, Turkey does not take a
clear stance with either with the non-proliferation nor with the nuclear disarmament
group o f states. This makes Turkey a weak actor in the nuclear area because it does not
have power to pressure either side. Turkey, together with Brazil, couldn’t manage the
Iranian nuclear swap deal because it could not get nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear
disarmament supporters to its side. The Tehran Declaration was a nuclear swap deal to
deposit 1200 kg low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey.26 This was not a nuclear
nonproliferation or nuclear disarmament effort; rather it was a peaceful use o f nuclear
energy effort, because it ensures the safety o f the LEU and aims to prevent clandestine
nuclear weapons activity through enrichment. This initiative, however, would not be
sufficient for Iran not to proliferate. President Obama, as discussed in depth in Chapter 5,
directly pointed out his concern in a letter to President Lula and Prime Minister Erdogan.
With the Tehran Declaration, Turkey and Brazil, unintentionally, changed the nuclear
nonproliferation agenda to peaceful use o f nuclear energy. This is because Turkey does
not distinguish that nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use o f nuclear energy could be
at odds.
4-

Israel’s nuclear ambiguity does more harm than good: The Nuclear

Proliferation Treaty is actually in favor o f the non parties to the treaty— India, Israel,
North Korea and Pakistan. To follow an effective and universal nonproliferation policy, it
is significant to create a system where each state is equally responsible. If the United

26 Maria Luiza, Ribeiro Viotti and Ertugrul Apakan. May 17, 2010. Joint Declaration by Iran,
Turkey, and Brazil. N ew York.
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States and allies, however, are determinate on their nuclear nonproliferation and
disarmament efforts then they should press these four states for nuclear clarity. Israel’s
nuclear posture harms its democratic claims and the public does not question the Israeli
state’s nuclear policy due to the perpetual state of emergency.
This dissertation has positioned Israel in the material security complex, which is
the group that North Korea is in. Some may suggest that this is a very harsh assessment.
However, once Israeli non-democratic, non-liberal nuclear posture is considered, one can
see there is not much difference between the two states. Likewise, both are not party to
major nuclear treaties. This results in the conclusion that the international stance on North
Korea and Israel should be on a similar basis regarding nuclear ambiguity. This, however,
is never the case. Why so? Realism, power relations, and national interest calculations
usually prevail in the decisions o f states, even within an institutional setting. When
national interest prevails the common/societal interest, the decisions made are biased.
One should not expect a solution for Arab-Israeli conflict or on Iranian nuclear
ambitions without noticing that Israel is one o f the key actors and factors that generates
these insecurities. This does not mean all other parties are right on their claims or are
legitimate in their nuclear cause. It only means that a dual nuclear posture by the United
States begets proliferation desires and/or harms the possibility o f peace in the Middle
East.
5-

Iran’s full integration to the economic system will help the United States and

its partners to create dependency. Iran’s membership to the main nuclear treaties is not
enough to convince the world o f its intent not to proliferate. Iran’s nuclear
nonproliferation policy discourse does not meet the international standards, as
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International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors cannot rule broad conclusions about Iran.
Due to the economic sanctions that pressed the society and the change in the leadership,
from former President Ahmadinejad to Rouhani, Iran is at the negotiation table with the
United States and European partners. The interim deal, however, is not comprehensive. It
does not, for instance, involve the ballistic missiles program. Once the Western powers
have alleviated the existing economic sanctions, Iran is likely to continue its nuclear
weapons ambitions. Iran, in this regard, has a history o f non-compliance.
Economic sanctions help the liberal-democratic countries only to a certain extent.
As discussed in Chapter 5, Iran lacks a nuclear democratic posture and the Iranian public
is not totally aware o f the nuclear weapons program. Yet, they consider Iran’s nuclear
initiatives within the peaceful use o f nuclear energy realm. For a successful, long-term
approach, the United States can focus on engaging with the Iranian public without any
propaganda acts.
Another aspect is related to the limited role that the United States might have on
Iran’s nuclear nonproliferation posture. The historical animosities between Iran and the
United States after the fall o f Shah do not let the parties engage in a pro-active solution.
The European states within the European Union initiative can take the lead in this case.
The interim agreement is a good example o such an action. Most o f the European states
lay either in the liberal security complex or in norms based security complex. It might
help to shift the nuclear discourse on nuclear disarmament rather than focusing on
nuclear nonproliferation, to engage with Iran. One other initiative could be to link the
United States’ policies o f reduction o f nuclear weapons with Iran’s nuclear
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nonproliferation policies. In this respect, Iran might sense a level o f leverage; thus power,
in the nuclear deals, and can engage in nuclear cooperation.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This dissertation is based on the question ‘does security complex theory explain
nuclear proliferation’, especially in the 21st century. I suggested to amend conventional
security complex theory, because its regional focus does cannot be applied to
transnational issues, like nuclear proliferation. I still utilized the regional understanding
in security studies as a tool for grouping states. To have a non-territorial grouping
approach in the nuclear field, I proposed the nuclear security complexes model. Based on
this model, state characteristics shape nuclear posture. The main state characteristics that
are gathered from nuclear proliferation literature are existence o f threat, nuclear
democracy and institutions, and nuclear treaty participation and compliance.
The grouping method is significant to understand, analyze, and suggest policies to
nuclear capable states. The findings show that nuclear weapons are a transnational issue;
therefore regional approaches mainly fall short to explain different nuclear behaviors in a
region. In this regard, I examined the nuclear postures o f Iran, Israel, and Turkey. I
placed these three countries in different nuclear security complexes due to their
differences in state characteristics.
The proposed model is not tested in a traditional research methods structure. In
other words, I did not follow a rigid cause and effect relationship for examining states’
nuclear posture. The model followed the method o f falsification by examining Buzan and
Waever’s security complex theory and by analyzing this theory for nuclear proliferation
purposes. In other words, the conventional theory’s robustness to explain nuclear
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proliferation is examined but not the he proposed theory. This dissertation, rather used 4
countries (Iran, Israel, Turkey, United States) to show an example o f how the proposed
theory, which is to group states in terms o f state characteristics to reach nuclear posture,
may work in practice. In the future area o f research, the model can be applied to another
group o f states, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, to analyze nuclear posture from
a systemic level.
In the proposed model, states from the same region may be placed in different
groups, Nuclear posture differs inside the regions because nuclear weapons are
transnational in nature and nuclear proliferation ambitions are not necessarily based on
regional security problems but may result from global or domestic issues. The
transnational nature o f nuclear weapons is the first challenge to the conventional security
complex theory. Nuclear weapons, nuclear knowledge, nuclear materials and expertise
cross boundaries easily. This dissertation also found that nuclear security is a
transnational issue because foreign policy reflections are not limited to regional
boundaries. Western powers oppose nuclear proliferation because o f the established
nuclear regime in the post-Cold War era.
While conducting the grouping method three core variables are used: threat
existence, nuclear democracy and institutions, nuclear treaty ratification and compliance.
The model indicated that there are actually 7 types o f nuclear posture in world politics
and not necessarily all types o f nuclear proliferation are the same. North Korean nuclear
ambitions, for instance, fell under the existence o f a threat category, whereas Iran’s
nuclear ambitions fell under a sub-category o f which Iran is still a legitimate actor in the
nuclear field but it faces and/or creates major security threats that puts decision-making
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structures into limbo. As a result, Iran does not fully comply with the nuclear treaties but
remains a member o f the international nuclear structure.
The proposed model pointed out that material issues such as threat existence,
military dependency, economic, political, and military power weaknesses may cause
states to consider nuclear proliferation. State survival is the main driving motive under a
nuclear weapons program because these states act in a self-help system, where gains are
viewed as relative. The world is a zero-sum game and it is almost a win or a lose
situation. North Korea’s leaders’ aggressive statements about a tactical nuclear attack on
the United States, or Israel’s official rhetoric, in which is Israel is surrounded by enemies
are forms o f the zero-sum game conceptualization o f world politics in the material
security complex.
The proposed model also pointed out that once states internalized nuclear treaties
and norms through domestic structures and when they have liberal and democratic
policies over their nuclear energy and weapons projects, they are not likely to proliferate.
The nuclear weapon states that have already proliferated in the Cold War environment,
however, are not representative o f this assumption because the Cold War system was
based on bipolarity in which states’ built up their arsenal in that context. The contextual
shift after the Cold War is significant to consider while modeling nuclear security
complex theory.
The proposed model also pointed out that when states adhere to the nuclear
treaties and they voluntarily follow nuclear non-proliferation through an institutional
framework, they are less likely to proliferate. These states’ nuclear posture is to follow
peaceful nuclear energy programs and to pressure nuclear weapon states to renounce
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upon their nuclear weapons. Civil society movements and transnational advocacy
networks are also part o f this process.
The analysis also showed that there is a huge difference between the nuclear
undertakings o f the nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear
transitioning states. The de jure nuclear weapon states support nuclear nonproliferation
policy in the international agenda. The de facto nuclear weapon states follow a policy
based on nuclear ambiguity. The non-nuclear weapon states mainly call for nuclear
disarmament. The nuclear transitioning states uses nuclear disarmament as leverage
against nuclear weapon states, although they follow concrete proliferation policies at
home. As long as the nuclear non-proliferation supporters (thesis) do not engage with the
nuclear disarmament (antithesis) supporters, it is extremely hard to expect a synthesis that
may affect the nuclear transitioning parties. So, in reality, the power is in the hands o f the
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament supporters by not letting the ‘transitioning
nuclear states’ to politicize nuclear issues based on their national interest.
The United States can voluntarily give up some o f its power in the nuclear field
at international setting so that alternative policy making could emerge. The reason for this
suggestion is because the United States pursues its national interest so much more than
the international/global interest. A check and balances dynamic could be supported only
through the United States voluntary decision to renounce its power in the nuclear field.
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FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS

This dissertation only proposes an alternative approach to nuclear proliferation
that is formerly dominated by regional settings. There are still areas o f research for future
scholars, if they would like to pursue a non-territorial analysis o f nuclear proliferation.
The first question, in this regard, is to ask ‘how do states shift from one nuclear
security complex to another?’ Throughout this dissertation, 1 have explicitly stated that
states can shift from one nuclear security complex to another. I, however, have not stated
how this could be possible in the real world. 1 assumed that the international system is not
fixed. When the international system is not fixed and states have alternative options to
choose from, it is easier to shift between and within security complexes. This shift, if not
voluntary, would take time. For instance, I have mentioned about the contemporary
engagement with Iran through the Joint Action Plan. Although Iran seems to adhere to
the conditions o f this plan, its place in the material-norms security complex does not
change up until the point where its policies are followed by actions, especially in the
domestic realm. I assume that the United States, as a hegemon, has the power to shift
states’ nuclear policies from one stage to another; therefore, a shift in the security
complex is possible. An examination o f the role o f the United States with a possible
proliferator would be a good future research topic.
I assumed in theory that states are not fixed to one group. Unlike neo-realism’s
assumption of states dwell under anarchy, therefore they have similar state
characteristics, this dissertation argued that state characteristics change from state-to-state
different even though state system lacks rules and regulations above the states. At the
micro-level, different nuclear postures are an example o f this process. If state actions are
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not fixed to a group, unlike in regional security complexes, then shifts between groups is
possible. Nuclear rollback is a result o f this type o f change, such as in Taiwan, South
Korea, Brazil, South Africa and Libya. I would expect a shift from one security complex
to another in conditions such as a change in the polarity o f the system, powerful
interaction with one state to another in a different security complexes, persuasion,
influence, coercive actions and change in the domestic structures.
Nuclear security complex theory is currently based on a unipolar world order in
which the United States is the main power after the end o f the Cold War. Polarity in the
international system affects national policies as well. Due to the bipolar world order in
the Cold War, small states either balance each other or bandwagon with one o f the
superpowers. In a bipolar world order, arms races and small wars become indispensible
in regional settings as two clashing views become dominant. Nuclear proliferation and
nonproliferation efforts are driven by the superpowers in a bipolar world order. Similarly,
hegemony leads a dominant nuclear policy in line with its interests in monopoly. A
systemic shift may shuffle the nuclear posture o f most o f the states. Argentina, Brazil,
South Africa, and some European countries invested in nuclear weapons program during
the Cold War, for instance, but with a shift in the system, they rolled back from these
programs.
The power of the hegemon to change other states’ nuclear posture is based on the
economic, political, and societal power that the hegemon has over the other states. I
discussed in Chapter 5 explicitly that the United States’ hegemonic capability in the 21st
century is limited, as emerging powers have challenged its economic power and some
European partners do not pursue and/or challenge its political power. To this end, I stated
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the example o f the British public refusing to take an action against the Syrian regime
during the uprising. The United States’ nuclear posture, which is nuclear
nonproliferation, is the dominant international policy today.
The second way to cause a shift in nuclear posture is through the hegemon’s
power. The United States, when combined with the European partners can cause shifts in
other states’ nuclear posture. How long would it take to settle a state’s nuclear posture, is
not observed in this dissertation. While analyzing Iran’s nuclear posture, however, I rest
the case o f Iran’s nuclear compliance to the European and American coordination on
applying economic sanctions and on Iranian economic and political integration into the
international system. The Iranian inclination for cooperation may not be a long-term
policy but a strategy to ease the effects o f economic sanctions though. This means that
shifts from one security complex to another is a long process that needs to be backed by
domestic and foreign policy actions.
Secondly, as I assume that state interaction in different security complexes may
affect the nuclear policy outcome, an analysis o f how states, in different security
complexes, interact would be a good start to analyze the process o f interaction that may
lead to a positive outcome. In this regard, any sort o f historical interaction that great
powers have through their nuclear undertakings would be helpful.
Thirdly, for the purpose o f this research, I have selected only four countries to
examine the model. I think that an all encompassing analysis o f all nuclear capable states,
both in a qualitative and quantitative way, would be valuable to create an overall schema
for nuclear nonproliferation behavior. This analysis should be perpetual; meaning to be
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conducted at certain times, so that it would be timely to react to any sort o f change in the
system.
The proposed model to group states in terms of their state characteristics may lead
to a positive outcome, when and if states realize that their nuclear behavior is a result of
state characteristics. There is a lack o f communication and comprehension between
nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear transitioning states.
Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament becomes an object o f domestic policy
discourse; whereas it could be considered an international security problem. Rather than
being stuck to the end-state (non-proliferation versus disarmament), states’ interest could
focus on the process in the nuclear field. That process would eventually lead to a different
outcome.

214
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdi Jamal. 14 January 2014. Letter To: Members o f the U.S. Senate. National Iranian
American Council. Available from:
http://www.niacouncil.org/menendez-graham-iran-letter-derail-iran-nuclear-deal-boxsenate/
Acton James. 15-19 July 2013. The Future o f Multilateral Arms Control Verification,
2013 CTBT Diplomacy and Public Policy Course, 15-19 July 2013, Vienna,
Austria.
Ahmadinejad Mahmoud. 26 September 2012. Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. New York: United Nations General Assembly.
American Embassy in Paris. 26 November 1960. Incoming Telegram. Department of
State.
Anzelon George. 4-8 June 2012. The State-Level Concept: Tailoring Safeguards
Activities to Analysis o f the State as a Whole. Paper read at International Nuclear
Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis, at Monterey, CA.
Arms Control Verification Website:
http://www.armscontrolverification.org/2009/06/elbaradei-intervention-to-bog.html
Assistant Secretary o f Defense. 27 November 1968. Paul C. Wamke to Ambassador
Yitzhak Rabin. Washington, D.C.
Ayoob Mohammad. 1986. Regional Security in the Middle East, in Regional Security in
the Third-World: Case Studies from South East Asia and the Middle East,
Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), London: Croom Helm.
Bamaby Frank. 1989. The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East,
I.B. Tauris: London.
Barnes Diane. 6 March 2013. "Nuclear Powers Reaffirm Opposition to Special
Disarmament Talks." Global Security Newswire.
Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.). 1981. Change and the Study o f International
Relations: The Evaded Dimension, New York: St. M artin’s Press, pp. 1-241.
Barry Buzan. 1983. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in
International Relations, 1st Edition, W heatsheaf Books: John Spiers Publisher.

215
Bekdil Burak Ege. 30 January 2014. "Turkey Extends Deadline for US, European Missile
Bidders." Defense News.
Betts Richard. Spring-Summer 1993. "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Non-Proliferation
Revisited." Security Studies no. 2 (3-4): 100-124.
Bilgin Pinar. January 2000. Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Security
Studies Perspective, Dissertation, University o f Wales, Aberystwyth.
Board o f Governors. 25 November 2002. The Technical Co-Operation Strategy: The
2002 Review. In GOV/INF/2002/8/Mod. 1, edited by International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Booth Kenneth. 1991. "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice."
International Affairs no. 67 (3): 527-545.
Brad Roberts. 1995. Rethinking The Proliferation Debate: A Commentary, Security
Studies, 4:4, pp. 792-801.
Brookhaven National Laboratory. June 2013. Summer Course: Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century.
Bueno de Mesquita Bruce and William H. Riker. June 1982. "An Assessment o f the
Merits o f Selective Nuclear Proliferation." Journal o f Conflict Resolution no. 26
(2): 283-306.
Bull Hedley. 1966. "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach." World
Politics no. 18(3): 361-377.
Bush George W. January 29, 2002. President Delivers State o f the Union Address.
Washington, D.C.: The While House.
Buzan Barry and Ole Waever. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure o f International
Security, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Buzan Barry and Ole Waever. 1997. Slippery, Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable?
The Copenhagen School Replies, Review o f International Studies, 23:2, pp. 241 250.
Buzan Barry. 1991. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd Edition, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner
Publishers.
Buzan Barry. 19 December 2009. Theory Talks #35: Barry Buzan on International
Society, Securitization, and an English School Map o f the World, accessed in:

216
http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html (Accessed date: Jan 2,
2013).
Buzan Barry, What is National Security in the Age o f Globalization, Refleks:
Utenrikspolitisk Ordskifte.
C-Span. 14 January 2014. Sen. Feinstein (D-CA) on US-Iran Diplomacy. In Senate
Session, Part 2.
Campbell Kurt, Robert Einhom and Mitchell Reiss (eds.). 2004. The Nuclear Tipping
Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices.
Cantori and Spiegel. 1970. The International Politics o f Regions, pp. 6-7.
Chaftez Glenn. Spring/Summer 1993. "The End o f the Cold War and the Future of
Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Alternative to the Neo-realist Perspective." Security
Studies 2:128.
Co-Chairs of Global Forum on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. Nagasaki
Declaration: Promoting Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education 2012.
Available from:
http://isp.unu.edu/news/2012/files/nagasaki-declaration-0811 .pdf.
Cohen Avner and Burr William. 30 April 2006. "The Untold Story o f Israel's Bomb." The
Washington Post: 1-3.
Cohen Avner. 1998. Israel and the bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 8185.
Cohen Avner. 2010. The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain With the Bomb. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. Who We Are. Available from
http://www.ctbto.org/specials/who-we-are/.
Cooley Jill. 17-20 October 2011. Progress in Evolving the State-level Concept. In Future
Directions for Nuclear Safeguards and Verification. Aix-en-Provence, France:
Seventh INMM/ESARDA Joint Workshop.
Cooper Robert. 1996. The Post-Modern State and the World Order: Demos.
Cooper Robert. 2003. The Breaking o f Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first
Century. London: Atlantic Books.

217
Cox Robert. 1981. Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, V ol.10: 2, pp. 126155.
CTBTO. July 2013. CTBT Diplomacy and Public Policy Course. Vienna.
Dahl Robert A. 1985. Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy versus Guardianship
Frank W. Abrams Lectures: Syracuse University Press.
Davenport Kelsey and Daniel Homer. December 2012. "Meeting on Middle East WMD
Postponed." Arms Control Today.
Davies Rodger to Mr. Austin et al. June 26, 1969. Review Group Consideration of
Response to NSSM-40.
Davis Jacquelyn K. Rovert L. Pfaltzgraff, Charles M. Perry and James L. Schoff.
February 2009. "Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning."
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.
Davis Zachary S. and Benjamin Frankel (eds.). 1993. The Proliferation Puzzle: Why
Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results, London: Frank Cass.
Davutoglu Ahmet. May 20 2010. Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy
Magazine.
Debating the Cost o f the Nuclear Triad. November 14,2013. Available from:
http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2013/November%202013/November%2
014% 202013/Debating-the-Cost-of-the-Nuclear-T riad.aspx.
Demirbas Betul Akkaya. 29 January 2013. "Turkey Needs Stronger Laws to Boost
Transparency in Defense." Today's Zaman.
Department o f Defense. April 2010. "Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR)."
Deudney Daniel H. 2007. "Anticipations o f World Nuclear Government." In Bounding
Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village, 244-265.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dillion G. M. 1990. The Alliance o f Security and Subjectivity, Current Research on
Peace and Violence, pp. 101-124
Director General. 8 March 2007. Cooperation between the Islamic Republic o f Iran and
the Agency in the Light o f United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737
(2006). In GOV/2007/7, edited by IAEA Board o f Governors.
Donahue John-Michael. 27 January 2014. An Urgent Call.

218
Doyle Michael. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." The American Political Science
Review no. 80 (4): 1151-1169.
Duffield John, Cynthia Michot and Sara Ann Miller. 2008. "Alliances." In Security
studies: an introduction, edited by Paul Williams, xxiv, 552 p. London: New York:
Routledge.
Duyeon Kim. July 2013. Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile
Programs. The Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. Accessed from:
http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_north_korea_nuclear
_and_missile_programs/
European External Action Service (EEAS). 24 November 2013. Joint Plan o f Action.
Geneva.
European Jewish Congress. France-lsrael: from de Gaulle's Arms Embargo to Sarkozy's
Election June 23, 2008. Available from
http://www.eurojewcong.org/improving-eu-israel-relations/2165-france-israel:from-de-gaulles-arms-embargo-to-sarkozys-election-.html.
European Parliament Resolution. 2013. Recommendations o f the Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference Regarding the Establishment o f a Middle East Free of
Weapons o f Mass Destruction. In P7 TA-PROV (2013) 0028.
Fair Christine and Stephen M. Shellman. 2008. "Determinants o f Popular Support for
Iran's Nuclear Program: Insights from a Nationally Representative Survey."
Contemporary Security Policy no. 29 (3): 538-558.
Feldman Shai. 1995. Is There a Proliferation Debate, Security Studies, 4:4, pp. 787-92
(787).
Freedman Lawrence. 2004. Deterrence, Polity Press. Malden, MA., p. 68
Gawdat Bahgat. 2006. "Nuclear Proliferation: The Case o f Saudi Arabia." Middle East
Journal no. 60 (3):421-443.
General Assembly o f the United Nations. 16 September 2013. Establishment o f a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Region o f the Middle East. In A/68/124 (Part
1)/Add.l.
General Assembly o f the United Nations. 3 October 2013. The Risk o f Nuclear
Proliferation in the Middle East. In A/68/124 (Part II).
Gladstone Rick and David E. Sanger. 7 March 2013. "New Sanctions on North Korea
Pass in Unified U.N. Vote." The New York Times.

219
Goldschmidt Pierre. Safeguards Noncompliance: A Challenge for the IAEA and the UN
Security Council January/February 2010. Available from:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010 01 -02/Goldschmidt.
Goldschmidt Pierre. 5 November 2012. "A Top-Down Approach to a Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone in the Middle East." Carnegie Endowment fo r International Peace.
Graham Thomas. 13 June 2013. Vocabulary and History o f Nuclear Proliferation and
Nonproliferation. Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Grieco Joseph M. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits o f Cooperation: A Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization no. 42 (3).
Grossman Elaine M. 26 July 2013. "Q&A: U.S. Envoy Derides Egyptian 'Theatrics' on
WMD-Free Zone Talks." Global Security Newswire.
Group of Non-Aligned States. 21 March 2013. Nuclear Disarmament Working Paper. In
NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14. Geneva: Preparatory Committee for the 2015
Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.
Gul Abdullah. 2007. Yeni Yuzyilda Turk Di§ Politikasi Ufuklan: Horizons o f Turkish
Foreign Policy in the New Century. Ankara: T.C Di§ I§leri Bakanligi Yayinlan. p.
16.
Gul Abdullah. 26 February 2007. Yeni Kuresel Diizen Arayi§lan, Yeni Ortakliklar: Turk
Perspektifi. Paper read at Rusya Federasyonu Di§i§leri Bakanligi Diplomasi
Akademisi, at Moscova.
Hardin Russell. 1986. "The Utilitarian Logic o f Liberalism." Ethics no. 97 (1): 47-74.
Harrington, Anne de Santana. 2009. "Nuclear Weapons as the Currency of Power:
Deconstructing the Fetishism o f Force." Nonproliferation Review no. 16 (3): 325345.
Henry A. Kissinger to the President. 6 November 1969. Israel's Nuclear Program.
Washington, D.C.: The White House.
Henry Owen to the Secretary o f State. March 17, 1969. Stopping the Introduction o f
Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: The Secretary o f
Defense.
Hentz James and Morten Boas (eds.). 2003. New and Critical Security and Regionalism.
Burlington, V T: Ashgate.

220
Hirschauer Sabine. August 2012. Dissertation: All is Fair in War: Violent Conflict and
the Securitization of Rape, Old Dominion University.
House o f Representatives o f the United States o f America. 30 January 2013. Atomic
Energy Act o f 1954.
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/sikkerhet/buzan.ht
ml?id=493187
Hufbauer Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J. Schott. 1985. "Economic Sanctions and U.S. Foreign
Policy." American Political Science Association no. 18 (4): 727-735.
Huth Paul and Bruce Russett. July 1990. "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a
Difference." World Politics no. 42 (4): 466-501.
Hymans E. C. Jacques. 2001. "Of Gauchos and Gringos: Why Argentine Never Wanted
the Bomb, and Why the United States Thought it did." Security Studies no. 10 (3):
155.
IAEA Board o f Governors. 12 August 2013. The Conceptualization and Development of
Safeguards Implementation at the State Level.
IAEA Staff Report. Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards 18 December
2003. Available from
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2003/iranap20031218.html.
IAEA. 18 July 1991. Iraq's Non-Compliance with its Safeguards Obligations. Edited by
Board o f Governors.
IAEA. 2 July 2012. International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards in Inventory of
International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. Monterey Institute:
Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
ICJ Advisory Opinion: Legality of the Treaty or use o f Nuclear Weapons, para. 39.
http://lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm
ICJ Advisory Opinion: Legality o f the Treaty or use o f Nuclear Weapons, para. 47,
http://lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm
IISS Strategic Dossier. 2008. "Israel: Nuclear Monopoly in Danger." in Nuclear
Programmes in the Middle East; in the shadow o f Iran, 119-140.
Ikenberry John. 2011. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation o f the
American World Order. Princeton University Press.
Ikenberry G. John. 2002. America unrivaled: the future o f the balance o f power, Cornell
studies in security affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

221
International Atomic Energy Agency. 1989. The Statute o f the IAEA: As Amended Up to
23 February 1989.
Intriligator Michael D. and Dagobert L. Brito. 1981. "Nuclear Proliferation and the
Probability of Nuclear War." Public Choice no. 37: 247-260.
Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 24 April 2008. Implementation o f Article VI: Report
Submitted by the Islamic Republic o f Iran. Edited by Preparatory Committee for the
2010 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. Geneva: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference.
Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 25 April 2008. Nuclear Disarmament-Working
Paper. Edited by Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference o f the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. Geneva:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 26 April 2012. Implementation o f Article VI. Edited
by Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. Vienna.
Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 26 April 2012. Nuclear Disarmament. Vienna.
Islamic Republic o f Iran Delegation. 26 April 2012. The Inalienable Right to Develop
Research, Production, and Uses o f Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes, edited by
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Vienna.
Islamic Republic o f Iran. 26 April 2012. Establishment o f a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone
in the Middle East, edited by Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear
Weapons. Vienna.
Islamic Republic of Iran. 26 April 2012. Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat
o f Use o f Nuclear Weapons—Working Paper, edited by Preparatory Committee for
the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. Vienna.
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Topic: IAEA Budget: What Budget
Matters Will the General Conference Consider In this Session? September 2013.
Available from
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/13091 l_cns_iaea_factsheet_budget.pdf.
Jerusalem Post Staff. 24 May 2011. "Text o f Binyamin Netanyahu's Speech to the US
Congress." The Jerusalem Post.

222
Johan Eriksson. 1999. Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role o f Security
Analysts, Cooperation and Conflict: 311-30.
Joseph J. Sisco to the Acting Secretary. 28 July 1969. Talking Points for Initial Meeting
with Israelis on Nuclear and SSM Issue July 29. Washington, D.C.: Department of
State.
Kaplan Morton A. 1966. "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in
International Relations." World Politics no. 19(1): 1-20.
Kelly E. Robert. 2007. Security Theory in the New Regionalism, International Studies
Review, No.9, pp. 197-229.
Keohane O. Robert and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2011. Power and Interdependence. 4th ed:
Pearson.
Keohane Robert O. 2005. After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy. A Princeton Classic Edition. 1st Princeton classic ed. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Kibaroglu Mustafa. 2006. "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and
Iran’s Quest for Nuclear Power." Middle East Journal no. 60 (2): 207-232.
Kibaroglu Mustafa. 2007. "Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and
the Attitude of the West." Middle Eastern Studies no. 43 (2): 223-245.
Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp and Kirk Bansak. 16 May 2013. "Pruning the Nuclear Triad?
Pros and Cons o f Submarines, Bombers, and Missiles." The Center for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation.
Kristensen Hans M. and Matthew McKinzie. 19 June 2013. "De-alerting Nuclear
Forces." Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists.
Kristensen Hans M. and Robert Norris. 2014. "US Nuclear Forces, 2014." Bulletin o f the
Atomic Scientists no. 70 (1): 85-93.
Kristensen Hans M. May 2012. "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons " Federation o f
American Scientists (3), p. 8.
Kristensen Hans M. 2013, Status o f World Nuclear Forces. Federation o f American
Scientists. Available from:
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.
Kroenig Matthew. 4 June 2012. "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does it Have a
Future." Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

223
Lake David. 1997. Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach, in Regional
Orders: Building Security in a New World, David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan
(eds.), The Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania.
Lake David. 2007. Escape from the State o f Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World
Politics, International Security, 32:1, pp. 47-79.
Lamy Steven L., John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. 2011. "Global Issues:
Security and Military Power." In Introduction to Global Politics, 273. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Lantis Jeffrey S. Dec 2009. "Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap
between Theory and Practice." Contemporary Security Policy no. 30 (3): 467-485.
Lebow Richard Ned and Janis Gross Stein. April 1990. "Deterrence: The Elusive
Dependent Variable." World Politics no. 42 (3): 336-369.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 3 May 2010. "Statement by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before the
2010 NPT Review Conference." International Atomic Energy Agency.
Mahmoud Karem. 1988. A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: Problems and
Prospects, Greenwood Press: New York.
Mansfield Edward and Jack Snyder. 2007. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging
Democracies Go to War: Belfer Center Studies in International Security.
McSweeney Bill. 1996. Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, Review
o f International Studies, 22:1, pp. 82-93.
McSweeney Bill. 1998. Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan
and Waever, Review o f International Studies, 24:1, pp. 137-140.
Mearsheimer John, 1990, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,
International Security, 15:1, pp. 5-56.
Mearsheimer John. 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,
International Security, 15:1.
Members o f the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. 9 April 2013.
Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education.
In NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.l2/Rev. 1. Geneva: Preparatory Committee for the
2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.
Memorandum o f Conversation. 1 December 1960. Israeli Atomic Energy Program.
Washington, D.C.: Department o f State.

224

Memorandum o f Conversation. 12 November 1968. Negotiations with Israel—F4 and
Advanced Weapons. Washington DC: Assistant Secretary o f Defense.
Memorandum o f Conversation. 4 November 1968. Negotiations with Israel-F4 and
Advanced Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Assistant Secretary o f Defense.
Memorandum o f Conversation. 8 November 1968. Negotiations with Israel - F4 and
Advanced Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Assistant Secretary o f Defense. (Third
Session).
Menendez Kirk and Schumer et al. 20 December 2013. Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of
2013. US. Congress.
Meyers David G. Social Psychology Glossary, 7/e. McGraw Hill Higher Education 2002.
Michael Barnett. 2009. "Evolution without Progress Humanitarianism in a World of
Hurt." International Organization no. 63 (4): 621-663.
Milner Helen. 1991. The Assumptions o f Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A
Critique, Review of International Studies, No: 17, pp. 67-85.
Milner Helen. 1992. "International Theories o f Cooperation among Nations: Strengths
and Weaknesses." World Politics no. 44 (3): 466-496.
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs (Norway). 4-5 March 2013. Humanitarian Impact o f Nuclear
Weapons.
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 23 March 2014. Press Release Regarding the Engagement o f
a Syrian Warplane Violating Turkey's Airspace. Ankara: Republic o f Turkey.
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 27 March 2014. Press Release Regarding the Illegal
Exposure o f Certain Audio Records with Regard to the Tomb o f Suleymansah
Memorial Outpost. Ankara: Republic o f Turkey.
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 4 December 2012. Press Release Regarding the North
Atlantic Council's Decision to Augment Turkey's National Air Defence. Ankara:
Republic o f Turkey.
Missile Technology Control Regime. 17 October 2013. Equipment, Software, and
Technology Annex.
Missile Technology Control Regime. Objectives o f the MTCR. Available from:
http://www.mtcr.info/english/objectives.html.

225
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers. 2010. Polity IV Country Report: Israel 2010.
Available from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Israel2010.pdf.
Morgan Patrick M. 2003. Deterrence Now. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Muller Harald. Summer 2003. "Germany and WMD Proliferation." The Nonproliferation
Review, p. 16.
National Nuclear Security Administration. 2014. 123 Agreements for Peaceful
Cooperation. U.S. Department o f Energy [cited March 10 2014], Available from
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agre
ementsforpeacefiilcooperation.
NATO. 19-20 November 2010. NATO Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of
the Members o f the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 5.
NATO. The Nuclear Planning Group. Available from:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50069.htm
Netanyahu Benjamin. 27 September 2012 (67th Session). Shared Goal o f Middle East
Peace at Center o f General Assembly Debate, edited by General Assembly o f the
United Nations. New York: Department o f Public information-News and Media
Division.
New Zealand Working Group. 1998. Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need
for a New Agenda. In A/C.1/54/L.18, edited by General Assembly o f the United
Nations Resolution/Decision 54/54 G.
Nielsen Jenny. 2 May 2013. "Egypt Exits Non-proliferation Meeting."
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. February 2013. Fact Sheet: Patriot Deployment.
Nossal Kim Richard. 1999. "Liberal-democratic regimes, international sanctions, and
global governance." In Globalization and Global Governance, edited by Raimo
Vayrynen, 127-49. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
NPT Preparatory Committee. 8 May 2007. NPT Preparatory Committee Cluster 1
Debates by Brazil.
Nuclear Threat Initiative. Country Profiles: Brazil. Available from:
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/brazil/official-documents/.
Nuclear Threat Initiative. Israel December 2013. Available from:
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/.

226
Nuclear Threat Initiative. January 2012. Nuclear Materials Security Index: Building a
Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action.
Nye Joseph. 2001. Seven Test: Between Concert and Unilateralism.
O'Neil Patrick H. 2013. "Advanced Democracies." In Essentials o f Comparative Politics,
pp. 226-228. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Obama Barack. 28 January 2014. President Barack Obama's State o f the Union Address.
Washington DC: The White House-Office of the Press Secretary.
Obama Barack. 5 April 2009. Remarks o f President Barack Obama, edited by Embassy
o f the United States: Czech Republic: U.S. Department o f State.
Office o f the Assistant to the Secretary o f Defense (Atomic Energy). February 1978.
History o f the Custody and Deployment o f Nuclear Weapons (U) July 1945
Through September 1977. pp. 65; 86.
Ogilvie-White Tanya. Fall 1996. "Is There a Theory o f Nuclear Proliferation? An
Analysis o f the Contemporary Debate." The Nonproliferation Review.
O nuf Nickolas. 1989. World o f Our Making, Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press.
Organization for the Prohibition o f Chemical Weapons. 14 October 2013. Status o f
Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 14 October 2013. In
S/1131/2013: Office o f the Legal Adviser.
Oye Kenneth A. 1986. Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
Pape Robert. 2005. “Soft Balancing Against the United States” International Security,
Vol.30, N o.l, pp. 7-45.
Pape Robert A. Autumn 1997. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." International
Security no. 22 (2): 90-136.
Parsi Mani and Steve Yetiv. August 2008. "Unequal Contest: Iranian Nuclear
Proliferation Between Economic and Value Symmetry." Contemporary Security
Policy no. 29 (2): 322-337.
Permanent Mission to the United Nations. New York: United Nations.
Personal Communication: Republic o f Turkey, Secretariat-General o f National Security
Council. 10 February 2014. Bilgi Edinme Basvurusu: Information Act.

227
President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter, Asst. Secretary Berding et al., 19 December,
1960. "Memorandum o f Conference with the President."
Raimo Vayrynen. 2003. Regionalism: Old and New, International Studies Review, No.5,
pp. 25-51.
Representative o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran. 30 April 2007-11 May 2007. NPT 2010
Review Conference, On Nuclear Disarmament. Vienna: United Nations.
Representative o f the Islamic Republic of Iran. 9 May 2007. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
in the Middle East Region, edited by Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear
Weapons: United Nations.
Roberts Brad. 1995. Rethinking The Proliferation Debate: A Commentary, Security
Studies, 4:4, pp. 792-801.
Rosen Steven J. 1977. The Stable System o f Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the ArabIsraeli Conflict, The American Political Science Review, 71(4): 1367-1383
Rosenthal Michael D. April 2013. "Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of
IAEA Safeguards A Textbook." Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC. p. 13.
Russett Bruce. 1979. International Regions and the International System: A Study in
Political Ecology, Yale University: Greenwood Press Publishers.
Russett Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence
and International Organizations, The Norton Series in World Politics. Bames and
Nobles: W. W. Norton & Company.
Sagan Scott. 2003. More will be Worse, in Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, The Spread
of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, Second Edition, New York: W. W.
Norton.
Sagan Scott. Sep/Oct 2006. "How to Keep the Bomb from Iran." Foreign Affairs, 85 (5).
Sagan Scott. 1996-1997. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in
Search of A Bomb." International Security, 21 (3): 54-86.
Sastry Viyyanna. 29 January 2010. "Pakistan Will Oppose the Fissile Materials Cut-Off
Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament." Institute fo r Defence Studies and
Analyses.
Scarry Elaine. 2014. Thermonuclear Monarchy: Crossing Between Democracy and
Doom. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

228
Schouten P. 2008. "Theory Talks #3: Alexander Wendt on UFO's, Black Swans and
Constructivist International Relations Theory." Theory Talks.
Senator William S. Cohen and General Brent Scowcroft et al. 25 April 2013. Joint Letter
from Eight National Security Experts to President Barack Obama. Washington D.C.
Shultz George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn. 4 January 2007. "A
World Free o f Nuclear Weapons."
Shultz George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn. 15 January 2008.
"Toward a Nuclear Free World." The Wall Street Journal.
Shultz George P., William Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn. 19 January 2010.
"How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent." The Wall Street Journal.
Shyam Bhatia. 1988. Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, Routledge: London & New
York.
Sidney Tarrow. 2005. The New Transnational Activism: Cambridge University Press.
Siegel Robert. 25 December 2013. Turkish Leaders Resign In Anti-Graft Probe, Erdogan
Claims Conspiracy: National Public Radio.
Solingen Etel. 1994. "The Political Economy o f Nuclear Restraint." International
Security no. 19(2): 126-69.
Solingen Etel. 2007. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tannenwald Nina, Elbridge, Colbry, Benno, Laggner and Li Bin. 2013. Humanitarian
Dimensions of Nuclear War, Deterrence, and Disarmament. Paper read at Nuclear
Policy Conference, at Washington DC.
Tannenwald Nina. 2008. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use o f
Nuclear Weapons since 1945: Cambridge University Press.
Tape James W. October 2008. "The State-Level Approach: Moving Beyond Integrated
Safeguards." Tokyo INMM ESARDA 1-8.
Ted Greenwood. 1977. The Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, in The Diffusion of
Power: I. Proliferation o f Force, Adelphi Papers, Number: 133, pp. 24-33.
Teixeira Carlos. 2011. Dissertation: The Absent Empire: The United States and the South
American Regional Subsystem, Old Dominion University.

229
The Representative o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran. 19 May 2005. Before NPT 2005
Review Conferences, Main Committee I On Nuclear Disarmament, edited by
Islamic Republic o f Iran.
The Simons Foundation and the International Association o f Lawyers Against Nuclear
Arms. 11 February 2011. Vancouver Declaration: Law's Imperative for the Urgent
Achievement o f a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. Edited by Simons Chairs in
International Law and Human Security at Fraser University. Vancouver, Canada.
The White House. 2006. The National Security Strategy o f the United States o f America.
Washington D.C.
The White House. April 20, 2010. To: Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva-President o f the
Federative Republic o f Brazil. Washington.
Thompson William R. 1973. The Regional Subsystems: A Conceptual Explication and a
Propositional Inventory, International Studies Quarterly, No: 17: 89-117.
Thompson Mark. 28 December 2011. "Can Iran Close the Strait o f Hormuz." Time U.S.
Thompson Mark. 21 June 2013. "Triad and True..." Time U.S.
U.S. Department of State. January 3, 1993. Treaty Between the United States o f America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation o f Strategic
Offensive Arms (START II). Bureau o f Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Turkey: Analysis February 1, 2013.
Available from http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TU.
Ulgen Sinan et al. 2012. Nukleer Enerjiye Geciste Turkiye Modeli—II. In Ekonomi ve Dis
Politika Arastirmalar Merkezi. Istanbul.
Ulgen Sinan. February 2012. "Turkey and the Bomb." Carnegie Endowment fo r
International Peace: The Carnegie Papers.
Unal Beyza, Domenic Vallone, Nic Wondra, Alankrita Sinha, and Sylvain Fanielle. June
2013. Position on the IAEA State-Level Concept. Presentation in Nuclear
Nonproliferation. Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century Course, Brookhaven
National Laboratory, Upton: New York.
United Nations Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles. Accessed from:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter 1. shtm 1

230
United Nations General Assembly NPT Conference. 2010. 2010 Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation o f Nuclear Weapons: Final
Document. Vol. 1.
United Nations General Assembly NPT Conference. 2010. 2010 Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation o f Nuclear Weapons: Final
Document. Vol. 2: 335.
United Nations General Assembly. 4 January 2013. 67/46 Decreasing the Operational
Readiness o f Nuclear Weapons Systems. In A/RES/67/46, edited by United Nations.
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2003. "Status o f Multilateral Arms
Regulation and Disarmament Agreements."
United Nations Security Council. 24 March 2007. Resolution 1747.
United Nations Security Council. 27 December 2006. Resolution 1737.
United Nations Security Council. 9 June 2010. Resolution 1929; United Nations Security
Council. 27 December 2006. Resolution 1737.
United Nations Security Council. 9 June 2010. Resolution 1929.
United States of America. 24 April 2013. Implementing the Treaty on the NonProliferation o f Nuclear Weapons: Peaceful Uses o f Nuclear Energy. Geneva: NPT,
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
Waever Ole. 1993. Securitization and Desecuritization in On Security, Ronnie D.
Lipschultz, (NY: Colombia University Press, 1995: 46-86.
Wallerstein Immanuel. 1976. "The Modem World-System." In The Modem WorldSystem: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins o f the European World-Economy in
the Sixteenth Century, 228-230. New York: Academic Press.
Walt Stephen. 1987. The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Walt, Stephen. 18 March 2013. Why I hope Obama is Bluffing. Foreign Policy.
Waltz Kenneth and Scott Sagan. 2003. The Spread o f Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Renewed, Second Edition, New York: W. W. Norton.
Waltz Kenneth. 2001. Man the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Colombia
University Press.

231
Waltz Kenneth. 1981. The Spread o f Nuclear Weapons: More May Better, Adelphi
Papers, Number 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Waltz Kenneth. 1988. The Origins o f War in Neorealist Theory, Journal o f
Interdisciplinary History, 18:4 pp. 615-628.
Waltz Kenneth. 1979. Theory o f International Politics: McGraw-Hill.
Wendt Alexander. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,
International Organization, No. 41:3.
Wendt Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make o f It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics, International Organization, No: 46.
Wendt Alexander. 1994. Social Theory o f International Politics, Cambridge University
Press: New York.
Wendt Alexander. 1999. Social Theory o f International Politics, Cambridge University
Press: New York.
Wentz B. W. 1968. Nuclear Proliferation. Washington: Public Affairs Press.
Wolfsthal Jon B. Jeffrey Lewis and Marc Quint. January 2014. "The Trillion Dollar
Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization Over the Next Thirty Years."
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Woods Matthew. Spring 2004. "Inventing Proliferation: The Creation and Preservation o f
the Inevitable Spread o f Nuclear Weapons." The Review of International Affairs
no. 3 (3): 418.
Xinwen Zhongguo. 25 Aralik 2013. "Turkiye'nin Savunma Butcesi Artti." T.C.
Basbakanlik
Basin
Yayin
ve
Enformasyon Genel
Mudurlugu.

232
VITA

Beyza Unal
7045 Batten Arts and Letters
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA, 23529

Beyza Unal is a William J. Fulbright Scholar from Turkey. She received her
Master’s degree from Bilkent University. At Old Dominion University (ODU), Beyza
teaches two undergraduate level courses: Introduction to International Politics, Politics o f
the Middle East. She is recognized as the NATO ACT Future Leader and attended 2014
NATO Wales Summit through Atlantic Council. She is also fellow o f NATO School of
Azerbaijan, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Monterey Institute o f International Studies.
She has worked as an intern in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Command
Transformation and published several op-eds during her studies at ODU.

EDUCATION
Ph.D.

International Studies, Old Dominion University, VA, 2014

M.A.

International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2010

B.A.

Political Science & International Relations, Cankaya University,
Ankara, 2007

